[Q] Google Legal Investigations... WTF!!! - Samsung Galaxy Nexus

um I'm 16 and have no about the law or what any of this mean, can someone tell me if i need to do anything please...
Hello,
Google has received a subpoena seeking information related to Android
applications that may have been made available on alternative markets
without the consent of the developer. The subpoena seeks information
about those Android applications, including contact information for the
developers of the applications. Our records show that your Android
developer account will be included in the information Google will provide
in response to this subpoena.
Google is not in a position to provide you with legal advice or discuss
the substance of the process in our possession. For more information
about the subpoena, you may wish to contact the Federal Bureau of
Investigation -- Atlanta Field Office at (404) 679-9000, reference #
2011R00320/FBI/ORKIN.
Regards,
Google Legal Investigations Support
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Click to collapse

http://www.androidcentral.com/fbi-investigating-android-apps-gathering-developer-information-google

I'd start by contacting google.

thanks for the responses, i Skyped the FBI this morning in collage, they said they didn't want Google sending these emails out and not to worry about it XD

That just means the FBI wanted to do their investigations without anyone knowing, but Google blew the whistle.. why would you suddenly not worry about it if it worried you initially?

There are shady markets selling pirated apps w/o developer's permission. There's an investigation, and because you have a developer account you're being included in that.

Kookas said:
That just means the FBI wanted to do their investigations without anyone knowing, but Google blew the whistle.. why would you suddenly not worry about it if it worried you initially?
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i was worried because i had no idea what it meant.

The strange thing about it is why would the FBI or any law enforcement agency want a secret subpoena for information about the *victim* of a crime they're investigating? EG, if Gucci shoes were being copied and sold, why would they get a secret subpoena against Gucci? Doesn't add up.

Related

Pls let someone explain!

I wonder why some apps require access to gps/my location and phone calls although they are not supposed to be in need of them, for instance some games like toss-it etc. Internet access may be required because of ads, and system tools for using the accelerometer sensor. That's it!
Really appreciate a reasonable, concrete response to this query as I principally refuse such apps as soon as I see such irrelevant demand on access although actually want to get them.
Sent from my HTC Desire using XDA App
I doubt that anyone can give you a definitive answer on this one, because it is going to be application dependent.
The whole point is that when you install an application, you review the list of permissions that it is requesting and then make a judgement as to whether you deem these to be acceptable or not. For example, if I were to download an application a video player, I wouldn't generally expect it to require location information and/or involve services that cost me money (e.g. sending SMS's), so I would refuse permissions for that app.
Regards,
Dave
Google or we -users/customers/cunsomers or whatever you may call- should request developers/sellers to specify why the particular app requires such accesses. They must include some clarifying statements in descriptions.
Personally I think I have right to know that, so that -more or less- we can keep us away from malicious softwares.
Sent from my HTC Desire using XDA App
iLHaNroID said:
Google or we -users/customers/cunsomers or whatever you may call- should request developers/sellers to specify why the particular app requires such accesses. They must include some clarifying statements in descriptions.
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Given that you can install applications from a non-Market source, this would be impossible to police for the most part. It could be implemented within the Market, but since you can submit apps to the Market without peer review, anyone submitting an application could post gibberish or blatant lies instead of clear statements.
Apple get around this by forcing all applications to undergo peer review, but then you only get to see the saccharin sweet Apple view of the world. Unfortunately, the threat of malware is the price you pay for an open system.
Regards,
Dave

Warning from Glu mobile

I am quite worried about what Glu mobile sniffs from my tablet. I use the latest stock firmware, not even root, spent some time in playing their game Bombshells: Hell's Bella, and found that their Career points system is not working since they released it few months back.
So I emailed their support, their replies are quite impolite and simply assumed me to be a cheater. I tried to email them several times and told them that is potentially a bug in their software, but below is the reply I just got from them (including ignore me several times).
I would like to report this rough developer to Google, but not sure how, any suggestions please? I am even happy to let Google check my Nexus7.
Response Via Email (Stan) 01/24/2013
We found unusual activities unauthorized cheat, tool or exploit in our game. Your account is flagged for abuse.
If we detect any further activity of this kind, we will take further measures against you including, but not limited to, revoking of your license to use Glu games. Please review our terms of use at this link:
www dot glu dot com/terms
Your compliance with all provisions of our terms of use is required in order to continue using Glu’s products.
Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation.
Regards,
Glu Mobile Customer Care
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If I were you I'd delete and make a new account. What happened is that someone likely hacked your account and is doing things under your account name. Happens all the time with Mobile games.
I'd tell them to ban it. Then create a new one if you like. IMO, glu games suck and are always looking for intrusive permissions or depend on users spending real world $.
Sent from my Nexus 7 using XDA Premium HD app

Warning about TextSecure App: Possible Compromised Development

Some of us use Textsecure as replacement for Stock SMS app. Textsecure provides encryption for your SMS. However, my recommendation is: stay away or at least don't update to 2.X... versions.
The developer has introduced Google Cloud Messaging, which means that even if your sms are secure, the fact you are using the app will be recorded in Google Centralized database. In addition, he removed the ability of the user to regenerate new identity key. In last couple of releases, he forced the user to allow the app to contact the internet (otherwise, the app would crash). That is even if you compile the app from sources, which I did a couple of hours ago. If you download the app from Store, you can't even use it without Google account and GSF, the latter will record your every keystroke including the password used to encrypt the messages. In further addition, the app is only available through Googleplay and the developer is actively resisting third party distribution. If that is not enough, you should know that Whisper systems is owned by Twitter, which is a red flag in of itself. The code is growing larger and is more difficult to examine for back door purposes.
My advice: stay away from this development, which in my view is compromised...
Edit. In January of this year, the developer left Twitter. Interestingly, he is still working on Textsecure and it is published under Whisper, which is Twitter. About the same time, all those things described above started to happen. Also interesting is that the developer was put on federal watch list and was continuously harrased by various agencies when flying. So, I wouldn't be surprised to learn that his new employer is the previous harraser...
All more reasons to stay away from this app.
optimumpro said:
Some of us use Textsecure as replacement for Stock SMS app. Textsecure provides encryption for your SMS. However, my recommendation is: stay away or at least don't update to 2.X... versions.
The developer has introduced Google Cloud Messaging, which means that even if your sms are secure, the fact you are using the app will be recorded in Google Centralized database. In addition, he removed the ability of the user to regenerate new identity key. In last couple of releases, he forced the user to allow the app to contact the internet (otherwise, the app would crash). That is even if you compile the app from sources, which I did a couple of hours ago. If you download the app from Store, you can't even use it without Google account and GSF, the latter will record your every keystroke including the password used to encrypt the messages. In further addition, the app is only available through Googleplay and the developer is actively resisting third party distribution. If that is not enough, you should know that Whisper systems is owned by Twitter, which is a red flag in of itself. The code is growing larger and is more difficult to examine for back door purposes.
My advice: stay away from this development, which in my view is compromised...
Edit. In January of this year, the developer left Twitter. Interestingly, he is still working on Textsecure and it is published under Whisper, which is Twitter. About the same time, all those things described above started to happen. Also interesting is that the developer was put on federal watch list and was continuously harrased by various agencies when flying. So, I wouldn't be surprised to learn that his new employer is the previous harraser...
All more reasons to stay away from this app.
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And here is some more fresh evidence. Today I posted this info on Cyanogen site related to Textsecure Push for CM.
http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/whisperpush-secure-messaging-integration
The site says it is neither censored no monitored. Within 5 minutes, the post has disappeared... . So, stay away from this app as the development has been compromised. In my view, of course...
You have no clue what youre talking about.
Corndude said:
You have no clue what youre talking about.
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Thanks, pal... for a very, very thorough, thoughtful and factual argument.
Edit: by the way, what does no gapps project have to do with textsecure being compromised?
Thanks for the heads up. Something is really amiss, and I won't want to directly experience it. I'm staying away from TextSecure for sure.
abdelazeez said:
Thanks for the heads up. Something is really amiss, and I won't want to directly experience it. I'm staying away from TextSecure for sure.
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Most messenger apps today work with Google Push Notifications, seems to be no problem for people there. Funny that it is here. As for SMS, I would never use that through another app. Besides, the phone carrier companies save those probably too, whats so different with that you said ? Text Secure is a very nice app I think. Right now people on iOS don't have that app yet, which makes it hard to establish in mixed system userbases among people. But I hope that will change.
Besides, most people here probably use Twitter. Funny to complain about something that might be related to Twitter then, isn't it ?
Wolfseye
wpkwolfseye said:
Most messenger apps today work with Google Push Notifications, seems to be no problem for people there. Funny that it is here. As for SMS, I would never use that through another app. Besides, the phone carrier companies save those probably too, whats so different with that you said ? Text Secure is a very nice app I think. Right now people on iOS don't have that app yet, which makes it hard to establish in mixed system userbases among people. But I hope that will change.
Besides, most people here probably use Twitter. Funny to complain about something that might be related to Twitter then, isn't it ?
Wolfseye
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The difference is that Textsecure/Whisperpush/CMpush tell you your SMS are encrypted. If they are indeed encrypted and there are no backdoors, your carrier (and others) can only get encrypted SMS (good luck to them trying to decipher). All other SMS apps are in plain text. In my view earlier versions of Textsecure are indeed secure. Starting from version 2.X, we no longer know that considering all the facts I mentioned in the OP.
You should really get your facts straight. Twitter bought Whisper Systems in 2011, mainly to get Moxie and the other Whisper Systems folks to work for them.
Moxie went on to lead Twitters security team. Twitter allowed them a month or so after they aquired Whisper Systems to open source their apps TextSecure and RedPhone. In January 2013 Moxie left Twitter and started Open Whisper Systems with a few others. They took the newly open sourced apps and developed them further.
This is also covered in their FAQ.
You can see all of their code on GitHub.
And if you don't have GAPPS installed, you will simply get a message that you won't be able to use push messages and that's it. Several friends of mine use it for SMS only, with Xprivacy restricting the internet access. It doesn't crash or anything.
If you experience this, you may either have a problem with your build or it's a bug specific to your device/Android version.
Moxie also wrote exactly why he doesn't want TextSecure to be released via F-Droid: for security reasons. They use central signing, which may very well compromise the update channel.
The whole discussion can be found in the most infamous thread in their GitHub: #127
lindworm said:
You should really get your facts straight. Twitter bought Whisper Systems in 2011, mainly to get Moxie and the other Whisper Systems folks to work for them.
Moxie went on to lead Twitters security team. Twitter allowed them a month or so after they aquired Whisper Systems to open source their apps TextSecure and RedPhone. In January 2013 Moxie left Twitter and started Open Whisper Systems with a few others. They took the newly open sourced apps and developed them further.
This is also covered ir FAQ.
You can see all of their code on GitHub.
And if you don't have GAPPS installed, you will simply get a message that you won't be able to use push messages and that's it. Several friends of mine use it for SMS only, with Xprivacy restricting the internet access. It doesn't crash or anything.
If you experience this, you may either have a problem with your build or it's a bug specific to your device/Android version.
Moxie also wrote exactly why he doesn't want TextSecure to be released via F-Droid: for security reasons. They use central signing, which may very well compromise the update channel.
The whole discussion can be found in the most infamous thread in their GitHub: #127
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Click to collapse
Which fact did I not get straight? You can't get the app anywhere other than from Googleplay and for Googleplay you need GSF, which records your every keystroke. And by the way, try to restrict getnetworkinfo in internet settings in Xprivacy and the app will crash as soon as you try to open a conversation (checked on several devices). And why was it necessary to prevent users from generating new identity key? Why not have an app available on Whisper's github, as many devs do. And by the way, I asked the same questions on github and f-droid threads and in response got a suggestion to build an equivalent of Google's GCM, so then Moxie would stop using Google.
optimumpro said:
Which fact did I not get straight? You can't get the app anywhere other than from Googleplay and for Googleplay you need GSF, which records your every keystroke. And by the way, try to restrict getnetworkinfo in internet settings in Xprivacy and the app will crash as soon as you try to open a conversation (checked on several devices). And why was it necessary to prevent users from generating new identity key? Why not have an app available on Whisper's github, as many devs do. And by the way, I asked the same questions on github and f-droid threads and in response got a suggestion to build an equivalent of Google's GCM, so then Moxie would stop using Google.
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You are not even trying to learn/understand why things are done the way they are done, but instead chose to blast an open source project by a security expert who has spoken at defcon various times and who is on a national security list and gets severely hassled by the TSA every time he tries to travel because of his involvement with secure communication projects.
You don't show the slightest form of objectiveness either. The truth content of what you are writing varies between "flat out wrong" and "there is a reason for how they do it that way, which you either didn't care to research or willingly ignored".
1. You can sideload the apk either from http://apps.evozi.com/apk-downloader/ or any of the dozens of sites that mirror packages from the app store.
They do not provide apks because it is a security risk: there is no automated upgrade channel from where a user can get a new version which may fix serious security flaws.
Everybody who is able to compile from source however should understand the importance of updating regularly and can do so on his/her own.
Moxie stated all of that in the github ticket I linked to.
2. GSF doesn't record your keystrokes.
3. If you had bothered to look it up, getNetworkInfo returns if a certain interface (like wifi) is used for internet.
This leaks no interesting information whatsoever. And it especially doesn't mean that TextSecure doesn't work without internet, because this permission does not give an app internet access. Xprivacy actually expects this behaviour by apps, that's why those fields are by default not restricted even if you restrict internet access of an app.
The program crashes without this, because it expects to get a needed value returned, which you chose to block. This is not something they willingly built in, to stop you from using it without Google Play.
If you can't manage the complexity of the permissions, you should use a simple firewall like AFwall+ to restrict internet access.
4. This was probably removed because it doesn't add any significant security and adds clutter to the user interface, because average users have no idea what it's for. The identity keys you are talking about are long term identity keys. TextSecure uses different keys in every message and actually uses the most secure protocol I know of. It has excellent forward secrecy, future secrecy and deniability. More so than OTR, which it is derived from.
You can learn more about that in their blog:
https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting/
5. You asked them to not use the only free world wide push network that has contracts with all major providers to not kill idle TCP connections.
Moxie always answered that they would love to use something else, but none exists. And that they don't have the resources to build a push network themselves.
This is all in the comments to https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-new-textsecure/ and on ycombinator:
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfxhm?context=3
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfrv0?context=3
They are however working on using emails as identifiers and websockets as an alternative to GCM. Websockets are already implemented on the server side and people are working on the client side.
Right now you can use encrypted SMS without GCM, no problem at all. If you want to use it over the internet, you can help to speed up the websocket development:
https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/issues/1000
lindworm said:
You are not even trying to learn/understand why things are done the way they are done, but instead chose to blast an open source project by a security expert who has spoken at defcon various times and who is on a national security list and gets severely hassled by the TSA every time he tries to travel because of his involvement with secure communication projects.
You don't show the slightest form of objectiveness either. The truth content of what you are writing varies between "flat out wrong" and "there is a reason for how they do it that way, which you either didn't care to research or willingly ignored".
1. You can sideload the apk either from http://apps.evozi.com/apk-downloader/ or any of the dozens of sites that mirror packages from the app store.
They do not provide apks because it is a security risk: there is no automated upgrade channel from where a user can get a new version which may fix serious security flaws.
Everybody who is able to compile from source however should understand the importance of updating regularly and can do so on his/her own.
Moxie stated all of that in the github ticket I linked to.
2. GSF doesn't record your keystrokes.
3. If you had bothered to look it up, getNetworkInfo returns if a certain interface (like wifi) is used for internet.
This leaks no interesting information whatsoever. And it especially doesn't mean that TextSecure doesn't work without internet, because this permission does not give an app internet access. Xprivacy actually expects this behaviour by apps, that's why those fields are by default not restricted even if you restrict internet access of an app.
The program crashes without this, because it expects to get a needed value returned, which you chose to block. This is not something they willingly built in, to stop you from using it without Google Play.
If you can't manage the complexity of the permissions, you should use a simple firewall like AFwall+ to restrict internet access.
4. This was probably removed because it doesn't add any significant security and adds clutter to the user interface, because average users have no idea what it's for. The identity keys you are talking about are long term identity keys. TextSecure uses different keys in every message and actually uses the most secure protocol I know of. It has excellent forward secrecy, future secrecy and deniability. More so than OTR, which it is derived from.
You can learn more about that in their blog:
https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/
https://whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting/
5. You asked them to not use the only free world wide push network that has contracts with all major providers to not kill idle TCP connections.
Moxie always answered that they would love to use something else, but none exists. And that they don't have the resources to build a push network themselves.
This is all in the comments to https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-new-textsecure/ and on ycombinator:
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfxhm?context=3
https://pay.reddit.com/r/Android/co..._cyanogenmod_is_integrating/cdyfrv0?context=3
They are however working on using emails as identifiers and websockets as an alternative to GCM. Websockets are already implemented on the server side and people are working on the client side.
Right now you can use encrypted SMS without GCM, no problem at all. If you want to use it over the internet, you can help to speed up the websocket development:
https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/issues/1000
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Your original statement was that I got my facts wrong. Since you have not cited any instance where I came up with a wrong fact, I will address your opinions.
Number one: you say GSF does not record keystrokes. How do you know? Have you seen the source (which is closed)? If you did, you work for Google and then everything you say is propaganda that has zero factual value. If you don't, then you are just speculating. You pick whichever is worse. If you use Google proprietary blobs, your device is totally open and there is no security measure/app on earth that is effective against this. That GSF phones home at regular intervals and transmits data there is a known fact. You can use encryption from Mars and yet it won't work because raw data (before encryption) is open to Google. As another user noted, having GSF and other closed source apps is like having a lock installed on your house door and not knowing who has access to it besides you.
Number two: inability to generate new identity key: It was there for a reason, the same way PGP or GPG keys have the ability to be limited in time, revoked or regenerated. It is a good security standard and removing it represents weakening. Clutter? LOL. A regular user wouldn't even be able to find it. Certainly, it does not pop up anywhere, one has to find it.
Number three: Sideload or compiling: a regular user will do neither, he/she will simply download the app from the market, which means he has to have Google blobs. Or you are suggesting that users should download the app from the market and then remove GSF and other Googleapps? LOL again.
As I said earlier, Moxie's argument that allowing third party apps on your device is a greater security risk than having closed source blobs is wrong and grand BS (especially coming from someone who is considered a security expert). It is security through obscurity, which is no security at all. The value of his open source project is completely defeated by having closed source blobs by a known private branch of known three letter agencies.
Now, these are facts. Let's get to opinions. I think that this deliberate weakening of security (again coming from a security expert) is a strong indication that development and/or developer has been compromised. And that is why I recommend to stay away from this app. But that is just my opinion, which is nonetheless based on facts.
optimumpro said:
Your original statement was that I got my facts wrong. Since you have not cited any instance where I came up with a wrong fact, I will address your opinions.
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Do you even read what I write?
If that is not enough, you should know that Whisper systems is owned by Twitter, which is a red flag in of itself.
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As I explained he does now work there any more.
You seem to have noticed that too:
Edit. In January of this year, the developer left Twitter. Interestingly, he is still working on Textsecure and it is published under Whisper, which is Twitter.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Are you kidding me? How the flying **** did you get to this conclusion? The company that was bought by twitter was Whisper Systems.
They are publishing the new source under Open Whisper Systems. (none of those was ever called Whisper)
See the difference? They also state this here: http://support.whispersystems.org/customer/portal/articles/1474591-is-textsecure-owned-by-twitter-
And here is some more fresh evidence. Today I posted this info on Cyanogen site related to Textsecure Push for CM.
http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/whis...ng-integration
The site says it is neither censored no monitored. Within 5 minutes, the post has disappeared... . So, stay away from this app as the development has been compromised. In my view, of course...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
So you are saying CyanogenMod is part of this grand conspiracy of yours? Come on...
GSF, which records your every keystroke.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Number one: you say GSF does not record keystrokes. How do you know? Have you seen the source (which is closed)? If you did, you work for Google and then everything you say is propaganda that has zero factual value. If you don't, then you are just speculating. You pick whichever is worse. If you use Google proprietary blobs, your device is totally open and there is no security measure/app on earth that is effective against this. That GSF phones home at regular intervals and transmits data there is a known fact. You can use encryption from Mars and yet it won't work because raw data (before encryption) is open to Google. As another user noted, having GSF and other closed source apps is like having a lock installed on your house door and not knowing who has access to it besides you.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's a binary blob and it sends data to google, but you have no proof whatsoever if it records keystrokes. You can know if you want to tough. Decompile it and analyze it. I don't like binary blobs, but you can't just say they do something without having any proof. I may not be able to guarantee that they don't do something, because I have not personally decompiled and analyzed every bit of it, but until you have and have proof that it does do something you can't just claim it does.
Number two: inability to generate new identity key: It was there for a reason, the same way PGP or GPG keys have the ability to be limited in time, revoked or regenerated. It is a good security standard and removing it represents weakening. Clutter? LOL. A regular user wouldn't even be able to find it. Certainly, it does not pop up anywhere, one has to find it.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It is not something the average user should have access to, for several reasons. The TextSecure V2 protocol is NOT comparable with PGP/GPG because it has forward secrecy and deniability. The keys that are actually used to encrypt a message are not static as with PGP.
They are derived from the original keys and are changed with every message. No need to change them after X days/months/years.
Even if one key is intercepted, you would only be able to decrypt one message and not every message as it is the case with PGP.
If you get a new key, all your contacts get alerts that your key changed and that somebody may be listening in. That's not something the average user should be exposed to. If you think for whatever reason that you really want to do this, back up your conversations, uninstall TextSecure, install it again, import the backup and you have your new key.
Number three: Sideload or compiling: a regular user will do neither, he/she will simply download the app from the market, which means he has to have Google blobs. Or you are suggesting that users should download the app from the market and then remove GSF and other Googleapps? LOL again.
As I said earlier, Moxie's argument that allowing third party apps on your device is a greater security risk than having closed source blobs is wrong and grand BS (especially coming from someone who is considered a security expert). It is security through obscurity, which is no security at all. The value of his open source project is completely defeated by having closed source blobs by a known private branch of known three letter agencies.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Every average user has the google blobs, because they are preinstalled on nearly every phone and it's nearly unusable without them. This app is supposed to make encryption available to the masses.
Google may be undermined by your beloved three letter agencies, but it's not one of them. This is not to hide from them.
You have your threat model wrong.
No app alone can ever protect you from those agencies. They have hundreds of 0days for every platform and will simply own your Android, open source or not.
And this is not what TextSecure tries to do. They protect the content of every conversation with extremely strong encryption, no matter what the transport is. This does protect you from dragnet surveillance. But they can not protect you from someone who targets you and is willing to spend hundreds of thousands or millions to break into your operating systems.
If the NSA really wants you they get you, period. But TextSecure protects you from theives, cyber criminals and nearly everybody else who wants to read your messages.
You say you think the encrypted SMS mode was safe? With this your provider (and thus your government and every agency that wants it) has all the metadata. Who sent something to whom etc.
Google on the other hand has actually LESS meta data, because your phone sends the message to the TextSecure server, which relays the message to GCM. GCM then delivers the message. Because everything is encrypted none of the servers get contact data. But google only gets the receiver, not the sender. Your provider gets everything.
A global passive adversary may still do time corellation attacks, by listening who sends something when and who receives something at this time. After some sessions it's pretty clear who is talking to whom. It doesn't matter if Google is evil or not in this case. They get the metadata if they want to.
If you want protection against something like this take a look at pond, or meet i person: https://github.com/agl/pond
Now, these are facts. Let's get to opinions. I think that this deliberate weakening of security (again coming from a security expert) is a strong indication that development and/or developer has been compromised. And that is why I recommend to stay away from this app. But that is just my opinion, which is nonetheless based on facts.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
As I explained there is no weakening whatsoever. Even if you consider google the adversary, they get less meta data than your SMS provider.
You can use this exactly as before without the google blobs if you want to.
They are actively working on a way to get away from the play store and GCM by building their own distribution method (which is finished, but not yet released, see #127 in their github) and implementing Websockets (server works, client is on the way).
Before you start slamming something you should really understand how it works, or ask if you understood it correctly.
lindworm said:
Do you even read what I write?
As I explained he does now work there any more.
You seem to have noticed that too:
Are you kidding me? How the flying **** did you get to this conclusion? The company that was bought by twitter was Whisper Systems.
They are publishing the new source under Open Whisper Systems. (none of those was ever called Whisper)
See the difference? They also state this here: http://support.whispersystems.org/customer/portal/articles/1474591-is-textsecure-owned-by-twitter-
So you are saying CyanogenMod is part of this grand conspiracy of yours? Come on...
It's a binary blob and it sends data to google, but you have no proof whatsoever if it records keystrokes. You can know if you want to tough. Decompile it and analyze it. I don't like binary blobs, but you can't just say they do something without having any proof. I may not be able to guarantee that they don't do something, because I have not personally decompiled and analyzed every bit of it, but until you have and have proof that it does do something you can't just claim it does.
It is not something the average user should have access to, for several reasons. The TextSecure V2 protocol is NOT comparable with PGP/GPG because it has forward secrecy and deniability. The keys that are actually used to encrypt a message are not static as with PGP.
They are derived from the original keys and are changed with every message. No need to change them after X days/months/years.
Even if one key is intercepted, you would only be able to decrypt one message and not every message as it is the case with PGP.
If you get a new key, all your contacts get alerts that your key changed and that somebody may be listening in. That's not something the average user should be exposed to. If you think for whatever reason that you really want to do this, back up your conversations, uninstall TextSecure, install it again, import the backup and you have your new key.
Every average user has the google blobs, because they are preinstalled on nearly every phone and it's nearly unusable without them. This app is supposed to make encryption available to the masses.
Google may be undermined by your beloved three letter agencies, but it's not one of them. This is not to hide from them.
You have your threat model wrong.
No app alone can ever protect you from those agencies. They have hundreds of 0days for every platform and will simply own your Android, open source or not.
And this is not what TextSecure tries to do. They protect the content of every conversation with extremely strong encryption, no matter what the transport is. This does protect you from dragnet surveillance. But they can not protect you from someone who targets you and is willing to spend hundreds of thousands or millions to break into your operating systems.
If the NSA really wants you they get you, period. But TextSecure protects you from theives, cyber criminals and nearly everybody else who wants to read your messages.
You say you think the encrypted SMS mode was safe? With this your provider (and thus your government and every agency that wants it) has all the metadata. Who sent something to whom etc.
Google on the other hand has actually LESS meta data, because your phone sends the message to the TextSecure server, which relays the message to GCM. GCM then delivers the message. Because everything is encrypted none of the servers get contact data. But google only gets the receiver, not the sender. Your provider gets everything.
A global passive adversary may still do time corellation attacks, by listening who sends something when and who receives something at this time. After some sessions it's pretty clear who is talking to whom. It doesn't matter if Google is evil or not in this case. They get the metadata if they want to.
If you want protection against something like this take a look at pond, or meet i person: https://github.com/agl/pond
As I explained there is no weakening whatsoever. Even if you consider google the adversary, they get less meta data than your SMS provider.
You can use this exactly as before without the google blobs if you want to.
They are actively working on a way to get away from the play store and GCM by building their own distribution method (which is finished, but not yet released, see #127 in their github) and implementing Websockets (server works, client is on the way).
Before you start slamming something you should really understand how it works, or ask if you understood it correctly.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
"Decompile GSF"
You are kidding. Aren't you? If one can examine closed source the same way as open one, then all problems would be solved. And by the way, there would be no point in having proprietary software. Would it? Of course Java is easier to reverse engineer, but want to try Oracle's java?
"Google" Google has root access to your device: It can pull/install any application without you noticing it. They can install another version of TextSecure with backdoors. They can do whatever they want or told to. So, if you have Google, there is no point in any security at all. And when a developer forces users to have Google for his app to work, that's no security at all.
Cyanogenmode/Conspiracy? There is no conspiracy. The US has a law that requires providers to have back doors in their software/hardware for law enforcement, and there are wild claims (by those who know (and don't) what they are talking about) of TextSecure as "weapon" against this kind of surveillance. And that is pure bull. All that the app can provide is the false sense of security, while in reality making users more transparent to surveillance.
Phone service providers vs. internet: when you use Textsecure as a pure sms app, your provider gets gibberish, but they have no way of knowing what you are using. With GCM/GSF/Googleplay, they know exactly what you are doing, as you are marked as using this particular app. So, Moxie is making life of "survaillors" much easier.
Thanks for telling me to uninstall the app if I want to generate new key. So, if I do it this way, you think my contacts won't receive a message that my key has changed?
Here is how I began to suspect foul play: First I noticed the app wanted access to the internet, then I discovered that I can no longer generate a new key, then I went to read about F-droid/Whisper problems. Then I read that he wants the app be available through Google only, because he cares about security and does not want users to allow third party apps (BS). Then I read about feds harassment. You think the 3 letter agencies wouldn't like to have him?
In my view, Moxie's arguments no longer make sense. And by the way, when he is against the wall, he tells you to create a world wide push service - alternative to GCM. LOL.
For me that's enough to stay away from the app. Others will decide accordingly...
Does anybody work on an alternativ push service in order to replace hard requirement on Google services for TextSecure, Redphone and lots of other useful apps?
I understand that GAPPS are needed to run textsecure.
Is it possible/ has anyone succeed to get it to run with the no GAPPS apps such as the blank store etc or is the app relying too much on google infrastructure?
i can use textsecure sms without internet. besides registering with push is not mandatory at all so the crash you've experienced must be a bug in the version of textsecure you're using. also why compare it to pgp/gpg? textsecure uses otr with improvements to deniability and forward secrecy. also textsecure supports mms (which uses internet).
if you're really that paranoid, avoid android at all and stop spreading FUD claiming it to be fact. i don't find the statement factual at all. it lacks any evidence (show us the code with the backdoor first).
and also avoid openguardian project too as they conspire with textsecure since they are recommending it.
and by the way, whisper and openwhisper are different.
It really is ashamed when misinformed people comment on things they do not have enough information to intelligently speak about. Especially when it discourages people from using an application that is one of the only current means of communicating over SMS in a secure manner. Is it perfect? Certainly not... Security and encryption are never perfect, and there will always be flaws to be found, but to insist that someone such as Moxie Marlinspike is somehow working against the security researcher community in some undercover role as an agent of the government or some corrupt company is really insulting. If you have some absolute proof, or even a reasonable solid suspicion, please share it, but otherwise do not taint these incredible people with false accusations. Learn a bit about encryption, reverse engineering, and packet inspection, and then come back and give an intelligent analysis of your findings of the application you suspect to be playing some nefarious role. Until then, your accusations are completely unfounded and damaging to the community as a whole. There are many people who have worked hard to make this product a reality, and I believe they should be praised for their efforts. Obviously these are my own opinions, and you are free to dismiss them outright as you have done to others in previous posts. In addition, I realize I am not an active member of the xda community, but I am an active member of the security/reverse engineering community. My job and nearly all of my free time is spent reverse engineering software and I see no basis for your accusations.
Here is more update on Textsecure: there was a major vulnerability found last October-November. And Moxie's response (not surprisingly) - fixing "feels pretty cumbersome" and "I dunno."
Also, Open Whisper is now accepted into the family of such a bastion of privacy, as Facebook (kids love it, NSA approves). So, If you had any doubt about this app before, now you can sleep well at night (sarcasm).
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/001029.html
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/001030.html
To those who like to attack the messenger ( I call them Google thugs or pacifier babies). One says decompile GSF, the other - false accusations and absolute proof?! Wake up and get the pacifier out of your mouth. There is no such thing in real life. I give you the dots, you can't connect them with the pacifier in your mouth.
Here is some more damning evidence that Textsecure is a totally compromised project no longer to be trusted: during 2013-2014 Open Whisper Systems received over $1.3 mln from BBG, which is an arm of US Government and its 3-letter-agencies.
http://pando.com/2015/03/01/internet-privacy-funded-by-spooks-a-brief-history-of-the-bbg/
So, Moxie, it appears, has turned from someone who was harrased by TSA in airports (presumably for a failure to cooperate with the government) to a receipient of major funds from the same government. I am not even talking about him getting a once in a life-time project to work on "securing" Facebook's What's up application. Pitty and shame...
Replacement for Textsecure
Here is a pure sms app, which replaces compromised Textsecure, as well as stock messaging. There is no over the internet messaging, no google binaries and no Google Services Framewor all closed sourse. In addition, starting from version 2.7, textsecure no longer encrypts SMS. Pitty.
Here is the latest version: http://forum.xda-developers.com/android/apps-games/sms-secure-aes-256-t3065165

Received a bunch of Lookout Detected Threats

I'm running MOAR v6.0 MD4 (Android 4.1.2) on Sprint GS3. I never received any alerts from Lookout before but today it report 15 riskware alerts:
com.android.phone
com.mythtrandyr.inkeffectsettings
com.lidroid.settings
com.sonyericsson.lockscreen.uxpnxt
com.jy.iconchanger.ad
de.robv.android.xposed.mods.appsettings
com.asushi.livewallpaper.mytree
com.monotype.android.font.XDAFONTS
com.android.launcher
de.robv.android.xposed.installer
com.android.flashblink
com.sec.android.mimage.photoretouching
com.koo.lightmanager
com.android.lmt
com.lidroid.sgs.secretcode
All have a classification of: Riskware.Android.CompromisedKey.a.
Should I alarmed or this is likely a problem with definition update from Lookout?
Great support from the Lookout guys as I emailed them and they replied right away, here's what they said. I should be okay:
The reason we have flagged this app is as 'Riskware' is due to a special key that this particular developer used when publishing the app. The key is normally a private piece of information that we use to determine if an app is authentic, and to identify the developer. In this particular situation, the developer chose to use a key that has been widely distributed on the internet or has been compromised.
This makes it impossible for us to validate the app and its authenticity. Therefore, we are not calling these apps malware, but we recommend that users not install apps like this because it is inherently more risky (hence the "Riskware" assessment).
If you as a user understands the risk and still decide to trust the app, feel free to ignore the warning.
We have also been seeing some device manufacturer, preinstalled apps also being flagged as 'Riskware' for the same reason. These apps are unable to be uninstalled and we please ask that you ignore the warning if it is an app that came preinstalled on the device. We have reached out to these developers to make the proper changes.
Thanks for using Lookout!
David,
The Lookout Team
mindfulness said:
Great support from the Lookout guys as I emailed them and they replied right away, here's what they said. I should be okay:
The reason we have flagged this app is as 'Riskware' is due to a special key that this particular developer used when publishing the app. The key is normally a private piece of information that we use to determine if an app is authentic, and to identify the developer. In this particular situation, the developer chose to use a key that has been widely distributed on the internet or has been compromised.
This makes it impossible for us to validate the app and its authenticity. Therefore, we are not calling these apps malware, but we recommend that users not install apps like this because it is inherently more risky (hence the "Riskware" assessment).
If you as a user understands the risk and still decide to trust the app, feel free to ignore the warning.
We have also been seeing some device manufacturer, preinstalled apps also being flagged as 'Riskware' for the same reason. These apps are unable to be uninstalled and we please ask that you ignore the warning if it is an app that came preinstalled on the device. We have reached out to these developers to make the proper changes.
Thanks for using Lookout!
David,
The Lookout Team
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
What effect will this have on CM builds because they are using public available keys (https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_build/tree/gingerbread/target/product/security) to sign ?

Block incoming calls from "no caller id"

Hello
Anyone know how to block all incoming connection where number is hidden "no caller id".
Is there built in feature or need download app ?
Thanks
Golempl said:
Hello
Anyone know how to block all incoming connection where number is hidden "no caller id".
Is there built in feature or need download app ?
Thanks
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I have "Call blacklist pro" for this, an Xposed module. The pro is that it's a very lightweight app, the con is that it's not supported anymore and you won't receive any additional features that would also be very much needed and appreciated. Unfortunately I've not found any valid replacement so far and if you need only basic feature that could be your app.
You can install Truecaller from Google Playstore - this application could block calls without ID and/or calls marked by community as scam/advertisements, it displays caller info provided by community. Give it a try
kondzi said:
You can install Truecaller from Google Playstore - this application could block calls without ID and/or calls marked by community as scam/advertisements, it displays caller info provided by community. Give it a try
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Just to inform readers, truecaller has some issues with respecting user privacy. Indeed many of these caller id programs have a buisness model that involves vacuuming up the information of both you and of those in your contacts. This may not be necessarily what the user desires, though it stated that this is the case in the EULA. My own search for an alternative is what brought me here.
See "How Caller ID Apps Like Truecaller Secretly Violate Your Privacy" by Dennis Z on fatsecurity.
reconmaster said:
Just to inform readers, truecaller has some issues with respecting user privacy. Indeed many of these caller id programs have a buisness model that involves vacuuming up the information of both you and of those in your contacts. This may not be necessarily what the user desires, though it stated that this is the case in the EULA. My own search for an alternative is what brought me here.
See "How Caller ID Apps Like Truecaller Secretly Violate Your Privacy" by Dennis Z on fatsecurity.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
thanks for showing up to inform us of this risk; this is horrifying, it should be circulated and Google should block this app on the play store. If Google doesn't I see it as an accomplice
Unfortunately, these egregious violations of privacy tend to manifest concurrently with certain approaches to software development business models. I generally prefer to use as much of the open-source variants in the F-Droid app store where such data collection attempts are transparent. I do enjoy some of the conveniences provided by google, so I concede they already have the aforementioned contact information.
As such, my current solution to the spam recognition is installing Google's phone app as my default call software. They've recently added access to a registery of known spam callers and you have the subsequent index of your own contacts. This seems a viable compromise giving the the fact Google already has that information be it via conacts or your email. I mainly need a solution to the fact the Federal Do-Not-Call list (US users) is now a joke when dealing the recent spike in various potential Nigerian prince schemery.
But to your original point, there is a degree of complicity in such a big-data business model. With this in mind, I prefer to limit the exposure of my personal info to 3rd parties. I'll try to help when possible when some developer's don't necessarily have their customer's best interest at heart.

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