LiveLibs is an SDK that you can use in your apps. It allows you to have automatically updating code written in JavaScript. And yes, it'll even pass Marketplace approval. For more info, go here:
LiveLibs.com
Alpha 2 changes:
- Completely changed over from IronRuby to Jurassic (JavaScript) engine
- Improved security (hints and libraries are signed; lib.xml contains more verification data)
(Reserved)
Even though I do respect all the effort you may have put in this project, I'm still not too sure about it. As we've already seen and learned from Android and even iOS there's always the risk of a misuse of such an updating method as unauthorized code can be injected. I rather wait for updates to pass the official certification ways than let my apps update on their own and not knowing what exactly was downloaded.
You are right. With alpha 1 there is a risk of a MitM attack causing apps to download something they shouldn't. However, the framework is already in place to mitigate that - I just haven't had time to implement it fully.
All library ZIP files are signed on the server side with the LiveLibs private key, and the signature is checked by the SDK upon download. Starting with alpha 2, hints will also be signed, which will ensure that erroneous updates are never downloaded.
Also, you don't have to trust the LiveLibs.com site to do the updating. The SDK lets you specify alternate URLs for hints and for libraries.
Just stumbled across this link from your sig. Very cool idea. However, I want to know: have you tested it on a developer-locked phone? Dev-unlock allows the phone to execute code that doesn't have a Microsoft signature (Marketplace apps receive this on all DLLs) but user-replaced or self-compiled binaries won't have that signature. I don't know exactly how your libs worked, but from the look of things (based on your choice of languages) you're looking at monkey-patching the code in place. That's a cool idea, and may well get through Marketplace ingestion, but as soon as the patching is used, you'll have a file without a valid Marketplace signature, and the app won't run anymore...
At least, that's my guess on what would happen. If you can get around that, it would be incredible. That would provide a way to run homebrew code on dev-locked Windows Phones...
The way it worked with IronRuby is the Ruby code was interpreted on the fly. With Jurassic, the JavaScript is compiled into anonymous classes (IIRC from docs/forums on Jurassic.codeplex.com) and executed w/o ever creating separate assemblies. In other words, there's no monkey patching - just live emitted code via Reflection.Emit and similar methods. I'm in the process of getting alpha 2 ready for release now, actually.
Hmm, it's sounds quite interesting! However it's not a way to get an interop-unlock. Also (from the marketing side) it has another cons: an official updates via marketplace for some reasons are increasing number of app customers/downloads (so, good idea - if you have ads-based app - to publish updates at least monthly) but silent, "self-update" I afraid will not.
There's no reason to stop doing proper Marketplace-based updates. The biggest benefit of LiveLibs is the ability to quickly crush bugs instead of having to wait for Marketplace approval while your users complain and give your app bad ratings because of some simple bug.
Arktronic said:
There's no reason to stop doing proper Marketplace-based updates. The biggest benefit of LiveLibs is the ability to quickly crush bugs instead of having to wait for Marketplace approval while your users complain and give your app bad ratings because of some simple bug.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Agree. But your code also may have a bugs so it's still not an easy decision: should I add that app's overhead or better to spend more time/money for beta-testing
That, my friend, is entirely up to you
LiveLibs alpha 2 is out. Also, here's a little demo app I wrote using LiveLibs: Rando!
Some of us use Textsecure as replacement for Stock SMS app. Textsecure provides encryption for your SMS. However, my recommendation is: stay away or at least don't update to 2.X... versions.
The developer has introduced Google Cloud Messaging, which means that even if your sms are secure, the fact you are using the app will be recorded in Google Centralized database. In addition, he removed the ability of the user to regenerate new identity key. In last couple of releases, he forced the user to allow the app to contact the internet (otherwise, the app would crash). That is even if you compile the app from sources, which I did a couple of hours ago. If you download the app from Store, you can't even use it without Google account and GSF, the latter will record your every keystroke including the password used to encrypt the messages. In further addition, the app is only available through Googleplay and the developer is actively resisting third party distribution. If that is not enough, you should know that Whisper systems is owned by Twitter, which is a red flag in of itself. The code is growing larger and is more difficult to examine for back door purposes.
My advice: stay away from this development, which in my view is compromised...
Edit. In January of this year, the developer left Twitter. Interestingly, he is still working on Textsecure and it is published under Whisper, which is Twitter. About the same time, all those things described above started to happen. Also interesting is that the developer was put on federal watch list and was continuously harrased by various agencies when flying. So, I wouldn't be surprised to learn that his new employer is the previous harraser...
All more reasons to stay away from this app.
optimumpro said:
Some of us use Textsecure as replacement for Stock SMS app. Textsecure provides encryption for your SMS. However, my recommendation is: stay away or at least don't update to 2.X... versions.
The developer has introduced Google Cloud Messaging, which means that even if your sms are secure, the fact you are using the app will be recorded in Google Centralized database. In addition, he removed the ability of the user to regenerate new identity key. In last couple of releases, he forced the user to allow the app to contact the internet (otherwise, the app would crash). That is even if you compile the app from sources, which I did a couple of hours ago. If you download the app from Store, you can't even use it without Google account and GSF, the latter will record your every keystroke including the password used to encrypt the messages. In further addition, the app is only available through Googleplay and the developer is actively resisting third party distribution. If that is not enough, you should know that Whisper systems is owned by Twitter, which is a red flag in of itself. The code is growing larger and is more difficult to examine for back door purposes.
My advice: stay away from this development, which in my view is compromised...
Edit. In January of this year, the developer left Twitter. Interestingly, he is still working on Textsecure and it is published under Whisper, which is Twitter. About the same time, all those things described above started to happen. Also interesting is that the developer was put on federal watch list and was continuously harrased by various agencies when flying. So, I wouldn't be surprised to learn that his new employer is the previous harraser...
All more reasons to stay away from this app.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
And here is some more fresh evidence. Today I posted this info on Cyanogen site related to Textsecure Push for CM.
http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/whisperpush-secure-messaging-integration
The site says it is neither censored no monitored. Within 5 minutes, the post has disappeared... . So, stay away from this app as the development has been compromised. In my view, of course...
You have no clue what youre talking about.
Corndude said:
You have no clue what youre talking about.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Thanks, pal... for a very, very thorough, thoughtful and factual argument.
Edit: by the way, what does no gapps project have to do with textsecure being compromised?
Thanks for the heads up. Something is really amiss, and I won't want to directly experience it. I'm staying away from TextSecure for sure.
abdelazeez said:
Thanks for the heads up. Something is really amiss, and I won't want to directly experience it. I'm staying away from TextSecure for sure.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Most messenger apps today work with Google Push Notifications, seems to be no problem for people there. Funny that it is here. As for SMS, I would never use that through another app. Besides, the phone carrier companies save those probably too, whats so different with that you said ? Text Secure is a very nice app I think. Right now people on iOS don't have that app yet, which makes it hard to establish in mixed system userbases among people. But I hope that will change.
Besides, most people here probably use Twitter. Funny to complain about something that might be related to Twitter then, isn't it ?
Wolfseye
wpkwolfseye said:
Most messenger apps today work with Google Push Notifications, seems to be no problem for people there. Funny that it is here. As for SMS, I would never use that through another app. Besides, the phone carrier companies save those probably too, whats so different with that you said ? Text Secure is a very nice app I think. Right now people on iOS don't have that app yet, which makes it hard to establish in mixed system userbases among people. But I hope that will change.
Besides, most people here probably use Twitter. Funny to complain about something that might be related to Twitter then, isn't it ?
Wolfseye
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
The difference is that Textsecure/Whisperpush/CMpush tell you your SMS are encrypted. If they are indeed encrypted and there are no backdoors, your carrier (and others) can only get encrypted SMS (good luck to them trying to decipher). All other SMS apps are in plain text. In my view earlier versions of Textsecure are indeed secure. Starting from version 2.X, we no longer know that considering all the facts I mentioned in the OP.
You should really get your facts straight. Twitter bought Whisper Systems in 2011, mainly to get Moxie and the other Whisper Systems folks to work for them.
Moxie went on to lead Twitters security team. Twitter allowed them a month or so after they aquired Whisper Systems to open source their apps TextSecure and RedPhone. In January 2013 Moxie left Twitter and started Open Whisper Systems with a few others. They took the newly open sourced apps and developed them further.
This is also covered in their FAQ.
You can see all of their code on GitHub.
And if you don't have GAPPS installed, you will simply get a message that you won't be able to use push messages and that's it. Several friends of mine use it for SMS only, with Xprivacy restricting the internet access. It doesn't crash or anything.
If you experience this, you may either have a problem with your build or it's a bug specific to your device/Android version.
Moxie also wrote exactly why he doesn't want TextSecure to be released via F-Droid: for security reasons. They use central signing, which may very well compromise the update channel.
The whole discussion can be found in the most infamous thread in their GitHub: #127
lindworm said:
You should really get your facts straight. Twitter bought Whisper Systems in 2011, mainly to get Moxie and the other Whisper Systems folks to work for them.
Moxie went on to lead Twitters security team. Twitter allowed them a month or so after they aquired Whisper Systems to open source their apps TextSecure and RedPhone. In January 2013 Moxie left Twitter and started Open Whisper Systems with a few others. They took the newly open sourced apps and developed them further.
This is also covered ir FAQ.
You can see all of their code on GitHub.
And if you don't have GAPPS installed, you will simply get a message that you won't be able to use push messages and that's it. Several friends of mine use it for SMS only, with Xprivacy restricting the internet access. It doesn't crash or anything.
If you experience this, you may either have a problem with your build or it's a bug specific to your device/Android version.
Moxie also wrote exactly why he doesn't want TextSecure to be released via F-Droid: for security reasons. They use central signing, which may very well compromise the update channel.
The whole discussion can be found in the most infamous thread in their GitHub: #127
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Which fact did I not get straight? You can't get the app anywhere other than from Googleplay and for Googleplay you need GSF, which records your every keystroke. And by the way, try to restrict getnetworkinfo in internet settings in Xprivacy and the app will crash as soon as you try to open a conversation (checked on several devices). And why was it necessary to prevent users from generating new identity key? Why not have an app available on Whisper's github, as many devs do. And by the way, I asked the same questions on github and f-droid threads and in response got a suggestion to build an equivalent of Google's GCM, so then Moxie would stop using Google.
optimumpro said:
Which fact did I not get straight? You can't get the app anywhere other than from Googleplay and for Googleplay you need GSF, which records your every keystroke. And by the way, try to restrict getnetworkinfo in internet settings in Xprivacy and the app will crash as soon as you try to open a conversation (checked on several devices). And why was it necessary to prevent users from generating new identity key? Why not have an app available on Whisper's github, as many devs do. And by the way, I asked the same questions on github and f-droid threads and in response got a suggestion to build an equivalent of Google's GCM, so then Moxie would stop using Google.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
You are not even trying to learn/understand why things are done the way they are done, but instead chose to blast an open source project by a security expert who has spoken at defcon various times and who is on a national security list and gets severely hassled by the TSA every time he tries to travel because of his involvement with secure communication projects.
You don't show the slightest form of objectiveness either. The truth content of what you are writing varies between "flat out wrong" and "there is a reason for how they do it that way, which you either didn't care to research or willingly ignored".
1. You can sideload the apk either from http://apps.evozi.com/apk-downloader/ or any of the dozens of sites that mirror packages from the app store.
They do not provide apks because it is a security risk: there is no automated upgrade channel from where a user can get a new version which may fix serious security flaws.
Everybody who is able to compile from source however should understand the importance of updating regularly and can do so on his/her own.
Moxie stated all of that in the github ticket I linked to.
2. GSF doesn't record your keystrokes.
3. If you had bothered to look it up, getNetworkInfo returns if a certain interface (like wifi) is used for internet.
This leaks no interesting information whatsoever. And it especially doesn't mean that TextSecure doesn't work without internet, because this permission does not give an app internet access. Xprivacy actually expects this behaviour by apps, that's why those fields are by default not restricted even if you restrict internet access of an app.
The program crashes without this, because it expects to get a needed value returned, which you chose to block. This is not something they willingly built in, to stop you from using it without Google Play.
If you can't manage the complexity of the permissions, you should use a simple firewall like AFwall+ to restrict internet access.
4. This was probably removed because it doesn't add any significant security and adds clutter to the user interface, because average users have no idea what it's for. The identity keys you are talking about are long term identity keys. TextSecure uses different keys in every message and actually uses the most secure protocol I know of. It has excellent forward secrecy, future secrecy and deniability. More so than OTR, which it is derived from.
You can learn more about that in their blog:
https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting/
5. You asked them to not use the only free world wide push network that has contracts with all major providers to not kill idle TCP connections.
Moxie always answered that they would love to use something else, but none exists. And that they don't have the resources to build a push network themselves.
This is all in the comments to https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-new-textsecure/ and on ycombinator:
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfxhm?context=3
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfrv0?context=3
They are however working on using emails as identifiers and websockets as an alternative to GCM. Websockets are already implemented on the server side and people are working on the client side.
Right now you can use encrypted SMS without GCM, no problem at all. If you want to use it over the internet, you can help to speed up the websocket development:
https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/issues/1000
lindworm said:
You are not even trying to learn/understand why things are done the way they are done, but instead chose to blast an open source project by a security expert who has spoken at defcon various times and who is on a national security list and gets severely hassled by the TSA every time he tries to travel because of his involvement with secure communication projects.
You don't show the slightest form of objectiveness either. The truth content of what you are writing varies between "flat out wrong" and "there is a reason for how they do it that way, which you either didn't care to research or willingly ignored".
1. You can sideload the apk either from http://apps.evozi.com/apk-downloader/ or any of the dozens of sites that mirror packages from the app store.
They do not provide apks because it is a security risk: there is no automated upgrade channel from where a user can get a new version which may fix serious security flaws.
Everybody who is able to compile from source however should understand the importance of updating regularly and can do so on his/her own.
Moxie stated all of that in the github ticket I linked to.
2. GSF doesn't record your keystrokes.
3. If you had bothered to look it up, getNetworkInfo returns if a certain interface (like wifi) is used for internet.
This leaks no interesting information whatsoever. And it especially doesn't mean that TextSecure doesn't work without internet, because this permission does not give an app internet access. Xprivacy actually expects this behaviour by apps, that's why those fields are by default not restricted even if you restrict internet access of an app.
The program crashes without this, because it expects to get a needed value returned, which you chose to block. This is not something they willingly built in, to stop you from using it without Google Play.
If you can't manage the complexity of the permissions, you should use a simple firewall like AFwall+ to restrict internet access.
4. This was probably removed because it doesn't add any significant security and adds clutter to the user interface, because average users have no idea what it's for. The identity keys you are talking about are long term identity keys. TextSecure uses different keys in every message and actually uses the most secure protocol I know of. It has excellent forward secrecy, future secrecy and deniability. More so than OTR, which it is derived from.
You can learn more about that in their blog:
https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting/
5. You asked them to not use the only free world wide push network that has contracts with all major providers to not kill idle TCP connections.
Moxie always answered that they would love to use something else, but none exists. And that they don't have the resources to build a push network themselves.
This is all in the comments to https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-new-textsecure/ and on ycombinator:
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfxhm?context=3
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfrv0?context=3
They are however working on using emails as identifiers and websockets as an alternative to GCM. Websockets are already implemented on the server side and people are working on the client side.
Right now you can use encrypted SMS without GCM, no problem at all. If you want to use it over the internet, you can help to speed up the websocket development:
https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/issues/1000
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Your original statement was that I got my facts wrong. Since you have not cited any instance where I came up with a wrong fact, I will address your opinions.
Number one: you say GSF does not record keystrokes. How do you know? Have you seen the source (which is closed)? If you did, you work for Google and then everything you say is propaganda that has zero factual value. If you don't, then you are just speculating. You pick whichever is worse. If you use Google proprietary blobs, your device is totally open and there is no security measure/app on earth that is effective against this. That GSF phones home at regular intervals and transmits data there is a known fact. You can use encryption from Mars and yet it won't work because raw data (before encryption) is open to Google. As another user noted, having GSF and other closed source apps is like having a lock installed on your house door and not knowing who has access to it besides you.
Number two: inability to generate new identity key: It was there for a reason, the same way PGP or GPG keys have the ability to be limited in time, revoked or regenerated. It is a good security standard and removing it represents weakening. Clutter? LOL. A regular user wouldn't even be able to find it. Certainly, it does not pop up anywhere, one has to find it.
Number three: Sideload or compiling: a regular user will do neither, he/she will simply download the app from the market, which means he has to have Google blobs. Or you are suggesting that users should download the app from the market and then remove GSF and other Googleapps? LOL again.
As I said earlier, Moxie's argument that allowing third party apps on your device is a greater security risk than having closed source blobs is wrong and grand BS (especially coming from someone who is considered a security expert). It is security through obscurity, which is no security at all. The value of his open source project is completely defeated by having closed source blobs by a known private branch of known three letter agencies.
Now, these are facts. Let's get to opinions. I think that this deliberate weakening of security (again coming from a security expert) is a strong indication that development and/or developer has been compromised. And that is why I recommend to stay away from this app. But that is just my opinion, which is nonetheless based on facts.
optimumpro said:
Your original statement was that I got my facts wrong. Since you have not cited any instance where I came up with a wrong fact, I will address your opinions.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Do you even read what I write?
If that is not enough, you should know that Whisper systems is owned by Twitter, which is a red flag in of itself.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
As I explained he does now work there any more.
You seem to have noticed that too:
Edit. In January of this year, the developer left Twitter. Interestingly, he is still working on Textsecure and it is published under Whisper, which is Twitter.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Are you kidding me? How the flying **** did you get to this conclusion? The company that was bought by twitter was Whisper Systems.
They are publishing the new source under Open Whisper Systems. (none of those was ever called Whisper)
See the difference? They also state this here: http://support.whispersystems.org/customer/portal/articles/1474591-is-textsecure-owned-by-twitter-
And here is some more fresh evidence. Today I posted this info on Cyanogen site related to Textsecure Push for CM.
http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/whis...ng-integration
The site says it is neither censored no monitored. Within 5 minutes, the post has disappeared... . So, stay away from this app as the development has been compromised. In my view, of course...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
So you are saying CyanogenMod is part of this grand conspiracy of yours? Come on...
GSF, which records your every keystroke.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Number one: you say GSF does not record keystrokes. How do you know? Have you seen the source (which is closed)? If you did, you work for Google and then everything you say is propaganda that has zero factual value. If you don't, then you are just speculating. You pick whichever is worse. If you use Google proprietary blobs, your device is totally open and there is no security measure/app on earth that is effective against this. That GSF phones home at regular intervals and transmits data there is a known fact. You can use encryption from Mars and yet it won't work because raw data (before encryption) is open to Google. As another user noted, having GSF and other closed source apps is like having a lock installed on your house door and not knowing who has access to it besides you.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's a binary blob and it sends data to google, but you have no proof whatsoever if it records keystrokes. You can know if you want to tough. Decompile it and analyze it. I don't like binary blobs, but you can't just say they do something without having any proof. I may not be able to guarantee that they don't do something, because I have not personally decompiled and analyzed every bit of it, but until you have and have proof that it does do something you can't just claim it does.
Number two: inability to generate new identity key: It was there for a reason, the same way PGP or GPG keys have the ability to be limited in time, revoked or regenerated. It is a good security standard and removing it represents weakening. Clutter? LOL. A regular user wouldn't even be able to find it. Certainly, it does not pop up anywhere, one has to find it.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It is not something the average user should have access to, for several reasons. The TextSecure V2 protocol is NOT comparable with PGP/GPG because it has forward secrecy and deniability. The keys that are actually used to encrypt a message are not static as with PGP.
They are derived from the original keys and are changed with every message. No need to change them after X days/months/years.
Even if one key is intercepted, you would only be able to decrypt one message and not every message as it is the case with PGP.
If you get a new key, all your contacts get alerts that your key changed and that somebody may be listening in. That's not something the average user should be exposed to. If you think for whatever reason that you really want to do this, back up your conversations, uninstall TextSecure, install it again, import the backup and you have your new key.
Number three: Sideload or compiling: a regular user will do neither, he/she will simply download the app from the market, which means he has to have Google blobs. Or you are suggesting that users should download the app from the market and then remove GSF and other Googleapps? LOL again.
As I said earlier, Moxie's argument that allowing third party apps on your device is a greater security risk than having closed source blobs is wrong and grand BS (especially coming from someone who is considered a security expert). It is security through obscurity, which is no security at all. The value of his open source project is completely defeated by having closed source blobs by a known private branch of known three letter agencies.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Every average user has the google blobs, because they are preinstalled on nearly every phone and it's nearly unusable without them. This app is supposed to make encryption available to the masses.
Google may be undermined by your beloved three letter agencies, but it's not one of them. This is not to hide from them.
You have your threat model wrong.
No app alone can ever protect you from those agencies. They have hundreds of 0days for every platform and will simply own your Android, open source or not.
And this is not what TextSecure tries to do. They protect the content of every conversation with extremely strong encryption, no matter what the transport is. This does protect you from dragnet surveillance. But they can not protect you from someone who targets you and is willing to spend hundreds of thousands or millions to break into your operating systems.
If the NSA really wants you they get you, period. But TextSecure protects you from theives, cyber criminals and nearly everybody else who wants to read your messages.
You say you think the encrypted SMS mode was safe? With this your provider (and thus your government and every agency that wants it) has all the metadata. Who sent something to whom etc.
Google on the other hand has actually LESS meta data, because your phone sends the message to the TextSecure server, which relays the message to GCM. GCM then delivers the message. Because everything is encrypted none of the servers get contact data. But google only gets the receiver, not the sender. Your provider gets everything.
A global passive adversary may still do time corellation attacks, by listening who sends something when and who receives something at this time. After some sessions it's pretty clear who is talking to whom. It doesn't matter if Google is evil or not in this case. They get the metadata if they want to.
If you want protection against something like this take a look at pond, or meet i person: https://github.com/agl/pond
Now, these are facts. Let's get to opinions. I think that this deliberate weakening of security (again coming from a security expert) is a strong indication that development and/or developer has been compromised. And that is why I recommend to stay away from this app. But that is just my opinion, which is nonetheless based on facts.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
As I explained there is no weakening whatsoever. Even if you consider google the adversary, they get less meta data than your SMS provider.
You can use this exactly as before without the google blobs if you want to.
They are actively working on a way to get away from the play store and GCM by building their own distribution method (which is finished, but not yet released, see #127 in their github) and implementing Websockets (server works, client is on the way).
Before you start slamming something you should really understand how it works, or ask if you understood it correctly.
lindworm said:
Do you even read what I write?
As I explained he does now work there any more.
You seem to have noticed that too:
Are you kidding me? How the flying **** did you get to this conclusion? The company that was bought by twitter was Whisper Systems.
They are publishing the new source under Open Whisper Systems. (none of those was ever called Whisper)
See the difference? They also state this here: http://support.whispersystems.org/customer/portal/articles/1474591-is-textsecure-owned-by-twitter-
So you are saying CyanogenMod is part of this grand conspiracy of yours? Come on...
It's a binary blob and it sends data to google, but you have no proof whatsoever if it records keystrokes. You can know if you want to tough. Decompile it and analyze it. I don't like binary blobs, but you can't just say they do something without having any proof. I may not be able to guarantee that they don't do something, because I have not personally decompiled and analyzed every bit of it, but until you have and have proof that it does do something you can't just claim it does.
It is not something the average user should have access to, for several reasons. The TextSecure V2 protocol is NOT comparable with PGP/GPG because it has forward secrecy and deniability. The keys that are actually used to encrypt a message are not static as with PGP.
They are derived from the original keys and are changed with every message. No need to change them after X days/months/years.
Even if one key is intercepted, you would only be able to decrypt one message and not every message as it is the case with PGP.
If you get a new key, all your contacts get alerts that your key changed and that somebody may be listening in. That's not something the average user should be exposed to. If you think for whatever reason that you really want to do this, back up your conversations, uninstall TextSecure, install it again, import the backup and you have your new key.
Every average user has the google blobs, because they are preinstalled on nearly every phone and it's nearly unusable without them. This app is supposed to make encryption available to the masses.
Google may be undermined by your beloved three letter agencies, but it's not one of them. This is not to hide from them.
You have your threat model wrong.
No app alone can ever protect you from those agencies. They have hundreds of 0days for every platform and will simply own your Android, open source or not.
And this is not what TextSecure tries to do. They protect the content of every conversation with extremely strong encryption, no matter what the transport is. This does protect you from dragnet surveillance. But they can not protect you from someone who targets you and is willing to spend hundreds of thousands or millions to break into your operating systems.
If the NSA really wants you they get you, period. But TextSecure protects you from theives, cyber criminals and nearly everybody else who wants to read your messages.
You say you think the encrypted SMS mode was safe? With this your provider (and thus your government and every agency that wants it) has all the metadata. Who sent something to whom etc.
Google on the other hand has actually LESS meta data, because your phone sends the message to the TextSecure server, which relays the message to GCM. GCM then delivers the message. Because everything is encrypted none of the servers get contact data. But google only gets the receiver, not the sender. Your provider gets everything.
A global passive adversary may still do time corellation attacks, by listening who sends something when and who receives something at this time. After some sessions it's pretty clear who is talking to whom. It doesn't matter if Google is evil or not in this case. They get the metadata if they want to.
If you want protection against something like this take a look at pond, or meet i person: https://github.com/agl/pond
As I explained there is no weakening whatsoever. Even if you consider google the adversary, they get less meta data than your SMS provider.
You can use this exactly as before without the google blobs if you want to.
They are actively working on a way to get away from the play store and GCM by building their own distribution method (which is finished, but not yet released, see #127 in their github) and implementing Websockets (server works, client is on the way).
Before you start slamming something you should really understand how it works, or ask if you understood it correctly.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
"Decompile GSF"
You are kidding. Aren't you? If one can examine closed source the same way as open one, then all problems would be solved. And by the way, there would be no point in having proprietary software. Would it? Of course Java is easier to reverse engineer, but want to try Oracle's java?
"Google" Google has root access to your device: It can pull/install any application without you noticing it. They can install another version of TextSecure with backdoors. They can do whatever they want or told to. So, if you have Google, there is no point in any security at all. And when a developer forces users to have Google for his app to work, that's no security at all.
Cyanogenmode/Conspiracy? There is no conspiracy. The US has a law that requires providers to have back doors in their software/hardware for law enforcement, and there are wild claims (by those who know (and don't) what they are talking about) of TextSecure as "weapon" against this kind of surveillance. And that is pure bull. All that the app can provide is the false sense of security, while in reality making users more transparent to surveillance.
Phone service providers vs. internet: when you use Textsecure as a pure sms app, your provider gets gibberish, but they have no way of knowing what you are using. With GCM/GSF/Googleplay, they know exactly what you are doing, as you are marked as using this particular app. So, Moxie is making life of "survaillors" much easier.
Thanks for telling me to uninstall the app if I want to generate new key. So, if I do it this way, you think my contacts won't receive a message that my key has changed?
Here is how I began to suspect foul play: First I noticed the app wanted access to the internet, then I discovered that I can no longer generate a new key, then I went to read about F-droid/Whisper problems. Then I read that he wants the app be available through Google only, because he cares about security and does not want users to allow third party apps (BS). Then I read about feds harassment. You think the 3 letter agencies wouldn't like to have him?
In my view, Moxie's arguments no longer make sense. And by the way, when he is against the wall, he tells you to create a world wide push service - alternative to GCM. LOL.
For me that's enough to stay away from the app. Others will decide accordingly...
Does anybody work on an alternativ push service in order to replace hard requirement on Google services for TextSecure, Redphone and lots of other useful apps?
I understand that GAPPS are needed to run textsecure.
Is it possible/ has anyone succeed to get it to run with the no GAPPS apps such as the blank store etc or is the app relying too much on google infrastructure?
i can use textsecure sms without internet. besides registering with push is not mandatory at all so the crash you've experienced must be a bug in the version of textsecure you're using. also why compare it to pgp/gpg? textsecure uses otr with improvements to deniability and forward secrecy. also textsecure supports mms (which uses internet).
if you're really that paranoid, avoid android at all and stop spreading FUD claiming it to be fact. i don't find the statement factual at all. it lacks any evidence (show us the code with the backdoor first).
and also avoid openguardian project too as they conspire with textsecure since they are recommending it.
and by the way, whisper and openwhisper are different.
It really is ashamed when misinformed people comment on things they do not have enough information to intelligently speak about. Especially when it discourages people from using an application that is one of the only current means of communicating over SMS in a secure manner. Is it perfect? Certainly not... Security and encryption are never perfect, and there will always be flaws to be found, but to insist that someone such as Moxie Marlinspike is somehow working against the security researcher community in some undercover role as an agent of the government or some corrupt company is really insulting. If you have some absolute proof, or even a reasonable solid suspicion, please share it, but otherwise do not taint these incredible people with false accusations. Learn a bit about encryption, reverse engineering, and packet inspection, and then come back and give an intelligent analysis of your findings of the application you suspect to be playing some nefarious role. Until then, your accusations are completely unfounded and damaging to the community as a whole. There are many people who have worked hard to make this product a reality, and I believe they should be praised for their efforts. Obviously these are my own opinions, and you are free to dismiss them outright as you have done to others in previous posts. In addition, I realize I am not an active member of the xda community, but I am an active member of the security/reverse engineering community. My job and nearly all of my free time is spent reverse engineering software and I see no basis for your accusations.
Here is more update on Textsecure: there was a major vulnerability found last October-November. And Moxie's response (not surprisingly) - fixing "feels pretty cumbersome" and "I dunno."
Also, Open Whisper is now accepted into the family of such a bastion of privacy, as Facebook (kids love it, NSA approves). So, If you had any doubt about this app before, now you can sleep well at night (sarcasm).
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/001029.html
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/001030.html
To those who like to attack the messenger ( I call them Google thugs or pacifier babies). One says decompile GSF, the other - false accusations and absolute proof?! Wake up and get the pacifier out of your mouth. There is no such thing in real life. I give you the dots, you can't connect them with the pacifier in your mouth.
Here is some more damning evidence that Textsecure is a totally compromised project no longer to be trusted: during 2013-2014 Open Whisper Systems received over $1.3 mln from BBG, which is an arm of US Government and its 3-letter-agencies.
http://pando.com/2015/03/01/internet-privacy-funded-by-spooks-a-brief-history-of-the-bbg/
So, Moxie, it appears, has turned from someone who was harrased by TSA in airports (presumably for a failure to cooperate with the government) to a receipient of major funds from the same government. I am not even talking about him getting a once in a life-time project to work on "securing" Facebook's What's up application. Pitty and shame...
Replacement for Textsecure
Here is a pure sms app, which replaces compromised Textsecure, as well as stock messaging. There is no over the internet messaging, no google binaries and no Google Services Framewor all closed sourse. In addition, starting from version 2.7, textsecure no longer encrypts SMS. Pitty.
Here is the latest version: http://forum.xda-developers.com/android/apps-games/sms-secure-aes-256-t3065165
Need some feedback from the community. What the title says. I can download Hulu on Windows 11/10 (desktop computer with unlocked processor and root permissions of the OS) and watch everything through my account but with Android P6P rooted, it's a PAIN IN THE ASS to watch hulu through the app.
I just don't understand the logic here. Can someone explain the difference?
rester555 said:
Need some feedback from the community. What the title says. I can download Hulu on Windows 11/10 (desktop computer with unlocked processor and root permissions of the OS) and watch everything through my account but with Android P6P rooted, it's a PAIN IN THE ASS to watch hulu through the app.
I just don't understand the logic here. Can someone explain the difference?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
They are different things. I am not an expert but I know that android is linux based and windows isn't. There are different techniques used to display things, get root access, use the internet/apps etc. Also, the processor comes unlocked and it is meant to be that way unlike the phone which comes locked.
stelmilt said:
They are different things. I am not an expert but I know that android is linux based and windows isn't. There are different techniques used to display things, get root access, use the internet/apps etc. Also, the processor comes unlocked and it is meant to be that way unlike the phone which comes locked.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Fair point, my computer comes with an unlocked processor, but the phone comes with an unlockable bootloader, but that's a pretty weak argument with over the top restrictions from these vendors. It seems like they all have a vision in the future and that's everything behind a server wall in the future I bet and you are just a dumb terminal with a data pipe.
I guess another side point is how do you check which level of widevine you have? If memory serves me, on A13 if you don't have the proper level apps don't show movies like Hulu. Has this been solved for A13 on P6P?
Further review of doing identity check, I am getting an HDCP disconnected error when using hulu. Seems like the Hulu apk is looking for HDCP connect status.
Yep, Windows is a very different animal. Even with UAC (User Account Control) that has existed since Windows Vista, the main account of a Windows PC is still an Admin and effectively has root control. You can store Word documents in the Windows\System32\Drivers subfolder if you want. This kind of thing happens by accident all the time. It's pretty crazy, really.
I think even "Standard" (non-Admin) Windows accounts have far greater permissions than they would for some aspects they would on a Linux-based device. I think Standard users can still store things in the wrong places, but probably not as many wrong places, and they can't access other users' folders.
In the end, streaming services operating on a Windows PC have to operate without as strict conditions because the computer is already "rooted" as it comes from the manufacturer.
rester555 said:
Need some feedback from the community. What the title says. I can download Hulu on Windows 11/10 (desktop computer with unlocked processor and root permissions of the OS) and watch everything through my account but with Android P6P rooted, it's a PAIN IN THE ASS to watch hulu through the app.
I just don't understand the logic here. Can someone explain the difference?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
There is ZERO difference, except EXPECTATION.
Because the software vendor CANNOT expect any desktop/laptop to not provide elevated privileges on demand, but STUPID FRIKKIN GOOBLE built it with these fundamental restrictions in as expectation.
I have hulu bought, but I can't watch it, so I ended up getting a modded apk
tl;dr; because android and Linux are open source
Whenever the app is starting either in windows or android, the only thing it can reach out it's an operating system. The app has almost no privileges over the OS while the OS has ALL over the app. Since the app wants to work with its own data that shouldn't be leaked, the app somehow must ensure it can trust the highly privileged OS before it brings the data into it. How an app can ensure? Well, with certain assumptions it can.
Windows is a proprietary OS with proprietary drivers. All drivers and critical binaries in the OS are passing Microsoft's signing to ensure they aren't modified and their developers are known. OS and drivers are all binaries which makes them hard to be modified or at least such modification would require abnormal resources like expertise, time, money, and knowledge. Windows passes different certifications, security audits, and under permanent attention from security researches. Such things as audits are trying to ensure the OS applies all available security measures and is using available hardware to protect the system and apps from intrusion/modification, thus enterprises trust it. Considering the all above, you, as an app developer, can easily assume: I can trust Windows as its binaries can be hardly modified as it leverages hardware to secure everything, so whenever our app will ask the OS to provide a hardware protected storage for the data, the app will get it.
The all above applies to the stock Android as well, and apps trust such systems. The only difference here is that app developers know that Android and Linux kernel are open source and anyone can modify them and flash into the phone. Now, how an app can ensure it runs on the OS that can be trusted? The app can do that by checking whether the OS is rooted or not. If it's rooted, the OS is certainly somehow modified. The app's devs are assuming that highly privileged modified OS can fake/emulate secure storage and steal the app's data from the less privileged app.
If you wish here is an analogy: Windows is a Ritz Hotel and Android is AirBnB. While they are serving the same purpose: host you as a guest, they are different, and you'll deal with them differently as a guest. Ritz has reputation, a license to run a business, and no one can fake a Ritz hotel. When you stop in a Ritz hotel, you can 100% be sure you can trust it and there are no hidden cameras in rooms as well as you can expect a decent service. Absolutely different story with AirBnB. In AirBnB everyone can be a host, and this brings a problem with a trust to a random person. Once you stop in Airbnb apartments, you highly likely will try to find a hidden camera to understand whether you can trust the host or not.
PS: as per my knowledge, some banking apps aren't running on rooted phones due to same reasons
burned-donut said:
tl;dr; because android and Linux are open source
Whenever the app is starting either in windows or android, the only thing it can reach out it's an operating system. The app has almost no privileges over the OS while the OS has ALL over the app. Since the app wants to work with its own data that shouldn't be leaked, the app somehow must ensure it can trust the highly privileged OS before it brings the data into it. How an app can ensure? Well, with certain assumptions it can.
Windows is a proprietary OS with proprietary drivers. All drivers and critical binaries in the OS are passing Microsoft's signing to ensure they aren't modified and their developers are known. OS and drivers are all binaries which makes them hard to be modified or at least such modification would require abnormal resources like expertise, time, money, and knowledge. Windows passes different certifications, security audits, and under permanent attention from security researches. Such things as audits are trying to ensure the OS applies all available security measures and is using available hardware to protect the system and apps from intrusion/modification, thus enterprises trust it. Considering the all above, you, as an app developer, can easily assume: I can trust Windows as its binaries can be hardly modified as it leverages hardware to secure everything, so whenever our app will ask the OS to provide a hardware protected storage for the data, the app will get it.
The all above applies to the stock Android as well, and apps trust such systems. The only difference here is that app developers know that Android and Linux kernel are open source and anyone can modify them and flash into the phone. Now, how an app can ensure it runs on the OS that can be trusted? The app can do that by checking whether the OS is rooted or not. If it's rooted, the OS is certainly somehow modified. The app's devs are assuming that highly privileged modified OS can fake/emulate secure storage and steal the app's data from the less privileged app.
If you wish here is an analogy: Windows is a Ritz Hotel and Android is AirBnB. While they are serving the same purpose: host you as a guest, they are different, and you'll deal with them differently as a guest. Ritz has reputation, a license to run a business, and no one can fake a Ritz hotel. When you stop in a Ritz hotel, you can 100% be sure you can trust it and there are no hidden cameras in rooms as well as you can expect a decent service. Absolutely different story with AirBnB. In AirBnB everyone can be a host, and this brings a problem with a trust to a random person. Once you stop in Airbnb apartments, you highly likely will try to find a hidden camera to understand whether you can trust the host or not.
PS: as per my knowledge, some banking apps aren't running on rooted phones due to same reasons
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
That is all hogwash. They harass owners of mobile devices *because they can*, which is exclusively connected to expectation and not security.
As for your example of a custom compiled kernel, THAT IS NOT ROOT. That's just a custom compiled kernel.
96carboard said:
As for your example of a custom compiled kernel, THAT IS NOT ROOT. That's just a custom compiled kernel.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It’s not a “just”. Kernel is the most privileged part of the whole system and “just custom compiled” for app developers means “it’s no longer a kernel signed by the manufacturers we trust as they have contracts with vendors supplying a DRM subsystem and this unknown kernel has endless power over the system and who knows how it was altered”. Thus “just custom compiled android” with “just root functionality” is the same thing from the app’s perspective. Google for “android verified boot” and you’ll learn why “just custom compiled kernel” breaks the chain of trust.
PS: in past I was a developer of a linux multimedia devices that had supported the same thing to play drm media. Without proper drm support which requires a verified boot no one will allow you to join the US media market and import your devices. If Hulu app would allow to play a licensed content on devices without drm+verified boot — the Hulu immediately would be kicked out from the market by other players.
burned-donut said:
tl;dr; because android and Linux are open source
Whenever the app is starting either in windows or android, the only thing it can reach out it's an operating system. The app has almost no privileges over the OS while the OS has ALL over the app. Since the app wants to work with its own data that shouldn't be leaked, the app somehow must ensure it can trust the highly privileged OS before it brings the data into it. How an app can ensure? Well, with certain assumptions it can.
Windows is a proprietary OS with proprietary drivers. All drivers and critical binaries in the OS are passing Microsoft's signing to ensure they aren't modified and their developers are known. OS and drivers are all binaries which makes them hard to be modified or at least such modification would require abnormal resources like expertise, time, money, and knowledge. Windows passes different certifications, security audits, and under permanent attention from security researches. Such things as audits are trying to ensure the OS applies all available security measures and is using available hardware to protect the system and apps from intrusion/modification, thus enterprises trust it. Considering the all above, you, as an app developer, can easily assume: I can trust Windows as its binaries can be hardly modified as it leverages hardware to secure everything, so whenever our app will ask the OS to provide a hardware protected storage for the data, the app will get it.
The all above applies to the stock Android as well, and apps trust such systems. The only difference here is that app developers know that Android and Linux kernel are open source and anyone can modify them and flash into the phone. Now, how an app can ensure it runs on the OS that can be trusted? The app can do that by checking whether the OS is rooted or not. If it's rooted, the OS is certainly somehow modified. The app's devs are assuming that highly privileged modified OS can fake/emulate secure storage and steal the app's data from the less privileged app.
If you wish here is an analogy: Windows is a Ritz Hotel and Android is AirBnB. While they are serving the same purpose: host you as a guest, they are different, and you'll deal with them differently as a guest. Ritz has reputation, a license to run a business, and no one can fake a Ritz hotel. When you stop in a Ritz hotel, you can 100% be sure you can trust it and there are no hidden cameras in rooms as well as you can expect a decent service. Absolutely different story with AirBnB. In AirBnB everyone can be a host, and this brings a problem with a trust to a random person. Once you stop in Airbnb apartments, you highly likely will try to find a hidden camera to understand whether you can trust the host or not.
PS: as per my knowledge, some banking apps aren't running on rooted phones due to same reasons
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
A custom kernel is not the same thing as root. In classic Linux and UNIX, root is a user account that can do pretty much anything (even delete the entire OS if you know what flags to pass to rm, I will not go into what they are). Root is present on a lot of Linux distros until disabled, and all variants of BSD.
Next time do your research before acting like you know what you're talking about, there will always be someone who actually knows that will take you down a peg.
dragynbane222 said:
A custom kernel is not the same thing as root.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
You didn't read my comment carefully. I did say:
burned-donut said:
Now, how an app can ensure it runs on the OS that can be trusted? The app can do that by checking whether the OS is rooted or not. If it's rooted, the OS is certainly somehow modified.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
The app doesn't care about the rooting itself, it has only concerns about whether it can trust the whole system or not. If the system is rooted → it came from an unverified source → it's likely somehow modified because it's open source → no trust. The rooting is only a red flag because none of stock Androids have it. Nowadays, there could be other options to check whether the chain of trust is broken or not, so apps could decline to work even if there is no rooting at all but custom kernel had broken the chain.
dragynbane222 said:
root is a user account that can do pretty much anything even delete the entire OS
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
That's no longer true. The Linux kernel (and Android particularly) has the SELinux subsystem that can be tuned up to prevent a root user from doing that. Kernel has absolute privileges, and kernel can manage what's allowed to the root user. Next time, do your research before acting like you know what you're talking about.
burned-donut said:
It’s not a “just”. Kernel is the most privileged part of the whole system and “just custom compiled” for app developers means “it’s no longer a kernel signed by the manufacturers we trust as they have contracts with vendors supplying a DRM subsystem and this unknown kernel has endless power over the system and who knows how it was altered”. Thus “just custom compiled android” with “just root functionality” is the same thing from the app’s perspective. Google for “android verified boot” and you’ll learn why “just custom compiled kernel” breaks the chain of trust.
PS: in past I was a developer of a linux multimedia devices that had supported the same thing to play drm media. Without proper drm support which requires a verified boot no one will allow you to join the US media market and import your devices. If Hulu app would allow to play a licensed content on devices without drm+verified boot — the Hulu immediately would be kicked out from the market by other players.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
What are you on about? That has nothing to do with this discussion.
burned-donut said:
it's likely somehow modified because it's open source
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Being open source has NOTHING AT ALL to do with whether or not it is modified.
96carboard said:
Being open source has NOTHING AT ALL to do with whether or not it is modified.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Sorry, no wish to continue a discussion after such confident but fallacy statement. Good luck.